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Allen Kassof, Assistant Professor of Sociology at Princeton University, spent the past academic year at the Swiss-Eastern Institute in Berne, doing research on Soviet sociology and trends in Soviet society. His study *The Soviet Youth Program* will be published late in 1964.

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Roger D. Masters, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University, recently edited a new translation of *The First and Second Discourses* by Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1964). He will spend the coming academic year in France, working on an analysis of Rousseau's political philosophy, and will subsequently return to the general problem of the theoretical comparison of primitive and international political systems.

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TRADITIONAL, MARKET, AND ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIETIES AND THE USSR

By T. H. RIGBY

THIS article represents an attempt to describe Soviet society, and particularly the Soviet political system, in terms of a typology of society based on modes of coordinating social activity. It is felt that this approach may be of value in pointing up both some of the similarities and some of the differences between Communist and non-Communist industrialized societies.[1]

Society arises from the possibility of achieving by combined effort ends which cannot, or cannot as well, be achieved by individual effort. Any combination of effort, however, whether it involves a division of functions or merely the collective performance of the same function, produces a problem of coordination. Human society exhibits three main modes of coordinating combined effort.

The most obvious of these is *command*. Command is a relationship in which one party is active and the other is passive in the determination of what is done. The complement of command is obedience. One actor formulates or transmits goals, assigns tasks, and prescribes methods; the other carries out his assigned tasks in the manner prescribed.

The second mode of coordinating social activity is *contract*. In contract, both parties are active, though not necessarily to the same degree, in determining what is done. Contract involves a commitment by each party to perform certain actions which have the effect of furthering the goals of both parties: these goals may be shared or separate. A mutual assistance pact between states, a business partnership, and a wage agreement between employers and workers are various examples of the coordination of activity on the basis of contract. A special and most important type of contract is the contract of sale.

[1] The conceptual framework employed here was suggested in the course of a critical study of Max Weber's typology of society based on forms of domination (*Herrschaft*), which will be reported elsewhere. An earlier version of this paper was read at a seminar on the sociology of power held at the Australian National University. Many matters touched on in the following pages involve thorny issues of historical interpretation, which must await examination in a more extended exposition of the writer's views, but it was felt that a general outline of the latter might be of some value at the present stage.

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The final mode of coordination is *custom*. In a purely customary relationship, both parties are passive in determining what is done. Objectives, roles, and methods are all "given." Like habit for the individual, custom economizes effort by providing standard solutions to recurrent problems. Like habits, customs tend to evolve from more or less deliberate solutions reached in the past: that is, they can often be regarded as routinized commands or contracts.

In amplification of this classification, three main points need to be made.

First, these three modes approach the problem of coordination from different angles, and it is possible for more than one of them to be brought into play in a particular segment of social activity. For example, on a feudal manor, the duties owed by the serf to his lord were prescribed by custom, but in carrying out these duties the serf was subject to the commands of the lord's steward.

Second, although there are many activities whose conduct *requires* one or another of these modes of coordination, there is a wide range of activities which can be conducted, though not necessarily equally effectively, on the basis of two or all of them.

The third point of amplification relates to the comparison of societies. It is probable that all three modes of coordination can be found to some degree in all societies. Nevertheless it does seem that one mode or another tends to predominate in most societies; and, further, that as societies become technologically more developed and more complex, coordination by contract and command tends to replace coordination by custom.

The tendency of one particular mode of coordination to predominate makes it possible to classify societies in terms of this criterion, and it will be useful to introduce such a classification into the discussion at this point. Custom-dominated societies will be called *traditional societies*; contract-dominated societies will be called *market societies*; and command-dominated societies will be called *organizational societies*. The terms chosen are rather arbitrary, and would require some discussion in a fuller exposition. They are intended to suggest the predominance of particular modes of coordination without implying that any society can be fully identified with a particular mode of coordination.

Traditional society in anything like its pure form did not long outlast the advance from food-gathering to food-production. The society of medieval Europe, while retaining a marked traditional quality, contained well-developed contractual features, especially in the regula-

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tion of relationships within the elites, and the role of command was also significant, notably in the military and ecclesiastical spheres.

The narrowing scope of custom and the expanding role of contract and command in the later Middle Ages were connected with the growth of two activities: trade, and the exercise of the central political authority of the state.

It is obvious that, once either the ramifications of the market or the command activities of the state spread beyond certain narrowly circumscribed limits, they will act as powerful solvents of the customary mode of coordination, because the latter depends on a constant environment, which can be relied upon to throw up only standard problems for which it has ready-made solutions. For the same reason, since both contract and command presuppose the possibility of *ad hoc* solutions, every customary relationship presents them with a potential obstacle. In Europe, everywhere from England to Muscovy, the state and the market went hand in hand and reinforced each other in undermining the traditional society of the Middle Ages. As both command and contract were expanded in scope beyond their old limits, they came into conflict not only with customs specific to their concrete field of operation, but with the whole legal, political, and ideological context within which these customs were set. The main theme of European history from the sixteenth to the twentieth century is the impact of the contractual and command spheres in refashioning this legal, political, and ideological context in their own image. The competition between these different modes of coordination was also reflected in conflicts of interest between the different segments of society based on them, and particularly their elites—the feudal nobility, the bourgeoisie, and the bureaucracy. Prominent bourgeois and bureaucrats not only struggled against the traditional privileges of the nobility, but sought admission to the nobility themselves, and thereby helped to transform it from within; or they went farther and sought to destroy and supplant the nobility as a class.

One further aspect of this process should be noted. As the spheres of contract and command increased, they soon met with obstacles set up by each other as well as by the older customary relationships. While the decline of custom was universal, countries came to manifest considerable variety in the relative weight of the three modes of coordination, and the way these were distributed through different areas of life. Here one might risk the generalization that, whereas in Eastern Europe the main heir to customary forms was command, in Northwestern Europe (and North America) it was contract.

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In pre-reform Russia, repeated expansion of the role of the state command-structure took the country a long way on the *direct route* to an organizational society. Important steps in this direction were the replacement of the traditional nobility, not by a bourgeoisie, but by a "service nobility" created by and dependent on the state; Peter the Great's "revolution from above"; and the defeat of the Decembrist revolt, which left the nobility as a class little more than a decorative but afunctional façade for the bureaucracy.

Nonetheless, Russia did not develop into a fully fledged organizational society until the twentieth century. This was partly due to deficiencies of ambition and resources, especially technical resources, and partly to the prolonged freezing of organizational forms at a fairly primitive level. Although command played the decisive role in many areas of life, including some sections of the economy, the most important section, agriculture, was still governed predominantly by custom. This helped to maintain the supremacy of the state command-structure by inhibiting the development of market relationships, but it did so at the price of crippling the organizational *resources* of the state itself. The abolition of serfdom in 1861 and Stolypin's reforms fifty years later, which promised the dissolution of the peasant commune, opened the way for a vast extension of *either* organizational *or* market relationships. The reforms of 1861 certainly gave a great fillip to the growth of contractual forms and of the bourgeoisie, and the market began to impinge on political life even before the granting of representative institutions. It expressed itself, for instance, in the struggles within the central bureaucracy at the end of the nineteenth century, when the Ministry of the Interior often spoke for landed interests and the Ministry of Finance for industrial interests. The creation of representative institutions after the 1905 revolution, with all their limitations, promised a further extension of contractual relationships; and these might well have assumed crucial importance within a generation or so if it had not been for Russia's involvement in the First World War. The collapse of the state command-structure as a result of the war opened up two possibilities: *either* a reassertion of the dominant organizational pattern of Russian society, its possibilities now enormously enhanced by the destruction of prematurely frozen organizational forms and of the traditional survivals in the economy, *or* a breakthrough by contractual forms and the bourgeoisie that would put Russia on the path to becoming a market society. In the event, it was the first of these possibilities which was realized.

The most distinctive feature of modern Western countries is the

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tremendous scope of contractual relationships—so much so that we are justified in describing these as market societies. The original focus of these contractual relationships was trade and access to revenue from land, and economic life has always provided the main dynamic for the spread of such relationships.

But the essence of a market is competition and choice, and the economic market is bound to be distorted by, and to struggle against, everything that obstructs choice and competition by prescribing obligatory roles, goals, or methods, either by custom or by command of state or other authorities. The economic market requires, and increasingly wins for itself, a market in ideas and a market in leaders. It is alien to the ascription of status, which cripples the market's role as determinant of the division of labor, and favorable to a doctrine of "inalienable rights" which guarantees to all some degree of autonomous participation in the market.

The ideal market would be one in which each individual is an autonomous and equal agent. But it is one of the ironies of history that the wider market relationships have spread in the modern Western world, the farther they have tended to depart from this ideal. The causes of this are the advantages of combination and scale in a market situation. Factory production, trade unions and employers' associations, and political parties are various responses to this situation in different fields of activity. In advanced market societies, the autonomously competing and contracting actors therefore tend more and more to be groups, rather than individuals. The more complete the elimination of traditional elements in such societies, and the narrower the scope of the command-structure of the state, the closer their politics will approach the model of our group theorists. Group theory may thus represent an appropriate method of analyzing the politics of such societies, but we must note the special conditions which make this so, conditions present only in rudimentary form, if at all, in other types of society.

Looked at from the point of view of its internal rather than its external relationships, each of these groups shows features of a "market" or an "organization" or a mixture of the two—that is to say, the relationships between its members may be based on contract or command or both. In production units organizational relationships predominate, whereas in organized interest groups market relationships play a much bigger part, and usually include internal competition between subgroups over the choice of aims, methods, and leaders. It is worth noting that greater cohesiveness and therefore often greater

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effectiveness of the group tend to arise from emphasis on the organizational rather than the market aspects in its internal relationships. If a trade union is to be an effective bargainer with employers, it must work for compulsory union membership and place its members under strong discipline in the case of a strike. And the greater the stress of competition to which the group is exposed, or the stronger the threat to its integrity or survival, the more its command-structure tends to be reinforced and the closer its internal market is constrained. We see this even in market societies taken as a whole. In wartime there is a wholesale replacement of coordination through contract by coordination through command, and predominantly market societies are transformed into proto-organizational societies. We see, then, that the spread of market relationships provides an umbrella, as it were, beneath which organizational relationships grow, just as the command-structure of the state at an earlier historical phase provided an umbrella for the growth of market relationships.

And a further apparent paradox: the growth of these organizational relationships does not always restrict the scope of contractual decisions, but may even expand them. For example, a strong trade-union organization, while narrowing the area of individual contract between employers and workers, may greatly widen the range of negotiable issues and cover a greater proportion of workers by negotiated contracts.

Nevertheless, the more the organizational forms grow within the womb, as Marx would say, of the market society, the greater the chances of the fully fledged organizational society's being born. Britain could not have been turned into an organizational society during the Crimean War. It could during the Second World War. There is thus an *indirect* route, as well as a direct one, to the organizational society.

Without necessarily implying a monogenetic theory of social change, one must note the peculiar importance here of technological advances (whether these are seen as motive impulse or simply as transmission belts of change). The possibilities opened up by improved technique were obviously of central importance in the transition from traditional to market societies. I have suggested that market relationships themselves have played a large part in the fostering of organizational forms: but at all stages, available technique has set limits to the growth of these forms. The advance of technology constantly opens up new possibilities for larger and more effective organization and gives those organizations which employ such technology an advantage in the competition of the market. But whereas in the transition to a market

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society it was technological changes in the field of *production* that were of greatest importance, in the transition to an organizational society the key role was played by advances in the techniques of *communication* and *transport.*

By the twentieth century it had become technically possible to run a large nation as a single organization. The pioneers in attempting this were Italy and Russia, although in both cases achievement fell well short of ambition, owing to the relative technical backwardness and largely agrarian economy of the two countries. Later it was taken up by Germany, to a lesser extent Japan, and during the Second World War by a group of English-speaking countries. In the latter, particularly in Britain, high technical levels combined with the experience accumulated by government agencies since the 1920's to produce a comprehensiveness of organizational coordination exceeding in important respects that yet achieved anywhere else. The resurgence of strong market elements in these societies since the war should warn us against taking for granted that the universalization of coordination by command is an inevitable process in contemporary human society. In the early postwar years Russia was for a time the only basically organizational society in existence, but the Communist regimes established along her eastern and western borders soon gave a strong organizational stamp to the society of these areas. The various societies identified above as "organizational" varied greatly not only in the purity of their organizational character but in the location and strength of residual market and traditional elements. Their transformation into organizational societies also followed a number of different patterns: a sudden vast extension of the range of activities coordinated by the state command-structure; a combination of violence and of manipulation of the political forms of the market society; the establishment of a miniature organizational society in one corner of the country and its extension by military conquest to the rest of the country, and so on. But in all cases what you had was a particular organization (the government, the party) taking over all other organizations within society, placing them under its command and eliminating market relations both between them and within them.

The organization which carried this out in Russia was of course the Bolshevik wing of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party. We are all familiar with the picture of the Bolsheviks as a clandestine, highly disciplined, and centralized organization aiming at the domination and manipulation of other organizations and ultimately of the state, and at employing this domination and manipulation to re-

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fashion society totally. While there is much truth in this picture and we should allot it considerable weight in explaining the genesis of Russia's organizational society, it is, as it stands, an oversimplification, and to lose sight of this is to run the danger of neglecting important contingent factors and of exaggerating the inevitability of later developments. For one thing, the Bolshevik leaders certainly had no "blueprint," as it were, for a system of overall command, and both the structure and the scope of the system were developed empirically. The most vivid illustration is what happened to the party command-structure after the seizure of power. Between November 1917 and March 1919 the party as an organization practically atrophied. Senior Bolsheviks were nearly all assigned to key posts in the hierarchy of executive committees of the soviets, and it was through this hierarchy that the leadership governed the country. The local party committee was reduced to the status of propaganda department of the soviet executive committee. This reached a point where there were even serious suggestions that the party, having obviously performed its historic role, might now be abolished. The main reason for this was that Yakov Sverdlov, who was both secretary of the CC of the party and chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Congress of Soviets, saw no great virtue in duplicating his lines of command and found it more convenient to channel nearly all matters through the better-staffed soviet apparatus. When Sverdlov died suddenly in March 1919, the Bolshevik leaders took a long hard look at their mechanism of rule, decided the atrophy of the party organization had gone too far, set up the basis for a new party command-structure, and placed the party and soviet hierarchies under different members of the leadership. During the next two years the party hierarchy replaced that of the soviets as the leadership's principal chain of command, through which it coordinated the administration of the whole country. Incidentally, we now have a pretty good picture of *how* this happened, but *why* it happened as it did is still far from clear.[2] The point I wish to make here, however, is that this sequence of events suggests reasons for doubt that the role the party has come to perform in the Soviet society flows with some inevitable logic from Lenin's principles of party organization and relations with extra-party organizations as we have them in *What Is To Be Done.*

The other qualification that should be made to the common stereotype of the Bolshevik organization is that Lenin's Bolsheviks always

[2] See Leonard Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (New York 1960), 242ff.

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fell short of the ideal, military-type, organization of professional revolutionaries. To employ my own terminology, they were not just a command-structure, but contained many market elements, even if these were often only latent or potential. It is easy to forget that the Bolsheviks were an integral part of the Russian Marxist movement, which was one of the main transmission channels for certain ideas and procedures generated in the market societies of the West, such as the election of leaders, decision by discussion and persuasion, the free competition of ideas, and the rights of individuals and minority nationalities, all of which Marxists connected with a vaguely conceived ideal of democracy. Although the Bolshevik organization provided less congenial soil for this ideal than some other sections of Russian socialism, and although the Bolsheviks perhaps more than any other group were prepared to violate the ideal in the interests of the organization, it was always implied that these violations were an unfortunate and temporary necessity, justified even in terms of the ideal, because victory for the organization would alone ensure the full and genuine realization of the ideal later. And indeed, when the end of the Civil War seemed to make possible an easing of organizational pressure, the leadership not only tolerated but even fostered some practical expression of the democratic ideal—in other words, some dilution of organizational by market forms. The high point of this was the trade-union discussion on the eve of the 10th Congress and the contest for electing delegates to the Congress on the basis of rival platforms. At this time the party, having suppressed all competing centers of ideas and leadership, looked as if it might itself come to serve as a limited market for ideas and leadership for the new Soviet society. In the event this did not happen, and the intra-party market was itself suppressed, but the seeds of the market have nevertheless been kept alive by the so-called "democratic" principles embedded in the party's ideology and formal rules of organization, and they have shown themselves capable of putting forth shoots when conditions are favorable. All this amounts to a significant difference between Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany: the "leadership principle" is a purer recipe for the organizational society than is "democratic centralism."

The organizational character of the Bolshevik movement and the comprehensiveness of its goals are not, then, the only factors one would need to invoke in explaining the building of an organizational society in Russia. Another factor of great importance was the precariousness of the regime during its early years. We have seen that stress of competition tends to favor command rather than contractual

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internal relationships, and that even a strongly market-oriented society may take on a predominantly organizational character in the throes of a serious struggle for survival.

No one would contest that the Civil War was largely responsible for the tremendous spread of coordination by command during the early years of the Soviet regime. After the Civil War the leadership found it both possible and expedient to replace command by contract and the market throughout a wide area of economic life. As we have just seen, this happened in some degree in political life as well, and if the tendency did not last long and did not go far in this sphere, this was primarily due to the realization that the threat to the integrity and survival of the organization remained greater than had been thought, a fact that was brought home to the leadership by the Kronstadt revolt, the spate of peasant disturbances, and the strength of the "workers' opposition." Realizing that the regime was still pretty precarious, the leadership felt justified in moving against its critics within the party, since public conflict among party members was obviously giving encouragement and ideological weapons to disaffected sections of the population, and an opposition group within the party was now the most likely rallying point for opposition to the regime in the country at large.

The reinforcement of the party command-structure after the 10th Congress, and in particular the ban on "fractionalism" on pain of expulsion from the party, were decisive steps in the building of an organizational society in Russia. Up to this time organizational measures had not been widely used to settle policy disputes within the leadership. After 1921 it became increasingly possible to do so, should any leader perceive these possibilities and have a will to use them. The appointment of Stalin as General Secretary in 1922 and his subsequent manipulation of the party organization to gain domination of the leadership and to eliminate all who questioned his commands raise in an acute form the problem of whether the occasion made the man or the man the occasion. To the present writer, the personality of Stalin seems another of those contingent factors which helped to determine the character of the Soviet political and social system, and without which these would have taken a substantially different form.

Let me now briefly describe the Soviet system as it developed under Stalin. First, Stalin's struggle to ensure his individual dominance of the party command-structure went hand in hand with a struggle to intensify party supervision of other organizations and to extend it to ever new fields of activity. The logic of this was in large part the need to

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occupy the actual or potential organizational bases of his rivals. This is an example of how sharp *internal* as well as *external* conflict can intensify the organizational character of a system, once organizational features reach a certain level of development. But the expansion and intensification of the organization also arose in part as a response to obstacles encountered to the implementation of Stalin's goals in the society at large. The so-called collectivization of agriculture was essentially a device to place peasant labor under a system of command when Stalin became convinced that direction through the market was proving inadequate to the needs of industrialization.

By the mid-1930's there was no sphere of social activity, from retail sales to internal security, and from farming to the arts, which was not directed by a chain of command culminating in Stalin. Soviet society had been welded into one large organization: to adapt Alfred Meyer's apt phrase, it was "Joseph Stalin, Incorporated."[3] But Stalin was evidently still not satisfied that he was assured of the unquestioning obedience of those around him or that the discipline of the population was yet adequate to meet the demands he might wish to make on it. Although he probably intended the terror of 1936-1938 to serve a number of purposes, the main one was just this: to reduce every individual, right up to the members of his immediate entourage, to simply an organization man of "Joseph Stalin, Incorporated," to eradicate any tendencies to serve *two* masters: not only Stalin, but also, say, one's local or national interests or ideals, the standards of one's profession, the interests of one's occupational group, artistic or humanitarian values, or what have you. After the trauma of the *Yezhovshchina* had effected this adjustment, a reduced level of terror was sufficient to keep it in force. And the logical complement of this was the Stalin cult, since everyone was, indeed, living for Stalin and at his pleasure.

This general picture requires some qualification, for there remained important areas of socially relevant activity which were subject to a wide degree of individual choice and only slight organizational control: many aspects of consumption, for instance, and leisure-time activities, not to mention mating and childrearing. The production and distribution of agricultural products were only partly organized; a considerable part was still in the hands of the individual peasant and was market-coordinated. There was still a market in labor, although it was suppressed for about ten years after 1940. In addition, people often did succeed in diverting effort and resources from assigned pur-

[3] See Alfred G. Meyer, "USSR, Incorporated," *Slavic Review*, XX (October 1961), 369-76.

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poses for the sake of personal gain or in the service of one or another of those group interests or ideals mentioned in the preceding paragraph. Indeed, in the economic field the regime clearly recognized that such diversions of resources were not always dysfunctional, that they were sometimes evoked by and helped to compensate for defective organization. In this way, some elements of a market were allowed to develop in the interstices of the command-structure.

It is now necessary to consider some special features of this system: the role of the party, mobilization, and the nature of intra-organization struggle; and then to look briefly at some of the changes in the system since the death of Stalin.

The Communist Party is described in the Soviet Constitution as the "guiding nucleus" in all Soviet institutions. Sometimes Western writers, impressed by the abundant evidence that the formally democratic structure of soviets is just a façade, seize on this statement about the "guiding nucleus" as an admission that the party "really" rules the USSR. There is a confusion here, arising from failure to take sufficient account of the character of intra-party relationships. In the early years of the regime, when there was still a significant market of ideas and leaders within the party, there was a certain sense in which one could speak of the party, as such, as ruling. But in the mature organizational society after the 1930's, when the party itself was totally manipulable by the supreme leadership, no amount of party supervision over other organizations entitles us to speak of party rule. A recent article by C. W. Casinelli[4] introduces a useful corrective in regard to this question. But Casinelli goes much farther. He not only argues that the CPSU does not rule the Soviet Union, but that in common with the parties found in other totalitarian systems it is not even one of the important instruments of rule; in other words, not only are the soviets a façade, but the party is a façade, too.

This view would scarcely stand up in a close empirical study of the Soviet system. So far as the CPSU is concerned, it appears to be based on a misreading of certain evidence from secondary sources. For example, Casinelli draws attention to the well-known fact that factory directors often do not take the meetings of their primary party organizations very seriously and treat the factory party secretary as a subordinate. What is left out of account here is that the party instance to which the factory director is effectively answerable is the bureau of the district or city committee; and he takes directives and criticism

[4] C. W. Casinelli, "The Totalitarian Party," *Journal of Politics*, XXIV (February 1962), 111-41.

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from these people very seriously indeed, since they can have him sacked and also substantially determine his promotion prospects.

Now it is true that Stalin, as he established his dictatorship, was careful to diversify his lines of command; he was not content to direct other organizations *through* the party command-structure but made the leaders of the most important of these organizations directly accountable to him personally, and he also established outside controls *over* the party, particularly police controls. All the same, the party remained not only an important instrument of rule, but the most important of such instruments throughout the Stalin period.

The party was responsible for a number of distinct operations. At places of work it was supposed to provide political and ideological leadership and supervision, to act, as it were, as the eyes, ears, and mouthpiece of the regime. For this purpose it attempted to maintain a nucleus of party members in all workplace groups.

In the instruments of coercion—the armed forces and the police—a party chain of control duplicated the formal line of command, and this served as the leadership's main safeguard against these organizations' becoming autonomous centers of power which might be used against it.

But the most important function performed by the party was (and remains) to provide overall coordination at various levels to all other territorially based organizations. A less generalized job of coordination is carried out by the politico-administrative mechanism of the state—the hierarchy of the central and republican governments and the executive committees of regional, city, and district soviets. But coordination through this channel is incomplete. If you take an administrative region (krai or oblast), for example, this will contain a great variety of economic, educational, welfare, and control organizations administered by the state; but some of these will be directly responsible to agencies of the central or republican governments, while in others government direction will be exercised through the regional executive committee. In addition you will have a whole range of organizations not directed through government channels at all: trade unions, the consumer cooperatives, the law courts, the Young Communist League, writers' and artists' unions, and so on. The regional party committee is the one body which can provide generalized leadership and coordination for all these organizations. The same thing applies at the republic, city, and district levels.

There are many misconceptions about the character of the control exercised by the territorial party hierarchy. Sometimes its ideological

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aspects are overstressed. The party may be conceived of as a kind of priesthood with police powers, which is there to prevent other agencies from slipping into apolitical attitudes to their job—to remind them, for instance, that they are not just making steel; they are building the technical base of communism. In actual fact, the *agitprop* side of party activities, though important, is a subordinate concern of local party committees, and the party officials responsible for it always play second fiddle in the local secretariats.

Another mistaken view of the party's role is to regard it as just another supervision agency, differing from, say, the old Ministry of State Control, the Inspectorate of the Ministry of Finance, the State Establishments Commission, and so on, only by being larger, more authoritative, and more generalized in its impact. It is regarded as an organization responsible solely for checking to see that the more specialized agencies carry out their jobs properly, and for chivying them into doing so. Again this draws attention to part of the truth. What is described as "verification of the fulfillment of party decisions" is indeed one of the major tasks of party committees vis-à-vis non-party agencies in both fact and theory. But in both fact and theory it yields in importance to two other tasks—namely, giving guiding directions on matters of importance, and selecting and assigning leading cadres.

The local party committee exists not just to preach at or jolly along the administration from outside. It is an integral part of the administration, its central core. The relationship of the party command-structure to the various specialized agencies, both governmental and otherwise, is partly analogous to the relationship of line to staff in a business corporation. The party committee is responsible for deciding issues which arise in any field of activity, which involve coordination at the level concerned, and which cannot be settled exclusively within the specialized agency directly responsible. Economic agencies throw up by far the greatest number of such issues. And just as cabinets everywhere in wartime find that a tremendous range of local or specialized issues are channeled up to them for decision, so in the Soviet Union at times of stress or on questions of crucial importance the bureaus and secretariats of party committees may become responsible for running things in very considerable detail. During the blockade of Leningrad, departments of the district party committees were in charge of even the transfer of individual workers from one factory to another and the allocation of spare parts among different factories.[5] In one district near the mouth of the Volga, where fishing is the main in-

[5] *Partiinoe stroitel'stvo*, No. 9-10 (1946), 19.

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dustry, the district party secretary used to cross all matters relating to the fishing industry off the agenda of sittings of the soviet executive committee and put them on the agenda of the bureau of the district party committee.[6] Until recent reorganizations, it was notorious that during the spring sowing and at harvest time the office of the district party secretary became the nerve center from which all the farms in the district were really run.

Failure to grasp this relationship, to realize that the party command-structure is an integral part of the administration, focused particularly on the running of the economy, is at the root of much of the confusion about the nature of Soviet politics, of crude dichotomies between "apparatchiks" and "technocrats," and so on. A regional party secretary is not only likely to have received the same technical education as the factory director or the industrial minister, but may well be the factory director of yesterday and the industrial minister of tomorrow.

Two other special aspects of the Soviet system as it developed under Stalin will have to be treated rather schematically. "Mobilization of masses" is a phrase much used by Soviet political writers. What they understand by it is perhaps not too remote from what we mean by "public relations." Its significance is best brought out by drawing a contrast. In modern Western countries the competitive processes of the market tend to build up in the public, and particularly in those groups whose interests are most directly involved, an awareness of public issues and their likely implications while these issues are still being settled. There are, however, large public and private corporations whose decision-making processes are little influenced by the market and whose major decisions nevertheless are likely to affect large numbers of people. Such corporations tend to find a particular need for what we call "public relations." In the Soviet Union nearly all decisions are made in this way—that is, the members of the public are not led to an understanding of them by the processes of the market, and need to have the decision "sold" to them after it is taken. Hence we have "mobilization," which aims at informing people as to what has been decided and what new benefits, sacrifices, or responsibilities it will involve for the country as a whole and for whatever special groups they belong to in particular, and at building a positive attitude of acceptance of the decision. "Mobilization" is not left to the mass communications media; it is the main aim of thousands of *ad hoc* workplace and other meetings, and the pseudo-democratic processes

[6] *Partiinaia zhizn'*, No. 4 (1948), 40.

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of elections, meetings of soviets, party conferences and congresses, and so on, have been largely shaped to serve its purposes.

Finally, a word about political conflict under Stalin. The form this took was largely a function of the methods by which Stalin found it convenient to exercise and preserve his domination. As we have seen, Stalin reduced the market elements in the system to such a marginal role that it was impossible for potential economic or other interest groups to cohere and take action to advance their interests. He also saw to it that particular organizational divisions based on sectors of the economy, national or territorial units, professional groups, or what have you could not be manipulated to serve sectional interests or aspirations. And finally, Stalin was particularly active in restricting any tendency for the various chains of command—the party, the police, the economic administration, the army, and so on—to develop into autonomous centers of power. He did this by an elaborate system of mutual controls and by giving the various members of his entourage—the potential manipulators of these potential power centers—divided and overlapping responsibilities for them. Three possible ways that political conflict *might* have been structured were thus excluded by Stalin.

Some students of the Soviet system may question whether Stalin did in fact prevent the third of these possibilities from being realized. Since there is evidence that Stalin's "lieutenants" managed to build up something like personal followings in sections of the organizations under their command, some writers have concluded that particular leaders were identified with the interests of the particular sub-elites associated with these sections: the military, the police, the managers, the apparatchiki, and so on. They then go on to explain the ups and downs of particular leaders and their most prominent supporters in terms of rivalries among these sub-elites.

The trouble with this view[7] is that, when you succeed in identifying networks of supporters, they appear typically to cut right across formal divisions between chains of command and fields of activity. For example, the officials identified as having been executed or imprisoned in connection with the so-called "Leningrad Case" enable us to build up a picture of the "patronage" exerted by the late Central Committee secretary Andrei Zhdanov. This evidence suggests that Zhdanov's patronage predominated in the state and party organizations of Leningrad Region and City, and that it was prominent without predom-

[7] The writer has considered this question at greater length elsewhere. See T. H. Rigby, "Crypto-Politics," *Survey*, No. 50 (January 1964), 188-91.

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inating in the Central Committee apparatus, the government of the RSFSR, the State Planning Committee, certain fields of ideology, and the party apparatus in a broad zone in northwest Russia. Study of the various purges and counterpurges in Georgia between 1951 and 1953 gives a similar picture of the ramifications of patronage networks there. And finally, the diverse organizations from which Khrushchev drew old subordinates to fill responsible posts under his command after 1953 indicate the extent to which his patronage had spread by the end of the Stalin era.

This was not accidental, as they say. It was a direct result of Stalin's own particular method of "divide and rule." From his point of view it was not only necessary to deprive particular command-structures of the unity and continuity of organization and leadership which might enable them to be brought into play as weapons against him; it was also necessary to prevent the command level immediately below him (i.e., his "lieutenants") from coalescing to limit his power or remove him. By allowing superiors right down the line a good deal of say in the appointment of their subordinates, to the point that this strongly affected career expectations and career rivalries, and at the same time by having his own immediate subordinates *share* responsibility for particular command-structures, by giving one the direction of control agencies working within the command-structure run by the other, by giving them interlocking responsibilities for territorial, functional, and organizational supervision, and finally by redistributing responsibilities with considerable frequency, Stalin was able to achieve both these objectives at the same time. He thus managed to distribute power in such a way as to keep it in manipulable chunks, without these chunks taking a form that could easily be wielded against him.

Space will permit only a brief sketch of some of the main modifications in this system since the death of Stalin.

First, the post-Stalin leadership found that it could dispense with two major supports of the organization without endangering its survival: the actual as distinct from the potential terror, and the leadership cult. This was made possible by the greater intrinsic viability of the organization due to a reduction in internal hostility, and this in turn was due to a number of factors, which included the killing off or dying out of many of the most embittered elements in the population, the improvement in economic conditions, and the long-term effects of education and indoctrination.

Second, the new leaders found that effective execution of policies by the ever more complex organization under their control called for a

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considerable decentralization of systems of command and for allowing more administrative discretion and initiative at lower levels. Moving in this direction, however, they quickly encountered new dilemmas. In combination with the changes referred to in the previous paragraph, decentralization afforded wider scope for individuals and groups to further particular interests or ideals independent of, or even contrary to, the intentions of the supreme leadership. Hence the many disciplinary measures to counter such deviations as minority nationalism, economic parochialism, "partylessness" in the arts, and so on. And this drew attention to a more fundamental problem. Could the evils and inefficiencies of overcentralization be overcome by administrative devolution without necessitating a greatly expanded control apparatus which virtually amounted to recentralization, or could this objective be achieved only by allowing an increased role to contractual, competitive "market" elements? This problem has been firmly posed in both the economic and the intellectual spheres, but the leadership has not yet squarely faced up to it.

And finally, there were of course changes in the locus of supreme power and consequent alterations in the forms of political struggle. The death of Stalin appears to have provoked a deal, a contract, between those occupying the next level of command; the terms of this deal involved the distribution among them of control over the various command-structures, each leader apparently enjoying a good deal of autonomy in those structures under his command, and the settling of major issues by negotiated agreement. These arrangements gave a distinct impetus to market elements in the political system, and these gradually increased in the years that followed. One most important manifestation of this was that some of the command-structures took on something of the nature of interest groups, which temporarily imbued Soviet politics with some of the characteristics imputed to it by the school of Kremlinology criticized above. Another manifestation was the emergence of proto-democratic procedures both in the Central Committee and at the base of the party hierarchy.

These trends, however, were partially reversed once one of the leaders succeeded in subverting the deal of March 1953 and establishing his personal dominance. Khrushchev has reduced (though not entirely eliminated) the flavor of pluralism which the system was beginning to acquire. He has also shown that one of Stalin's devices for controlling the exercise of power by his subordinates—the manipulation of rival and interlocking patronage systems—can work successfully even without the dimension of terror.

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The Soviet Union is the most long-lived and one of the most highly developed of twentieth-century "organizational" societies. Soviet experience amply demonstrates the viability of this new type of society and its relative efficiency for the achievement of many social goals. It provides no unequivocal evidence, however, of superior efficiency as compared with advanced market societies, at least at current levels of technological development. Moreover, any hypothesis of the inevitable maximization of the spread and intensity of command relationships in organizational societies (an assumption often implicit in discussions of "totalitarianism") could only be argued at this stage on the theoretical level; it certainly cannot be demonstrated empirically from the Soviet example. Here the spectacular extension of such relationships came to a halt in the late 1930's, and, despite some fluctuations since then, they have tended, if anything, to retreat somewhat.

Similarly, Soviet experience provides little evidential support for the view that there are particular mechanisms of control or particular relationships between different mechanisms of control which *must* be employed by their rulers in order to remain in power. The spread, intensity, and character of mechanisms of control have varied considerably in the history of the Soviet regime. Such variations seem to have been largely due to changes in the opportunities and dangers facing the regime and, as in any highly centralized system, to differences in the predilections and abilities of its leaders. These are factors whose future operation it would be impossible to predict.

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THE ADMINISTERED SOCIETY
Totalitarianism Without Terror

By ALLEN KASSOF*

> "As an orchestra conductor sees to it that all the instruments sound harmonious and in proportion, so in social and political life does the Party direct the efforts of all people toward the achievement of a single goal.
>
> "Each person must, like a bee in the hive, make his own contribution to increasing the material and spiritual wealth of society. People may be found who say that they do not agree with this, that it is coercion of the individual, a return to the past. To this my answer is: We are living in an organized socialist society where the interests of the individual conform to the interests of society and are not at variance with them."—Nikita Khrushchev, March 8, 1963.[1]

MORE than a decade after Stalin's death, the time is ripe for a fresh view of Soviet society. Many of the conventional patterns of analysis, developed largely during the period of Stalinist absolutism, seem to be no longer adequate for this purpose. This article proposes that a new concept, the "administered society," may be useful in summarizing and evaluating recent changes in the Soviet system and in identifying current trends.

Like other ideal-typical concepts, that of the administered society by no means pretends to account for all of the concrete detail of a social order. Instead, it draws attention (through emphasis, and hence a certain exaggeration) to very general features which constitute a society's ethos or prevailing themes—in the Soviet case, centering around the drive of the regime to establish a highly organized and totally coordinated society, and the consequences of that drive.

The administered society can be defined as one in which an entrenched and extraordinarily powerful ruling group lays claim to ultimate and exclusive scientific knowledge of social and historical laws and is impelled by a belief not only in the practical desirability, but the moral necessity, of planning, direction, and coordination from above in the name of human welfare and progress.

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[1] Reported in *Pravda* and *Izvestiia*, March 10, 1963; translation from *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XV, No. 11 (April 23, 1963).

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Convinced that there should be complete order and predictability in human affairs, the elite is concerned not merely with the "commanding heights," but also to an overwhelming degree with the detailed regulation of the entire range of social life, including those institutions which, in the West, typically have been regarded as lying beyond the legitimate scope of public authority and political intervention. The rulers of the administered society refuse to grant the possibility of unguided coordination and integration; they believe, on the contrary, that not only the masses but responsible subgroups (for example, the professions) are incapable of maintaining a viable social order on their own, without the precise and detailed supervision of an omniscient political directorate. The elite believes, and through a far-reaching program of education and propaganda tries to teach its subjects, that the only possible good society is one that is *administered*.

The administered society is thus a variant of modern totalitarianism, with the important difference that it operates by and large without resort to those elements of gross irrationality (in particular, the large-scale and often self-defeating use of psychological terror and physical coercion as basic means of social control) that we have come to associate with totalitarian systems in recent decades.

The administered society, however, should be distinguished from the conventional welfare state in that it is not involved simply or principally in creating minimal conditions of social welfare within an otherwise pluralistic political framework, but instead treats welfare as an incidental—and instrumental—element in the larger scheme of social planning and reform. While an administered society may display more or fewer welfare features of a material or service nature, they are neither final goals nor the most important determinants of overall policy. To put it another way, the elite regards the promotion of total coordination as itself the ultimate form of welfare under modern conditions.

Plainly enough, the administered society is not the authentic good society of faithful Marxists, for it is characterized by the growing size and importance of an elite party and state bureaucracy, in contrast to the withering-away of governmental apparatus which Marxism predicts and upon which it insists.

Nor, finally, should the administered society be confused with a rational technocracy, even though here there are some superficial parallels. The leadership of the administered society, to be sure, is forced to rely on scientific and technical cadres as sources of essential information and in the execution of highly complex economic and

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social planning. But the political elite is not bound solely or principally by considerations of technical rationality; the technicians and experts operate only under license of the political elite and in terms of the latter's self-proclaimed ultimate knowledge about the proper uses of science and technology in the larger socio-historical setting. The experts, in short, are servants rather than masters or even independent practitioners. They lack the power of veto on grounds of technical rationality over political decisions (though in the end the limits of technology itself, if not the will of the technocrats, of course impose certain restraints). And their potential for independent influence in the society is decisively cut short by the elite's consistent practice of defining *all* decision-making as political and therefore beyond the competence of any group other than itself. Similar considerations are applied—if anything, with more vigor—to the producers of the more "esoteric" goods and services—the artists and writers, professors and critics and journalists. Like technicians in the more literal sense, they are construed by the elite as turning out "commodities" whose creation, distribution, and consumption demand coordination from above in the pursuit of order and planned progress.

Let us see how this preliminary definition of the administered society can be applied to an understanding of Soviet developments, and with what advantages.

I. Totalitarianism Without Terror

By now it must be clear even to the most reluctant analyst that the cumulative change in Soviet society since Stalin's death is too great to dismiss as merely superficial. The transformation of Soviet society during this period, though by no means a wholesale departure from earlier patterns, nevertheless has been extensive. The conventional label for this change has been "liberalization." The reference point is to the state of Soviet totalitarianism under Stalin and to the degree of departure from that condition.

To be sure, the totalitarian model could only approximate the underlying reality. Even at the zenith of Stalinism, we know, there were major and numerous exceptions to the effective realization of absolute despotism. Piecemeal information such as the testimony of refugee informants showed that many individuals were able to preserve for themselves or to create tiny islands of privacy and to maintain attitudes of doubt and skepticism about the system in the face of the relentless propaganda that penetrated every corner of the society. We know, too, that in the midst of what was surely the most thorough-

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going system of political and social controls ever devised, there were widespread and patterned evasions of official demands in places high and low. The factory manager engaged in self-defensive falsification of production statistics; the peasant stealing time from the collectivized sector to work on his private plot; clandestine listeners to forbidden foreign radio broadcasts—these and other types are amply familiar to students of Stalinist Russia. For those who were caught (as well as for many of the totally innocent) the costs were horrendous, often final. But even at its most extreme the system of surveillance and punishments did not stamp out pockets of resentment, awareness, inner resistance.

Nevertheless, if Soviet totalitarianism under Stalin was not exactly an Orwellian 1984 and if, in important respects, it departed from the analysts' model of the totalitarian society, it came very close indeed (perhaps as close as is possible in a modern complex society) to approximating that model. Extraordinary was the near-completeness, if not actual totality, of the invasion of society by Party and State. The efforts to regulate in minute detail cultural activity, patterns of material consumption and taste, attitudes towards love and friendship, professional routine and aspiration, scholarly research, moral virtue, recreation and leisure, informal social relationships, sex and childbearing and childrearing—these efforts, though far from always successful, had the most profound effects in creating a condition of unfreedom. If one also recalls the elaborate development of control mechanisms designed to promote the institutionalization of anxiety (that state of affairs in which even the most innocent act is likely to be arbitrarily greeted with harsh and capricious punishment), then it is clear that the Soviet system under Stalin, by any practical definition, was totalitarian.

It is also clear that substantial liberalization has taken place since the dictator's death. But this measure, useful in many ways, creates very serious problems in analysis and evaluation. For although liberalization tells something about where the Soviet system has come from, it does not say very much about where it is *going*. To say that the system is being liberalized is like walking away backwards from a receding reference point, a procedure that gives too little information about what lies on the road ahead. After all, if the society has become less totalitarian, then what is it? To conclude, in effect, that it is still more of the same but somehow less so than it used to be may be essentially correct, but it is not a very satisfactory answer. And the understandable fascination with the political drama of on-and-off-again

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de-Stalinization has led to a partial neglect of its *social* consequences—in some quarters, too, to an imprecise assumption that political liberalization (the moderation of one-man despotism and the probably genuine efforts to avoid extreme abuses of absolute power) also spells some kind of broad social liberalization (even leading, perhaps, to a form of society more familiar—and less antagonistic?—to the Western experience).

Indeed, it may be that the use of liberalization as the key criterion for measuring changes in Soviet society is responsible for some of the confusion and disagreement among analysts of various persuasions. Thus, those of a conservative or pessimistic disposition have been inclined to deny that the changes are so significant (or that some of them have really taken place) because of the implication that liberalization also means *liberation*, a prospect they reject as too unlikely; while their more optimistic colleagues (especially those who see in Khrushchevism the harbinger of a welfare state) have attached far more significance to the same developments.

The core of the difficulty lies in the fact that, under Stalin, there was an amalgamation of totalism with terror and coercion, and that we may have overlearned a lesson about the necessary association between the two on the basis of that highly convincing record. The concept of the administered society is proposed as a way of saying that there can be totalism *without* terror; it recognizes that the changes in the Soviet Union have been real and vast (after all, totalism without terror is something new); but it insists that, far from developing alternatives to totalism, Soviet society is being subjected to new and more subtle forms of it, and that the Stalinist past is being streamlined rather than rejected.

The implications of this assumption will have to be explored, but first a few illustrations are in order to give a necessarily rather abstract discussion some concrete grounding.

II. Some Examples

The case for the administered society is not subject to proof of an absolute kind, for not only is such a concept more or less useful rather than right or wrong, but its application to the affairs of a live society cannot possibly cover all contingencies. It does, however, provide a general framework for depicting the Soviet system under Khrushchev (and probably his successors as well), sensitizing us to interpretations that otherwise might go unnoticed and enabling us to see patterns in apparently unconnected trends. The following examples (at this

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early stage it would be too much to call them evidence) are chosen from a number of important areas of the Soviet system: social stratification, educational policy, administrative shifts in industry and agriculture, the youth program, Khrushchev's position on art and literature, and the recent activity of Soviet sociologists.

SOCIAL STRATIFICATION

Under Stalin, the differences in income, life-style, and perquisites of the various occupational strata came to be very wide indeed, certainly so in contrast with the Marxist vision of the classless order, also in absolute terms. By and large this development could be accounted for by the functional importance of differential rewards in maximizing output and performance, particularly among the technical and managerial cadres, among symbol-makers and bureaucrats, and in assuring the loyalties of these strategic groups during the critical periods of economic expansion and political consolidation.

Under Khrushchev, however, this trend towards increasingly sharp social stratification has come into question and concrete measures have been adopted to slow its progress, if not to reverse it. And so in recent years we have seen reductions in income and privileges of some of the highest groups, along with serious efforts to improve the lot of the most deprived peasants and workers. Certainly these steps have not been sufficient to overturn the established order of priorities, a revolutionary change that would involve long-range costs and penalties too great for a system still bent on rapid expansion and dependent on a proven, if quite un-Marxist, system of motivations. But the official talk has revealed an apparently deep concern over the excesses of the stratification system given impetus under Stalin.

The Soviet explanation for these changes is that they represent a renewal of Marxist intention now that the requisite material base for establishing full communism, and with it full equality, has been achieved. A somewhat more likely explanation is that the regime under Khrushchev is making strenuous efforts to enhance its popularity by easing and improving living conditions, and probably this is true as far as it goes. But neither explanation accounts for the simultaneous attack against the privileged groups: in purely practical terms, the redistribution of part of their share of the national income could hardly have much of an impact on millions of new recipients and would also threaten to undermine the good-will of the strategic strata towards the post-Stalin regime.

Then what does lie behind this new policy? The most convincing

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answer has been given by Robert Feldmesser, an American student of Soviet affairs who has for some years carried on painstaking studies of social-class policies. Feldmesser's examination of the evidence leads him to the conclusion that class policy under Khrushchev represents an effort to prevent the formation of vested interest groups, in the form of durable social strata, that might interfere with the Party's freedom to plan and manage the affairs of society in its own way. According to Feldmesser, the growing privileges of the upper strata ". . . threatened to contravene the cardinal dogma of the Soviet system, which has come to be known as Stalinism though it could as well be called Leninism or Khrushchevism: that ultimate power belongs exclusively to the party—or more accurately, to the head of the party. Whenever any group jeopardizes that principle, it must be struck down, and that is what Khrushchev is doing. Stalin, in other words, forgot his Stalinism; and Khrushchev is not repudiating Stalinism, he is, if anything, reinstating it."[2]

The significance of this development, then, is very great. The growth of pluralism, or at least of the capacity of a population to erode the monolithism of a social system, seems to depend to a considerable degree upon the opportunities available to various social groupings (especially, perhaps, in the upper ranges of the stratification system) to develop over the generations, without undue manipulation and interference from the outside and with reasonable probabilities of continuity, their own traditions, expectations, and behavior patterns—in short, upon opportunities to develop into subcommunities of interest. This is why sociologists and others have sometimes looked to the possibilities of an incipient "bourgeoisification" of Soviet society as an important clue to the easing of totalitarianism, on the grounds that an increasing concern among a growing professional and middle class with preserving advantages once gained might lead to restraints on the freedom of the Soviet regime to pursue harsh programs at home or to engage in risky overseas adventures. But the Soviet record shows us how important it is not to confuse a bourgeoisification of taste and style (which undoubtedly is taking place) with a realignment of power and influence stemming from the interests of this stratum. Public displays of affluence and refinement, which in other times and places have been associated with the political ascendancy of a middle class, do not have this meaning in the contemporary Soviet Union.

It is precisely the prospect of such an ascendancy that is so intol-

[2] Robert A. Feldmesser, "Equality and Inequality under Khrushchev," *Problems of Communism*, IX (March-April 1960), 38.

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erable to the leadership; it would make it more difficult to administer the society from above. The regime depends upon the privileged groups—else they would not be privileged—but refuses to allow them the kind of long-run security of position that might dilute power. And so the Khrushchev policy can be seen as part of the drive to administer from above.

EDUCATIONAL POLICY

A parallel development has taken place in educational policy. Although the reforms of recent years, beginning in the late 1950's, reflect in part the influence of practical problems of manpower allocation (one intended consequence of the reforms is to reduce the pressure on university admissions by shunting more aspirants into the labor force instead), they are also designed to enhance administration from above. That the educational system continues to be construed as a preparatory instrument for quite specific and narrow adult occupational roles rather than as an agency of general enlightenment is highly revealing. Moreover, the new provisions requiring most applicants for admission to higher education to have spent some years either at work or in the military forces are quite consistent with the ethos of a system in which the official emphasis is on treating people as aggregate resources and elements of planning rather than as individuals whose voluntaristic impulses will be sufficient to keep the system running.

In the same connection, the efforts currently under way to establish the new boarding schools on a more extensive basis are, by Soviet assertion, designed to prepare children from the earliest possible age for the institutional atmosphere of the highly organized society. And it is no accident that the main theme of recent Soviet pedagogical and youth literature centers now about the task of raising the new generation in a spirit of "group and collective life" that will surpass in scope and intensity the experiences of the earlier generations. Such bold intentions, of course, may not be effectively realized (and this is a question that will have to be taken up later) but the intentions are unmistakable.

CONTROLS IN INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE

An especially convincing example is to be found in the record of industrial and agricultural organization. Early reaction to the widely publicized administrative reorganizations that gained momentum in the latter half of the 1950's saw in them a kind of decentralization that might lead to the development of an incipient grass-roots auton-

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omy on the local level. The announced desire to improve productive efficiency by granting more discretionary powers to plant and farm managers, it was speculated, also held forth the possibility of autonomies that would go beyond the intended area of purely economic or managerial decision-making; that is, might lead by tiny but cumulative steps to local patriotisms whose long-run effect would be to encourage a modicum of genuine political independence.

The proposition is reasonable enough, for there is a connection between one kind of autonomy and another, even though the actual political consequences of such a situation are necessarily difficult to forecast. However that may be, we now know that the new independence of industrial and agricultural managers has turned out to be largely illusory. As early as 1960, Arcadius Kahan could conclude in a study of agricultural reorganization that the practical consequence of administrative shifts had been to *tighten* Party control by reducing the overweight bureaucratic machine between Moscow and the farm, thereby enhancing the Party's effective presence in local operations. He writes: "The new collective amalgamations, the influx of agricultural specialists and former MTS personnel (often party members) into the farm organizations, along with a drive for new party recruits in rural areas, have made it possible to organize party cells on most collective and state farms. The consequent opportunity to exercise control from within, and to present the party to the mass of peasants as a local rather than an alien force, has undoubtedly increased the party's influence over the behavior of the farm population."[3]

On the industrial side, Herbert Ritvo has made a similar point even more emphatically: ". . . the economic bureaucracy has undergone a series of sweeping reorganizations designed to improve its efficiency and to strengthen direct controls. There can be little doubt that not only the power of leading representatives of this group, but also many of their personal privileges, have diminished as a result of Khrushchev's administrative changes and reforms. As one reads the familiar complaints of industrial managers, it becomes only too apparent how little the 'rights of managers' have been expanded since the decree of August 9, 1955. In addition, this sector, more than any other, has felt the greater severity of the new penal laws of 1961-1962; thus, the reorganization of management has revealed that the opinions of this part of the bureaucracy could be silenced and ignored in a matter affecting its vital interests; the harshness of the revised penalties for economic

[3] Arcadius Kahan, "The Peasant, the Party and the System," *ibid.*, IX (July-August 1960), 34.

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crimes has demonstrated that, despite the importance of the technical elite in an industrial society, their prerogatives are limited—not least by an educational system which can now provide a sufficiency of replacements."[4]

These are not only the conclusions of Western analysts; the fight against the dangers of local autonomy is a matter of high-level policy in the USSR: ". . . from the very beginning Comrade N. S. Khrushchev, to whom belongs the initiative for the reorganization, directed the attention of our economic cadres to the impermissibility of localism in any form and cautioned them against understanding an integrated economy as self-contained and autarchical. Was such a warning necessary? Undoubtedly it was. The relatively small size of many of the economic administrative regions was an objective basis for attempts to develop a self-sufficient economy within the framework of the economic councils."[5]

Both in industry and agriculture, then, the Khrushchev reforms have been liberalizing insofar as they attempt seriously to amend the rigid and inefficient Stalinist pattern of multiple, overlapping, and cross-checking hierarchies between the center and the localities. But at the same time they have given the Party a freer (because more direct and efficient) hand in administering its own interests within the production units.

THE YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS

An additional illustration comes from the Soviet youth organizations. Far from loosening their grip on the new generation in comparison with their practice in Stalin's time, the Komsomol and Pioneers have been involved in intensive efforts to extend their network of influence, both in membership coverage and in the range of youth activities that they originate or supervise. It is true that some steps have been taken to reduce some of the most extreme consequences of excessive bureaucratization and neglect of local interests and, at the most recent Komsomol Congress in 1962, there was some guarded talk about democratizing the internal structure.[6] But a close examination

[4] Herbert Ritvo, "The Dynamics of Destalinization," *Survey*, No. 47 (April 1963), 27-36.

[5] V. Pavlenko, "Ekonomicheskoe raionirovanie v novykh usloviiakh" [Economic Regionalism under the New Conditions], *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, October 19, 1963, 12-13; translation from *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XV, No. 42 (November 13, 1963).

[6] *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, April 18, 1962, 2. A detailed discussion of the youth organizations since Stalin is given in the author's forthcoming study, *The Soviet Youth Program* (Harvard University Press).

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of the recent Komsomol record suggests that the impulse for such changes comes not so much from a serious intention to democratize the youth program as to alter its widespread reputation as boring, repressive, and offensive in order to make it more appealing to youth. At the same time there has been no sign at all of a withdrawal from interference in personal life; if anything, the reforms are meant to make that interference more effective by replacing swivel-chair organizers with energetic enthusiasts who will not be afraid to grapple directly with problems of youthful nonconformity.

Certainly it is true, as in other areas of Soviet life, that the resort to coercion and threat has become less important than under Stalin. But their replacement with more reasoned tactics of persuasion should not be taken as a surrender of the principle of total involvement and control. On the contrary, the youth program is now regarded as more essential than under Stalin, for it has become increasingly important to remind the new generation—which does not share the caution born of experience in the old days—not to confuse the relatively more benign outward character of Khrushchevism with a grant of autonomy. A genuine test of change in the youth sector would be a surrender (more realistically, a partial surrender) of the organizations' claim to a monopoly over formal and informal youth activities. Concretely, such a step might take the form of allowing youngsters (especially in higher educational institutions) not to join if they have no desire to do so. But there has been no change in the Komsomol's policy of covering an ever-larger proportion of those of eligible age, including 100 per cent of the university students and large majorities of key categories of young professionals. And the Pioneer organization, as before, continues to maintain total coverage in its group. Finally, the content of the youth program (as revealed in recent policy literature) centers around renewed efforts to exercise total control over the young on the grounds that the reforms now make the organizations such benign and authoritative agencies of society that no one could possibly object to their paternalistic concern.

LITERATURE AND ART

In art, literature, and intellectual affairs generally, recent events in the Soviet Union have attracted such intensive scholarly and journalistic coverage in the West that it is hardly necessary to review them here. Most analyses have stressed the alternating thaws and freezes in the intellectual world since Stalin's death, seeking to discern in them an overall trend or to attribute cyclical changes to shifting alignments

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in the Party leadership or to general characteristics of the political climate.

Granting that the end of this complex story is yet to be told, Khrushchev's now famous speech of March 1963,[7] in which he upbraided errant artists and writers, must stand as a landmark in the publicly proclaimed policy of the administered society. The essence of his message is that the Party's willingness to allow at least some frank discussion of the Stalin period and the decision to loosen somewhat the straitjacket of rigid conformity must not be understood as permission to stray from Party control; that what the more optimistic members of the artistic and intellectual communities have taken for liberalization, or liberation, is only a readjustment in the form and content of Party supervision. In effect, said Khrushchev, either the writers, artists, and others must work out a satisfactory system of self-censorship conforming to the needs of the Party, or the Party will do the censoring itself.

Khrushchev made it clear, then, that artistic and intellectual output is a commodity to be mobilized as the regime sees fit in furthering its domestic and international programs, and that the leeway granted in the process of de-Stalinization has been a measure to improve the quality of the product for these purposes—not a signal that the instrumental approach has been modified or abandoned. The thaws and freezes, that is, have been generated by uncertainty as to how the product could be improved without violating unchanged political requirements. So long as this uncertainty remains, the ups and downs of the artistic and intellectual communities may be expected to continue as the limits of experimentation are redefined in practice. But the basic principle has been reiterated, and unmistakably so.

Khrushchev's statements on that occasion are in fact more interesting for what they reveal about his idea of social order than merely as strictures against disobedient poets. He could not have expressed more precisely the ethos of the administered society when he said that the denunciation of the Stalin cult does not signify that ". . . a time of drift has set in, that the reins of control have been slackened, that the ship of society is drifting at the will of the waves, and that each person can follow his own whim and behave in whatever way he sees fit. No. The Party has pursued and will consistently pursue the Leninist course it has mapped out, irreconcilably opposing any ideological waverings and attempts to violate the norms of life in our society." And, he said

[7] *Pravda* and *Izvestiia*, March 10, 1963; translation from *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XV, No. 11 (April 23, 1963).

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in the same speech, ". . . among certain people one can hear talk about some kind of absolute freedom of the individual. I do not know what they have in mind, but I believe that there will never be absolute freedom of the individual, even under full communism. . . . And under communism the will of one man must be subordinated to the will of the entire collective. Unless this is so, anarchic self-will will sow dissension and disorganize the life of the society. Without the organizing, directing principle, neither socialist society nor any other society, even the smallest collective of people, can exist."

To give him proper credit, Khrushchev is probably quite right in an elementary sociological or philosophical sense when he denies the possibility of absolute individual freedom. But there is an enormous difference between saying this as an abstract assertion about the limits of human experience and the active promotion of an all-encompassing social policy dedicated to the proposition of individual subordination to a superorganized society. And Khrushchev is not speaking as a sociologist or philosopher, but as a man of action.

SOCIOLOGY

A final illustration concerns the current work of Soviet sociologists. Sociological writing and research were taboo in the Soviet Union until recent years, and even the word "sociology" was regarded as a synonym for "bourgeois apologetics." But beginning in the late 1950's, a number of academics began to identify themselves as sociologists and to write under the heading of sociology. Much of what they have produced up to now consists of little more than political slogans of old dignified with a new professional vocabulary; this aspect of their work need not concern us here. More revealing are their research and their conception of the proper uses of sociology.

It is only a slight oversimplification to conclude that, so far, the principal assignments of the sociologists have been to prove the "superiority" of the Soviet Union over "bourgeois" societies and to provide policy-makers with how-to-do-it information of a rather limited scope. Conspicuously absent are even the most timid efforts at criticism, evaluation, or basic questioning about social structure. That is, there is no sign of an uninhibited, nonpolitical search for answers that are not already predetermined by general dogma. There is also an intriguing (and probably not altogether accidental) parallel with the kind of industrial and personnel research that is popular in some American corporations, where the micro-techniques of the social sciences are applied to the purposes of administration and manipulation. (So

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far, it must be said, the Soviet sociologists have barely begun to develop the kind of technical sophistication displayed by their Western counterparts, but they have declared their intention to do so.) In particular, there is a strong resemblance between the organizational ethos that is becoming increasingly evident in Khrushchev's Russia and the internal behavior of some American corporations depicted by observers such as William Whyte.[8] The concrete, human consequences of "being administered" may be more or less benign for the individuals involved—but that it takes place at all is the critical fact. On the one hand in a large corporation, on the other in an entire society, the insistence on the superiority of superorganization emphasizes the relevance of the whole life for the task-oriented area and results in efforts to bring together into a coherent pattern—under influence and guidance from above—such a wide variety of roles that social character and individual aspiration become increasingly a public affair. Probably it is no accident that, at a recent international sociological conference, a Soviet participant is reported to have said that David Riesman's "other-directed man" (that modern type whose behavior is motivated by what others think of him more than by a stable core of inner values)[9] comes very close to the ideal of responsible social behavior so ardently fostered by the Soviet educational and propaganda systems.[10]

III. Some Implications

These illustrations go only a small way towards showing the potential applications of the concept of the administered society to an understanding of contemporary currents in Soviet life. Others, no doubt, would be equally appropriate—for example, the growing emphasis on "public" participation in social control through voluntary assistance to the militia, the Komsomol street patrols' enforcing of dress, decorum, and taste, the quasi-judicial comrades' courts, and so forth.

There are also *a priori* reasons to expect the Soviet leadership to stress this approach. The organizational problems of the Soviet economy, for example, become more rather than less complex with technological advance; if economic successes under Stalin solved a number of relatively primitive problems of accumulation and investment, they in turn have created new problems of organization and coordination that are less easily solved. When Khrushchev rejects the notion

[8] William H. Whyte, *The Organization Man* (New York 1956).

[9] David Riesman, Nathan Glazer, and Reuel Denny, *The Lonely Crowd* (New Haven 1950).

[10] Recent developments in Soviet sociology are reviewed in Leopold Labedz, "Sociology as a Vocation," *Survey*, No. 48 (July 1963), 57-65.

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that the ship of society can sail wherever the waves carry it, he refers not only to the narrow problem of political unity and ideological correctness but to the larger, underlying issue of how to manage a modern industrial order. In one sense the Soviet case is a qualitatively extreme example of the problem of coordination faced in all modern industrial societies, aggravated by the peculiar ferocity with which the issue of backwardness was handled under Stalin.

The passion for organization, for perfect coordination and integration of social life—a kind of compulsive's dream of beehive order projected upon an entire society—has partly replaced the original impetus of Bolshevik ideology. The denial that there can be any real conflict in the good society, the belief that all legitimate human needs can be satisfied simultaneously, that interest groups are subversive, that only uninformed selfishness or disregard of organizational principles stands between the present and the utopia of the future—these are some of the ingredients of the new ideology. If it lacks some of the romantic appeal of barricade-storming, it is perhaps no less revolutionary in its consequences, for its purveyors insist that they will not rest until all societies have undergone the transformation to superorganization. Its potential impact on an audience, say, of hard-pressed political leaders and court philosophers of developing nations may be considerable, for the idea of total coordination must tempt many of them as the answer to problems and frustrations of economic backwardness and the awkward necessities of coping with competing political interests. And for mentalities especially sensitive to the real and apparent disarray of human affairs or philosophically intolerant of ambiguity in social structure, there is, after all, a great utopian charm in such an image: much like the classical Marxist formula of salvation, it seems to promise a final answer to the centuries-old dislocations generated by modernism and science and a return to a latter-day version of a medieval world where everything—and everyone—apparently had a proper place in the universe.

Assuming this assessment of the basic aspirations of the Soviet regime to be correct, there is the quite different question of how far they are likely to be realized in practice. Naturally it would be unrealistic to expect complete and literal fufillment of the dream, any more than one could have expected perfect totalitarianism to exist under Stalin. The issue, then, is how closely it will or can be approximated. Without going into the kind of detailed discussion that is far beyond the scope of these early notes, the best that can be done is to suggest some of the factors in a balance sheet of probabilities.

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In the background is the ancient dilemma of how to combine personal with public interest in such ways as to put an end to politics. If the record of other complex societies (not to mention the history of the Soviet Union itself) is a guide, we may be excused for having serious doubts about such a grandiose conception. To deny that there is social conflict, as the Soviet leadership essentially does, is not to be rid of it. Even the most superficial reading of the Soviet press daily provides an endless catalogue of the stresses and strains arising from the pursuit of private or group interests against the demands for conformity emanating from the center. Some of the examples are petty, more of them are serious, all of them reflect the underlying tensions of an imperfectly coordinated society; they usually fall short of posing immediate threats to the political directorate but often have cumulative consequences of an unplanned and unintended nature. Moreover, broad areas of deviant behavior and subversive attitudes which once were suppressed by the application of prophylactic terror now have to be handled by more patient and indirect means. It is too early to say whether the new machinery of social control will be as adequate to the task as was pure Stalinism.

Then there is the paradoxical discovery, finally dawning on the regime, that the gradual alleviation of extreme material want that has been behind so many traditional problems may produce new and more subtle issues of control over a long-deprived population experiencing relative affluence for the first time. Failures to satisfy these wants are the obvious danger; success breeds more subtle risks, however, for a rising standard of living (as we have seen in the case of other industrial nations) often results in new forms of emotional investment that are to a great extent antithetical to the high level of public commitment obviously essential in realizing the administered society. We already have some evidence of this in the form of a troublesome youth problem in the Soviet Union: one of the greatest headaches of the post-Stalin regime has been how to prevent the drive for individual advancement and the intoxication with consumption from becoming the basis for a privatism that could easily wreck long-term intentions. So far the problem has been most visible among youth, but there is reason to believe that it is widespread.

To these and equally powerful impediments in the road to the administered society—for example, the articulate and sometimes effective objections of at least parts of the scientific, artistic, and intellectual communities to being as totally mobilized as they were under Stalin—must be added the even more vexing "technical" problem of *how* to

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administer and coordinate an entire enormous society effectively even in the absence of any special opposition. Yet when all this is said, what stands out is the remarkable success of the Soviet regime, during and since Stalin's day, in making a very impressive start.

Most important is the fact that, during almost half a century of Communist rule, the possibilities for alternative institutional forms have been largely wiped out. Even were the will to democratic or pluralistic institutions substantially present—and it is not—it is highly doubtful that the resources currently available by way of formal structures, source philosophies, or practical experience would go very far. The Bolshevization of a society, if it goes on long enough, is an irreversible process, because it is so intense and so total that it indelibly alters not only earlier institutional forms but the entire pattern of a population's expectations of reasonable and workable alternative possibilities for social order. This is not to say that the Soviet leaders have mastered history, for even a process that is irreversible can move forward in unintended and undesired directions. But the prospects of developing viable substitutes for a social system that has so long been based upon extreme and centralized organization are very poor. Ironically, the regime is probably correct—at least in the case of Soviet society—when it insists that any form of pluralism is impossible. The best that can be expected is a more or less benign totalism within the limits of the administered society, with a very slow erosion of the Bolshevik heritage; the worst, a surrender of good intentions to manage the society without terror and a return in some form to the excesses and cruelties of classical Stalinism.

How one evaluates this situation depends on his general political outlook and his preferences about the good society. Surely no one will deny that the Soviet citizen is, in the most elementary sense, better off today than he was under Stalin. And certainly no one will claim that the Soviet citizen prefers to be brutalized as he was then. Still, the thoroughgoing bureaucratization, the superorganization, of social life contains a special nightmare quality of its own even when shorn (as probably it must be if it is to operate efficiently) of raw psychic brutality and terror. And the easing of the terror, while an obviously welcome development, also has the consequence of diminishing the awareness of living in an essentially closed society and of reducing the capacity to act from moral indignation towards a freer life.

Perhaps the concept of the administered society, in this preliminary form, errs on the side of pessimism by making too much of the dream and not enough of the sheer confusion of reality. Daily life in the Soviet Union is far richer, far more problematical to its rulers, far less

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certain than an abstraction can depict; no doubt the framework of this modest idea will have to be considerably filled in before it can be of much use in practical analysis. But it does call attention to the inadequacy of the liberalization formula in understanding contemporary Soviet developments and the new ideology driving the regime. And if this is the dream of the post-Stalin leadership, then the Soviet system under Khrushchev may be moving not towards its Western counterparts but even farther away from them. If Khrushchev and his heirs succeed, the developments of the last decade in the Soviet Union will have been only a tactical regrouping on the march from a relatively primitive to a far more advanced variety of twentieth-century totalitarianism.

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MODERNIZATION AND CONDITIONS OF SUSTAINED GROWTH

By S. N. EISENSTADT*

THE nature of modern society, the quality of the modern social, civil, and moral order, has been in the forefront of sociological thought and inquiry since the very beginning of sociology. This interest has been greatly reinforced by the growing preoccupation with the extension of the processes of modernization beyond their initial place of origin in Western Europe and the United States to Eastern Europe and later to Asian and African countries. The continuous processes of modernization in these societies have greatly added to the store of knowledge about the nature and variety of modern society, and they also have enabled us to reformulate many of the most crucial problems in this area.

One of the most important of these problems, that of the quality of modern social and civil order, has lately been reformulated in terms of the conditions and possibility for sustained growth—a concept originating with the economists, but one that can be transferred to other institutional spheres.

There is by now a very abundant—although certainly not definitive—literature that attempts to analyze and specify both the economic and the non-economic factors that influence the take-off into economic growth, as well as its continuation or sustainment.[1] However, although the importance of the non-economic factors for economic growth has been fully recognized, there have until now been relatively few systematic attempts to analyze conditions of continuous growth in the non-economic spheres themselves. In this article we shall examine some of the characteristics of such sustained growth in non-economic spheres and propose some tentative hypotheses about the conditions under which it may develop.[2]

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[1] See, e.g., Benjamin Higgins, *Economic Development: Principles, Problems and Policies* (New York 1959), esp. 3 and 4; Bert F. Hoselitz, "Some Reflections on the Social and Cultural Conditions of Economic Productivity," *Civilisations*, XII, No. 4 (1962), 489-99.

[2] For some complementary analysis, see also S. N. Eisenstadt, "Modernization, Di-

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I

Let us start with a brief illustration of what we mean by sustained growth in the non-economic sphere. We shall take our main illustrations from the political field, and begin by pointing out some of the major structural characteristics of modernization within it.

These are, first, the development of a highly differentiated political structure in terms of specific political roles and institutions, of centralization of the polity, and of specific political goals and orientations.[3] Second, the development of modern political structures is marked by increased extension of the central administrative, legal, and political activities and their permeation into all spheres and regions of the society. Third, it entails the continuous spread of potential political power to wider groups in the society—ultimately, to all adult citizens. Fourth, it is characterized by the weakening of traditional elites and of traditional legitimation of the rulers and by the establishment of some sort of ideological, and often also institutional, accountability of the rulers to the ruled, who are the holders of potential political power.

The culmination of this process, as it has gradually developed in the outright modern systems, is the participation of the ruled in the selection of the rulers, in the setting-up of the major political goals and, to a smaller extent, in the formulation of policies. The formal expression of this is the system of elections, as it has evolved in one way or another in most modern political systems.

But political modernization implies not only the development of these various aspects of growing structural differentiation, but also the continuous development of new situations and problems. Thus, at different stages of the development of modern political systems, there have arisen different problems which became politically important and different types of organizational frameworks within which such problems were handled. At certain stages of modernization, the problem of suffrage and the definition of the new political community, the attainment of its independence, assumed central importance. In other societies or at other stages of modernization, problems of religious toleration or of so-called "secularization of culture" predominated, while in still others economic and social problems as well as problems of organization were most pertinent. The development of

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versity and Growth," Carnegie Faculty Seminar on Political and Administrative Development, Department of Government, Indiana University (Bloomington 1963).

[3] The discussion here follows S. N. Eisenstadt, "Bureaucracy and Political Development," in Joseph LaPalombara, ed., *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton 1963); and S. N. Eisenstadt, "Initial Institutional Patterns of Political Modernization: A Comparative Study," *Civilisations*, XII, No. 4 (1962), 461-73.

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each of these problems was necessarily connected with the entrance of various new groups and strata into the political arena.

Modern political systems are therefore faced not only, like any other political system, with the problem of how to maintain in general some balance between political demands and policies, but also with that of maintaining such a balance while absorbing demands and patterns of political organization that are, potentially at least, continuously changing. Hence, the central problem of political modernization can be seen as the ability of any system to adapt itself to these changing demands, to absorb them in terms of policy-making, and to assure its own continuity in the face of continuous new demands and new forms of political organization. In other words, political modernization creates in its wake problems of sustained political growth which become its central concern.

Similar considerations can be applied to other social spheres—to social organization, mobility and stratification, and, above all, cultural and scientific creativity. In all these spheres, new forms of social organization and new problems may arise. Such developments present their respective institutional spheres with the necessity of absorbing such changes and continuously widening the scope of human endeavor within the expanding social structure.

II

The preceding discussion does not imply that a modern society is always fully able to deal with such new problems as are generated within it. Although the propensity to generate changes and also to some extent to absorb them is built into the institutional structure of modern social systems, the capacity to deal with such changes effectively varies greatly among these societies.

The history of modern societies is, of course, full of cases of unsuccessful adaptation, or lack of adaptation, of existing structures to new types of problems and organizations and of inability on the part of the major institutions to incorporate, even in a partial way, the various changes and movements of protest that are inherent in the process of modernization. In such cases the capacity for continuous growth and sustenance of such growth may be blocked or impaired. The external manifestation of such blocking is usually some type of eruption—i.e., more or less violent outbreaks of social and political activity and the development of symbols that are oriented against the existing system and its symbols.

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While movements and symbols of protest constitute an integral part of modern—as of any other—society, they tend in modern societies to impinge on the more central spheres of the polity, and one important test of a modern society's capability for sustained growth is the extent to which its central institutions can absorb some of the symbols of protest. Insofar as such ability is small, there may easily develop various eruptions and blockages.[4] When such difficulties are not merely transitory, their structural outcomes may cause the disintegration of a given social, political, or economic system or the suppression of the new demands and organizations to a level (sometimes the former level, sometimes a new one) at which the existing institutions are capable of dealing with them—thus often creating conditions of uneasy stagnation.[5]

In general, it is necessary to emphasize in this context the importance of studying systematically the various cases of breakdown of modernization, of "stagnation" in modern regimes, which often coincide with the extension of socio-demographic and structural aspects of modernization, which will shortly be analyzed. The analysis of such cases may greatly facilitate identification of the conditions that aid or impede sustained growth in the various institutional fields under discussion.

III

What, then are the major social forces or conditions that facilitate or impede such processes of growth?

Although there has as yet been little full and explicit analysis of these problems, some implicit indications or assumptions may perhaps be found in the literature. These indications are closely related to the two major definitions of modernization, or—perhaps more correctly—to the most widely used indices of modernization—the socio-demographic and the structural ones—that can be found in the literature.

The broad socio-demographic and structural corollaries of modernization as they develop in the major institutional spheres have by now

[4] For some very pertinent analyses of protest in modern societies, see Morton A. Kaplan, ed., *The Revolution in World Politics* (New York 1962), esp. Part II ("Protest Movements in Developed Areas") and Part III ("Revolutionary Protest Movements in Underdeveloped Areas").

[5] See, e.g., Rupert Emerson, "The Erosion of Democracy in the New States," in Harry Eckstein and David E. Apter, eds., *Comparative Politics: A Reader* (New York 1963), 635-44; and Michael Brecher, "Political Instability in the New States of Asia," in *ibid.*, 617-35. See also S. N. Eisenstadt, "Breakdowns of Modernization," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* (forthcoming).

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been well-studied. Perhaps the socio-demographic indices of modernization have been summarized best by Karl Deutsch in his use of the term "social mobilization." He has defined it as the "process in which major clusters of old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded and broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior," and has indicated that some of its main indices are "exposure to aspects of modern life through demonstrations of machinery, buildings, consumer goods, . . ." response to mass media, change of residence, urbanization, change from agricultural occupations, literacy, growth of per capita income, and so on.[6]

Similarly, the major structural characteristics of modernization have been identified as the development of (1) a very high extent of differentiation; (2) free resources that are not committed to any fixed, ascriptive (kinship, territorial, etc.) groups; (3) specialized and diversified types of social organization; (4) wide, non-traditional, "national," or even supranational, group identifications; and (5) concomitantly, in all the major institutional spheres, specialized roles and wider regulative and allocative mechanisms and organizations—such as market mechanisms in economic life, voting and party activities in politics, and diverse bureaucratic organizations and mechanisms in most institutional spheres.[7]

Many analyses of processes of modernization that took off from some of the preceding considerations often led to or were based on the—usually implicit—assumption that the conditions for sustained growth in different institutional fields could be found in the continuous extension of these various socio-demographic and structural indices.

Thus, for instance, one possible view—very often propounded—has been that the more a society exhibits or develops the basic characteristics of structural specialization and the higher its various indices of

[6] Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *American Political Science Review*, LV (September 1961), 494, 495. See also United Nations, *Report on the World Social Situation* (New York 1961).

[7] Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (Glencoe, Ill., 1958); Bert F. Hoselitz, "Noneconomic Factors in Economic Development," *American Economic Review*, XLVII (May 1957), 28-41; Wilbert E. Moore, "The Social Framework of Economic Development," in Ralph J. Braibanti and Joseph J. Spengler, eds., *Traditions, Values and Socio-Economic Development* (Durham, N.C., 1961), 57-83; Joseph J. Spengler, "Theory, Ideology, Non-Economic Values and Politico-Economic Development," in *ibid.*, 3-56. A good summary is provided by Joseph A. Kahl, "Some Social Concomitants of Industrialization and Urbanization," *Human Organization*, XVIII (Summer 1959), 53-74. See also A. H. Leighton and R. J. Smith, "A Comparative Study of Social and Cultural Changes," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, XCII (April 1955), 79-88; Raymond Firth, F. H. Fisher, and D. C. Macrae, "Social Implications of Technological Change," in International Social Science Council, *Social and Economic and Technological Change: A Theoretical Approach* (Paris 1958).

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social mobilization, the more modern it will be—i.e., by implication, the better it will be able to absorb continuous growth. According to this view, the traditionalism or modernity of a society can be measured by the extent of development of social mobilization within it and by the extent to which its basic principles of allocation and organization are particularistic, diffuse, and ascriptive as against universalistic and achievement- and specificity-oriented. For instance, according to some of such approaches, traditional society tends to be a familistic one, while modern society tends to divest the family unit of most of its functions and moves in the direction of the small nuclear family.[8]

Needless to say, such an approach has a great deal of plausibility. However, it is not fully borne out by the available evidence, which seems to suggest that such close relations do not always exist between these indices of social mobilization and specific forms of structural differentiation, on the one hand, and the capacity to absorb continuous growth and change, on the other.

It is true that there exist some minimal or basic conditions without which, almost by definition, no modernization or no modern social structure is possible. Thus, it is impossible to envisage a modern economy without the development of markets, suitable labor capital, and demand for the products of industry.[9] Similarly, it is difficult to envisage a modern political system without some political and administrative centralization and a tendency toward the continuous spread of potential political power. Moreover, there can be no doubt that extension of criteria of universalism and achievement into every strategic part of the social structure—especially in the sphere of social stratification and in the legal system—and a growing specialization (or specification of different societal functions) are very crucial aspects of any process of modernization.

But, beyond such "base" characteristics, the evidence is not so clear. It is true that, on the whole, the initial historical cases of modernization, those of Western Europe and the United States, have tended to exhibit a more or less continuous expansion of indices of social mobi-

[8] See some of these views as expressed, e.g., in the earlier writings of Marion J. Levy, Jr., *The Family Revolution in Modern China* (Cambridge, Mass., 1952); and Bert F. Hoselitz, *Sociological Aspects of Economic Growth* (Glencoe, Ill., 1960), esp. chaps. 2 and 3—both of whom have since greatly modified their views. A more recent work which seems to have similar implications is W. W. Rostow, *Stages of Economic Growth* (Cambridge, Eng., 1960).

[9] See, e.g., Simon Kuznets, "Economic Requirements of Modern Industrialization," *Transactions of the Fifth World Congress of Sociology* (Washington, D.C., 1962), II, 73-90.

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lization, together with growing structural specialization and the institutional capacity for sustained growth. It is also true that these societies have proved until now to be best capable of continuous absorption of change and of sustained growth.

But the situation is much more complex in most other countries that have undergone processes of modernization. In many cases—in several Central and Eastern European, Latin American, and Asian countries—there may have developed at certain levels a negative correlation between a high degree of development of various socio-demographic indices like the degree of literacy, the spread of mass media, formal education, or urbanization, and the institutional ability to sustain growth.[10]

Moreover, the structural differentiation that has taken place as a result of processes of modernization certainly has not always been of the type that was predominant in the West during its own initial stages of modernization. That is, it has not always taken the form of a continuous growth of different collectivities with specialized functions in different institutional fields—economic, political, cultural, etc.—of seemingly continuous expansion of universalistic and achievement criteria in all institutional spheres, and the concomitant receding of traditional spheres of life.[11]

Thus, to mention only a few examples, the modernization of Russia under the Soviet regime—even if it has been, to use Professor Shils's expression, a deformed modernization—has taken place through several types of political and economic organizations that greatly differ from those of the West and that have evinced a much greater degree, not only of centralization, but also of what may be seen as a merging of political and economic functions in the same collective units.[12] Perhaps even more interesting is the case of Japan, where the process of modernization not only has retained many of the more traditional patterns of social life or has incorporated them into the developing

[10] See, e.g., U.N., *World Social Situation*; J. Medina Echavarriá, "Relationship Between Social and Economic Institutions: A Theoretical Model Applicable to Latin America," *Economic Bulletin for Latin America*, VI, No. 1 (1961), 27-41; and Report of the Expert Working Group on Social Aspects of Economic Development in Latin America, *ibid.*, 51-64.

[11] See also Daniel Lerner, "The Reviving Civilizations," in Harold D. Lasswell and Harlan Cleveland, eds., *The Ethic of Power: The Interplay of Religion, Philosophy and Politics* (New York 1962), 307-22; and Daniel Lerner, "Toward a Communication Theory of Modernization," in Lucian W. Pye, ed., *Communications and Political Development* (Princeton 1963).

[12] See, e.g., R. A. Feldmesser, "Social Classes and Political Structure," in C. E. Black, ed., *The Transformation of Russian Society* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), 235-53, as well as all of Part III of this volume and esp. Alex Inkeles, 338ff.

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modern frameworks, but also has been connected with what may be called the proliferation of new, continuously expanding, relatively particularistic units, such as the school and company cliques and company unions, which start to operate and coalesce after a relatively brief period in which universalistic and achievement criteria prevail.[13]

On the other hand, in many cases the development, extension, and transplantation of various "Western" structural forms have been connected with what may be called breakdowns of modernization—i.e., with an inability to maintain broader institutional frameworks capable of absorbing continuous changes.[14]

Thus it can perhaps be said that attainment of a certain level of "social mobilization" and of structural differentiation constitutes a *necessary condition* of modernization, but that the development of these processes does not constitute a *sufficient condition of continuity* of modernization, in the sense of creating an institutional framework capable of continuous absorption of change.

IV

Another possible explanation that can be found in the literature regarding the ability—or inability—of various modern regimes to sustain growth and absorb changes is couched in terms of different levels of conflicts between the major groups and strata that develop along with the processes of modernization. Thus it has sometimes been claimed that the various cases of breakdown of constitutional or semi-constitutional regimes can be explained in terms of the intensity of the conflicts that develop in these societies between the major groups—be they economic, regional, cultural, or ideological—or of "simple" conflicts of narrow economic interests occurring continuously between the most active or vocal groups in the society.[15]

[13] Some of the most interesting analyses of these varied aspects of Japanese social structure can be found in J. C. Pelzel, "Social Stratification in Japanese Urban Economic Life," unpublished dissertation, Harvard University, 1949; Herbert Passin, "The Stratigraphy of Protest in Japan," in Kaplan, ed., *Revolution in World Politics*, 92-100; Ezra F. Vogel, *Japan's New Middle Class* (Berkeley 1963); R. N. Bellah, "Values and Social Change in Modern Japan," in *Studies on Modernization of Japan*, Asian Cultural Studies, No. 3, International Christian University, Tokyo (October 1962), 13-57, as well as the other studies in this volume. See also Y. C. Matsumoto, "Contemporary Japan: The Individual and the Group," *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society*, N.S., L (1960), 1; Robert E. Ward, "Political Modernization and Political Culture in Japan," *World Politics*, XV (July 1963), 569-96.

[14] See Emerson, "Erosion of Democracy"; and Eisenstadt, "Breakdowns of Modernization."

[15] See Emerson, "Erosion of Democracy"; Merle Kling, "Towards a Theory of Power and Political Instability in Latin America," *Western Political Quarterly*, IX (March

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But this view is not tenable either. Conflicts between various groups are inherent in any social structure, and the more differentiated and variegated the structure, the higher the extent and intensity of such conflicts; thus the very process of modernization necessarily creates a high level of conflicts.

The major difference between those modern countries that were successful in maintaining some stability and growth and those that were not and in which various breakdowns took place, lay not in the extent and intensity of conflicts within them, but rather in the degree to which they developed ways of dealing with these conflicts and of regulating them. Hence the central aspect of the development of continuous growth and the successful absorption of change is the development of adequate regulative mechanisms capable of dealing with continuously changing and newly emerging problems and conflicts.[16]

The development and adequate functioning of such regulative mechanisms, the continuous implementation by the ruling elite of relatively acceptable policies, and the relatively successful and continuous resolution or regulation of various conflicts within a society are dependent upon two basic conditions. One is the establishment of relatively efficient institutional frameworks and organizations capable of regulating conflicts and providing adequate administrative services and injunctions. The other is the development of values and symbols acceptable in different degrees to the ruling elite and major groups of the population that upheld the various regulations and injunctions developed within these institutional frameworks.

These two aspects of the regulative mechanism may be compared to Durkheim's distinction between the contractual and the precontractual elements in social organization. While the distinction between these two aspects can be found in all societies, it becomes especially important in more differentiated ones, in situations—again to use Durkheim's nomenclature—of relatively high "organic solidarity." It becomes especially acute with the onset of modernization and the development of social structures engendering potentially continuous change.[17]

1956), 21-35; Khalid B. Sayeed, "Collapse of Parliamentary Democracy in Pakistan," *Middle East Journal*, XIII (Fall 1959), 389-406.

[16] See Eisenstadt, "Breakdowns of Modernization."

[17] See Emile Durkheim, *De la division du travail social* (4th edn., Paris 1922), chap. 7 and Conclusion. On the interweaving of these two types of mechanisms in primitive societies, see M. Fortes, "Ritual and Office in Tribal Societies," in M. Gluckman, ed., *Essays on the Ritual of Social Relations* (Manchester, Eng., 1963), 53-89. On problems of application of the anthropological model, as related to these mechanisms,

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Thus, in almost all modern or modernizing societies, the number of spheres of social activity—be they in the field of labor relations, industrial relations, or administrative practice—in which new contractual and administrative arrangements and regulations have developed is usually very great. But not in all of them were such arrangements upheld by commonly shared values and orientations, nor did adequate normative frameworks develop for the application of contractual and administrative injunctions to specific situations.[18]

Hence, in our search for the conditions facilitating sustained growth, we should look for those elements or forces that may help in the development and institutionalization of these two aspects of regulative mechanisms.

V

What then are the conditions that facilitate the development of such institutional structures?

It seems to us that a very useful approach to this problem is one that emphasizes and analyzes the interaction between the broader sociodemographic and structural aspects of modernization and the activities of the so-called "modernizing" elites.[19] Such an approach assumes—although the full implications of this assumption have not always been made explicit by those who uphold it—that the process of modernization is, like so many other processes of development of new institutional structures, advanced not only by the development within a society of certain general structural characteristics, but also by the activities of special "charismatic" groups or personalities.[20] Even if

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to more complex societies, see S. N. Eisenstadt, "Anthropological Studies of Complex Societies," *Current Anthropology*, II (June 1961), 201-22.

[18] One of the best analyses of such a situation can be found in Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Ithaca 1962).

[19] On the concept of modernizing elites, see Clark Kerr *et al., Industrialization and the Industrial Man* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960); David C. McClelland, *The Achieving Society* (Princeton 1961); Everett E. Hagen, *On the Theory of Social Change* (Homewood, Ill., 1962), esp. chap. 10; Clifford Geertz, *Peddlers and Princes: Social Change and Economic Modernization in Two Indonesian Towns* (Chicago 1963); and S. N. Eisenstadt, "The Need for Achievement" (review of McClelland, *op.cit.*), *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, XI (July 1963), 420-31.

[20] The two need not, of course, be entirely antithetical in the analysis of concrete cases, and yet they always entail great differences of emphasis. A very instructive example of such differences is the shift in the interpretation of Japanese modernization from the "class" interpretation in E. H. Norman, *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State* (New York 1960), to the more recent "elite" interpretations in A. M. Craig, *Chōshū in the Meiji Restoration* (Cambridge, Mass., 1961), and Marius B. Jansen, *Sakamoto Ryoma and the Meiji Restoration* (Princeton 1961). I am also indebted here to Professor R. N. Bellah for showing me a manuscript written by him and Professor Craig on different interpretations of the Meiji revolution. Perhaps the most

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the characteristics and orientations of the groups that are most active in modernization differ greatly from those of older, "classical," religious types of charisma, yet the institutionalization of modernization is not unlike the processes of routinization of charisma that were analyzed by Max Weber.

Hence the direction of the crystallization of any given modern institutional structure may be greatly influenced by the nature of the orientations and activities of the specific modernizing elites that develop and are most active in any given society or situation.

The recent analysis by Kerr and his associates has shown, even if only in a preliminary way, that different types of elites tend to develop different strategies with regard to some major problems of social and economic policy, such as the pace of industrialization, sources of funds, priorities in development, pressures on enterprises and managers, the educational system, policies of agriculture, and methods of allocation of labor.[21] This insight of theirs can be generalized to other spheres. Thus, to give only a few examples from the political field, it seems that multiple oligarchic elites may have a tendency to develop or recommend certain restricted types of legislative bodies and organs of public opinion. On the other hand, autocratic elites tend to work mostly through the executive and the bureaucracy, while "movement" elites—i.e., elites developing from social movements—tend to work through large-scale, very often monolithic, parties.[22]

But the institutionalization of the modernizing "push" of certain elites is dependent not only on their own inherent tendencies, but also on their relations with other modernizing elites that tend to develop within any society, and with the broader institutional setting within which they operate. This is particularly true of the pre-existing institutional structure and the holders of power positions within it, on the one hand, and with the broader groups and strata of the society, on the other.

Of special importance in this interrelationship between the different elites and the broader social structure is, first, the general level of development, of "internal modernization" and cohesiveness of the different strata taking part in the process of modernization, and the level of resources that are generated by them in this process. Second in im-

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important conclusion that can be derived from the confrontation of these two approaches is that although, obviously, both are extremely important in any process of modernization, the conditions giving rise to each may greatly differ.

[21] See Kerr, *Industrialization and Industrial Man.*

[22] See Eisenstadt, "Initial Institutional Patterns."

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portance is the extent of compatibility or affinity between the modernizing elites and the major social strata, and third is the interrelationship among different elite groups and especially the extent of harmony or dissociation between the more technical, professional, and administrative elite, on the one hand, and the more generalized, "solidarity-making," political and cultural elites, on the other.[23]

The concrete form of the interplay among various modernizing elites and between them and the major strata may vary greatly from society to society and within any society at different stages of its development.[24] But whatever these exact structural varieties, some common, broader, social conditions seem to facilitate the continuous absorption of change, as against those that impede it.

Such continuous absorption of change necessarily entails the development of social processes that, on the one hand, tend to break up any fixed, "freezing," ascriptive arrangements of groups and of the power structure, while on the other hand they facilitate their continuous restructuring within common institutional frameworks.

The continuous development of such processes is greatly dependent on the extent to which there develop, continuously, *both* what have been earlier designated, in Durkheim's terms, as "contractual" and "precontractual" frameworks.

The identification of the mechanism and conditions that facilitate the development of such processes and arrangements is certainly not an easy task, yet some indications can perhaps be attempted. The various researches and materials available in this area seem to show that the successful crystallization of such processes is dependent especially—although certainly not exclusively—on developments in certain aspects of the system of stratification and organization, of the initial patterns of institutionalization of modern political frameworks, and of what may be called ideological transformation within modern societies.[25]

VI

With regard to the system of stratification, perhaps the most important factor that greatly influences the continuous adaptability of

[23] See Karl Mannheim, *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction* (New York 1940), esp. ii; Edward A. Shils, *Political Development in the New States* (The Hague 1962), esp. 13-38; and Feith, *Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia.*

[24] See Eisenstadt, "Initial Institutional Patterns."

[25] Some initial attempts in this direction have been made in S. N. Eisenstadt, *Essays on Sociological Aspects of Political and Economic Development* (The Hague 1961), esp. 19-99. See also Manning Nash, "Some Social and Cultural Aspects of Economic Development," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, VII (January 1959), 137-51.

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social frameworks to modern economic and political tasks and frameworks has been the extent of flexibility of the status system, of the mutual openness of various elites and social groups; the extent of interchangeability of different elite tasks (e.g., economic, political, cultural); and the extent to which the original "traditional" elites were ready to accept new subgroups.[26]

These aspects of the status system are relevant to the successful onset and continuity of modernization in several respects:

(1) They facilitate the development of new elites willing to learn new modern roles in the economic, organizational, and political spheres.

(2) Such new elites (or the members of the old elite who have learned new tasks and patterns of behavior) can often acquire an established place in the structure of the communities, and so find some sort of *modus vivendi* with the older elites. The new criteria of status (i.e., of economic achievement and specialization, of participation in a political party or youth movement) often overlap with many of the older "traditional" ones without creating close groups constituted only according to one type of criterion, and in this way enable a relatively continuous development of varied organizations within a relatively common structure.

(3) Such flexibility of the status system may enable the development of some new status criteria and groups without great disruption of the cohesion of the older groups. In such cases, not only do the new groups have access to existing social positions, but new types of positions of wealth, power, and prestige and new criteria of access to them may develop, and the relative position of different groups with regard to all of them may change continuously.[27]

Both such status flexibility and the opposite tendencies to ascriptive freezing of structural arrangements can be found in all spheres of

[26] See Eisenstadt, *Essays*, esp. 49-53.

[27] This conclusion entails a basic reformulation of the usual approach to the problem of the relation between degrees of traditionalism and success in adaptation to modern conditions. The preceding analysis indicates that the structural features that characterize a traditional society are not in themselves necessarily the most important determinants of the degree of adjustment or adaptation to modern conditions. The important characteristics seem to be the degree of solidarity of the family and of the community, flexibility of elites and of systems of stratification, and probably other factors that are not always directly related, in a one-to-one way, to the structural, "typological" characteristics of traditional societies. They seem to exist in both more and less traditional societies, and to be more closely related to the cultural differentiations and interrelations between different subgroups that exist with the common framework of these different types of societies than to their overall structural characteristics. See Eisenstadt, *Essays*, ii; and Bert F. Hoselitz, "Traditions and Economic Growth," in Braibanti and Spengler, eds., 83-113.

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social organizations—in political parties, in labor organizations, in different areas and channels of mobility—and are not necessarily tied to any specific structural form or level of development.

Investigation of the exact ways in which these mechanisms develop under different conditions, in different social settings, still lies ahead of us. The concrete structural constellations of such status flexibility are numerous and certainly are not limited to any one type—i.e., to the type developed in Western societies. Again, interesting manifestations of such possibilities are found in Japan, where there has been a continuous development, almost segmentation, of new units—be they economic corporations, cliques, or neighborhood groups—together with some differentiation among the occupational, the political, and the community fields; and in the attempts in Russia to break down the inherently ascriptive tendencies in the educational structure.[28] But, needless to say, much more research is required in this sphere before we can arrive at even tentative conclusions.

VII

The development and continuity of such structural flexibility are greatly reinforced by developments in the other two spheres mentioned above—i.e., in the initial patterns of modern institutional frameworks, and in what may be called the ideological transformation of the society.

The establishment and continuity of basic political symbols and political and legal frameworks—of common symbols of political and national identification, of organs of political struggle, legislation, and administration—are basic prerequisites for the development of a sense of modern, differentiated political identity and affinity among the various groups and strata that are drawn into the context of a modern political community.

Such continuity constitutes an important agent of political socialization of wider groups and strata—i.e., of their absorption into the central political sphere, their acceptance or modification of the major rules of the political game, of the criteria for regulating their demands or legal rights and procedures, as well as the forms of political struggle, and for allocating administrative services.

Thus, the initial pattern of the establishment of the basic modern

[28] See Vogel, *Japan's New Middle Classes*; Robert Feldmesser, "Toward a Classless Society?" in Alex Inkeles and Kent Geiger, eds., *Soviet Society* (Boston 1961), 573-82; Nicholas De Witt, "Upheaval in Education," *Problems of Communism*, VIII (January-February 1959), 25-34.

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political frameworks can be of crucial importance as a prototype for the further stages of modernization, when new groups and strata become politically more active—although such prototypes need not necessarily remain unchanged later on. Moreover, the pattern of establishment of these institutions may also greatly influence the extent to which different levels of consensus can be developed and maintained in various modern regimes.

The establishment of such common symbols and institutions has been historically effected in several different, sometimes overlapping, ways and through different structural organizations.[29] But the effectiveness of these central symbols and institutions as agents of political socialization is not ensured through their mere establishment, and is not inherently given in any structural arrangement—although such establishment itself is of major importance—but is greatly dependent on several other factors or conditions.

Cases of relatively successful institutionalization of absorption of change within these central frameworks have been characterized, first, by the transformation and reformation of central societal and political institutions and symbols so that they have become, in a way, more flexible and differentiated than the former, traditional, pre-modern frameworks. This has usually been connected with a relatively successful incorporation of various local or partial particularistic traditions and symbols into the central sphere, a process that does not necessarily negate the vitality or "rightness" of these "partial" symbols but makes the wider framework an accepted common, meaningful, frame of reference for such different traditions. Second, of crucial importance in this context have been the establishment and institutionalization—whether formal or informal—of certain rules of the political game such as systems of election or less formal institutional devices that establish some procedural consensus in the society. A third basic element has been the continuous provision, through the maintenance of somewhat autonomous administrative activities, of political and administrative services irrespective of momentary changes in the political struggle. Lastly, such successful institutionalization has usually been greatly dependent on, and related to, the development of a relatively flexible and differentiated legal system which, whatever its social or political underpinnings, could assure some basic legal rights to individuals, some protection in the undertaking of long-term commitments and activities, and some minimal rights for citizens.

[29] Eisenstadt, "Initial Institutional Patterns."

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These varied characteristics, which have helped to institutionalize some dissociation between political power and other centers of social power by spreading out the accessibility to political power among different groups and by facilitating its use for creating new status criteria and groupings, tend to facilitate the development of some status flexibility or to reinforce such development.

VIII

The tendency to continuous structural recrystallization is also facilitated or reinforced by what may be called a value and ideological transformation of the society in question. This process may provide both the symbolic expressions and meaning for an overall differentiated social structure and the motivation for participation within it.

Weber's classical thesis about the Protestant ethic stressed the importance of changes in religious beliefs and values for the development of new, differentiated, social orientations and also, to some extent, for the institutionalization of such value systems.

The importance of these religious values for such development was rooted first in their content—i.e., in the fact that they stressed growing transcendentalism, individualism, and differentiation between the secular and the more sacred spheres—and in the impact of this content on the motivation and "action" orientation of individuals. But it was also rooted in the structural location of the groups that developed these orientations—in the fact that they were secondary elites, mostly organized in sects, concentrating on economic and cultural activities which were able to spread their orientations both "upward" towards the central political framework, and "downward" towards wider groups and strata of the population. Moreover, these orientations developed and first became institutionalized in societies that acquired a sense of national unity very early, through some of the mechanisms analyzed above, and in which nationalism itself did not become a focus of cultural innovation.

It was probably this combination of value orientations and of the structural placement of the innovating groups that greatly facilitated this institutionalization of some status flexibility within the new, developing frameworks.

One of the most fascinating and difficult problems in the comparative study of modernization is to determine in what situations, structural organizations, and value contents there may develop functional equivalents for these effects of the Protestant ethic. The only systematic

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attempt in this direction has been made with regard to Japan, where the existence of a strong achievement orientation bound to the collectivity was found to facilitate the relatively smooth process of initial modernization.[30]

Such analytical attempts should be extended to the study of collective ideologies (socialistic, nationalistic, etc.) that have developed in various modernizing societies; for example, to such cases as the Russian, Mexican, and Turkish revolutions. They could also be applied to the potentiality for such changes in the different major world religions, within whose historical framework many of the processes of modernization are now taking place.

In none of these cases do we find a situation similar to that in Western Europe and the United States, where the wider social groups and strata were to a very great extent open to these modernizing influences and tendencies in both the economic and the ideological sphere and were gradually drawn into the newly emerging wider economic and cultural frameworks and into the orbit of the new central political institutions. Hence in all these cases the elites faced the problem of "opening up," encouraging and regulating whatever more modernizing forces existed within the broader strata. But the extent to which their ideological orientations helped or hindered them in the development of these activities varied greatly.

In general, it may perhaps be useful to distinguish between, on the one hand, those modernizing—nationalistic, political, or social—elites which, while creating new symbols and political frameworks, were not able to effect within their respective societies far-reaching structural transformations that would facilitate continuous growth; and, on the other, the elites of Mexico, Turkey, and Japan, which were relatively more successful in this sphere.

Although it is yet too early to indicate the exact types of value and ideological orientations that facilitate such transformation, some of their characteristics can perhaps be tentatively indicated.

The elites that were to some extent successful in effecting such transformation aimed, in the ideological and value spheres, at the development of a new, more flexible set of symbols and collective identity which, while not negating the traditions, could incorporate them into these new symbolic frameworks. They aimed at the transformation of

[30] Robert N. Bellah, *Tokugawa Religion* (Glencoe, Ill., 1957). See also Geertz, *Peddlers and Princes*; and Talcott Parsons, *Structure and Process in Modern Societies* (Glencoe, Ill., 1959).

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the internal values of wider social groups and strata and at the development, among these groups, of new, more flexible orientations.

They developed simultaneous orientations to collective ideological transformation and to concrete tasks and problems in different "practical" fields. They perceived their own legitimation in terms of such wider changes and not only in terms of providing various immediate benefits to different social groups—although they hoped that ultimately the new political system would also bring marked improvements in the standard of living of the broader groups and strata of the population.

In this respect, the success of these elites varied greatly in different countries, depending on their own ideological affinity with wider groups of the society and on the degree of initial openness and flexibility on the part of these wider groups.[31]

These are necessarily only a few indications or attempts in the direction of analysis of these structural conditions of such ideological transformations. Much further work must be done here, especially in regard to the broader social and cultural conditions that influence the development of such value and ideological orientations.

IX

It seems that insofar as these processes develop in the three areas discussed above—i.e., in the systems of social stratification, in the initial modern political frameworks, and in the ideological transformation of the society—through a great, though not infinite, variety of structural forms and frameworks, they may greatly facilitate the development of conditions conducive to sustained growth and the institutional ability to absorb change.

Insofar as these processes occur, they may enhance the affinity between the modernizing elite or elites and the major groups and strata, and among the major modernizing elites themselves. They may also enhance the internal cohesiveness of the major strata, their ability to participate in the process of modernization in various institutional spheres, and to regulate through some autonomous mechanism some of the problems attendant on the growing differentiation and modernization, to articulate realistic political demands, and to influence the formulation of major political goals and policies by the elites. Under such conditions, the modernizing elites themselves will be relatively

[31] For a fuller exposition of some of these points, see Eisenstadt, "Breakdowns of Modernization."

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strong and cohesive and can mobilize adequate support from different strata without by this very process giving rise to new cleavages within the society and undermining the cohesion of these strata.

Insofar as all these processes tend to develop within a society, even if in different degrees, they strengthen the development of those structural conditions that facilitate the institutionalization of both contractual and precontractual frameworks and facilitate the cooperation of different types of elites.

Needless to say, exact analysis of the conditions under which these processes develop and the ways in which they become crystallized still lies ahead of us, but it seems likely that the study of these processes can serve as a bridge between the analysis of the structural varieties of modernization and the search for conditions of sustained growth.

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WORLD POLITICS AS A PRIMITIVE POLITICAL SYSTEM

By ROGER D. MASTERS*

I. Reasons for Comparing Primitive and International Politics

MANY primitive peoples have political systems which are very much like the international political system. If the characterization of world politics as mere "anarchy" is an exaggeration, surely anarchy moderated or inhibited by a balance of power is a fairly accurate description of the rivalry between sovereign nation-states. The Nuer, a primitive African people, have been described as living in an "ordered anarchy" which depends on a "balanced opposition of political segments."[1] It is commonplace to describe the international system as lacking a government, so that "might makes right." "In Nuerland legislative, judicial and executive functions are not invested in any persons or councils"; hence, throughout the society, "the club and the spear are the sanctions of rights."[2]

To be sure, politics among the Nuer—or any other primitive people—is not identical to world politics, but however important the differences may be, a number of writers have suggested the possibility of comparing the two kinds of political systems.[3] Curiously enough, however, there has been virtually no effort to elaborate these similarities comprehensively from a theoretical point of view.[4]

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[1] E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *The Nuer* (Oxford 1940), 181; *idem*, "The Nuer of the Southern Sudan," in M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, eds., *African Political Systems* (London 1940), 293.

[2] Evans-Pritchard, *The Nuer*, 162, 169. Cf. R. F. Barton, "Ifugao Law," *University of California Publications in American Archaeology and Ethnology*, XV (February 1915), 15.

[3] E.g., Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (1st edn., New York 1953), 221; George Modelski, "Agraria and Industria: Two Models of the International System," in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba, eds., *The International System* (Princeton 1961), 125-26; and David Easton, "Political Anthropology," in Bernard J. Siegel, ed., *Biennial Review of Anthropology 1959* (Stanford 1959), 235-36. At least one anthropologist was aware of the analogy: see R. F. Barton, *The Half-Way Sun* (New York 1930), 109-10; *idem*, *The Kalingas* (Chicago 1949), 101; and *idem*, "Ifugao Law," 100, 103. In his introduction to *The Kalingas*, E. A. Hoebel wrote: "International law is primitive law on a world scale" (p. 5). Cf. Hoebel's *The Law of Primitive Man* (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), 125-26, 318, 321, 330-33.

[4] Since this study was undertaken, an article has been published that marks a first step in this direction. See Chadwick F. Alger, "Comparison of Intranational and International Politics," *American Political Science Review*, LVII (June 1963), 414-19.

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It should be noted in passing that there are three more general reasons for comparing primitive and international political systems. An attempt to bridge the gap between political science and anthropology has merits because such cross-disciplinary endeavors may free one from unnecessarily narrow assumptions which often dominate research in a given field. This is particularly true with respect to political anthropology, since the political aspects of primitive society have often been only imperfectly analyzed.[5]

Secondly, it may not be amiss to point out that long before anthropology was established as a discipline, political philosophers analyzed the social and political antecedents of existing states and governments.[6] The idea of a "state of nature," in which men lived before the establishment of governments, plays an important role in the history of political philosophy. Although recent students of primitive society have argued that "the theories of political philosophers" are "of little scientific value,"[7] the existence of a tradition which considered the "state of nature" as relevant to any political theory may indicate that political scientists should consider primitive politics more fully than they now do.

This general point is of specific importance for the theory of international politics because it can be said that the modern theory of international relations took the notion of a "state of nature" as its model.[8] Since anthropologists have asserted that such a "state of nature" never existed, consideration of the empirical and theoretical relevance of the concept may well be in order; not the least of the advantages of a comparison between primitive and international politics would be a fuller understanding of the relevance of modern political philosophy to a theory of world politics.[9]

[5] In 1940, A. R. Radcliffe-Brown said: "The comparative study of political institutions, with special reference to the simpler societies, is an important branch of social anthropology which has not yet received the attention it deserves" (Preface, in Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, eds., *African Political Systems*, xi). More recently, David Easton has written: "Such a subfield [as political anthropology] does not yet exist" ("Political Anthropology," 210).

[6] E.g., Montaigne, *Essays*, I, xxiii ("Of Custom, and that We Should Not Easily Change a Law Received"), and I, xxxi ("Of Cannibals"); Rousseau, *Second Discourse*, esp. First Part and notes c-q; and Locke, *Second Treatise of Civil Government*, esp. chaps. 2 and 3.

[7] Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, *African Political Systems*, 4. See also Henry Sumner Maine's sharp criticism of Rousseau's conception of the "state of nature" in *Ancient Law* (New York 1874), 84-88, 299.

[8] On the relations between the concept of a "state of nature" and the prevailing theory of politics among sovereign states, see Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (New York 1959), esp. chaps. 6-8; and Richard H. Cox, *Locke on War and Peace* (Oxford 1960), esp. chap. 4.

[9] Cf. Kenneth N. Waltz, "Political Philosophy and the Study of International Re-

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Finally, as Ragnar Numelin has shown, "international relations" (or its analog) exists among uncivilized peoples; the "discovery" of diplomacy cannot be attributed, as it customarily is, to the "historical" cultures of the Mediterranean or Orient.[10] Thus any exhaustive theory of world politics would have to comprehend the rivalry, warfare, and diplomacy of primitive peoples as genuine examples of "international politics."

II. Similarities Between Primitive and International Politics

At the outset, four elements common to politics within a number of primitive societies and international relations deserve mention: first, the absence of a formal government with power to judge and punish violations of law; second, the use of violence and "self-help" by the members of the system to achieve their objectives and enforce obligations; third, the derivation of law and moral obligations either from custom or from explicit, particular bargaining relationships (i.e., the absence of a formal legislative body operating on the basis of—and making—general rules); and fourth, a predominant organizational principle which establishes political units serving many functions in the overall social system.

The first three of these similarities between primitive and international politics are relatively self-evident when one considers those primitive societies which lack fully developed governments. The fourth, however, may not be as clear. In certain primitive societies, territorial political units are largely defined, especially in the eyes of their members, in terms of kinship groups which are reckoned either "unilaterally" (i.e., groups such as the "lineage," in which descent is in either the male or female line from a common ancestor), or "bilaterally" (i.e., the family group includes relatives of both mother and father, as in modern, "Western" society).[11] Different combinations or divisions of these groups, on a territorial basis, often provide the basic structure of the entire political system.

Although it is not normally noted, the international system of sov-

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lations," in William T. R. Fox, ed., *Theoretical Aspects of International Relations* (Notre Dame, Ind., 1959), 51-68; and Arnold Wolfers, "Political Theory and International Relations," in Arnold Wolfers and Laurence W. Martin, eds., *The Anglo-American Tradition in Foreign Affairs* (New Haven 1956), esp. xi-xiii.

[10] Ragnar Numelin, *The Beginnings of Diplomacy* (New York 1950), 125 *et passim*.

[11] See Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, *African Political Systems*, 11; and Barton, "Ifugao Law," 92-94, 110. Carl Landé, in a stimulating unpublished paper entitled "Kinship and Politics in Pre-Modern and Non-Western Societies," has emphasized the different effects of these two types of kinship groups.

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ereign states is also organized largely on the basis of a single principle. In this case, the principle is that of "territorial sovereignty"—i.e., the conception that sovereignty "is always associated with the proprietorship of a limited portion of the earth's surface, and that 'sovereigns' *inter se* are to be deemed not *paramount*, but *absolute* owners of the state's territory."[12] This ultimate authority can, of course, be divided, as it is in federal states; but so, too, with the lineage principle in some primitive systems which are divided into different levels of units.[13]

In primitive societies like the Nuer, lineage or kinship groups perform a wide variety of functions, so that it is not possible to point to a specific action and define it as "political";[14] rather, there is a political element in many actions which simultaneously serve other purposes. This characteristic has been described in recent sociological literature as the "functional diffuseness" of traditional social structures.[15] The conception of "diffuseness" is thus opposed to "functional specificity" (i.e., the organization of a special group or institution to perform a given activity or function), which is supposed to prevail in all modern societies.

An extreme example of this usage is found in Riggs's polar conceptions of a "fused" system, in which "a single structure performs all the necessary functions," and a "refracted society," in which, "for every function, a corresponding structure exists."[16] Riggs argues that traditional, agrarian societies are "fused," whereas modern, industrialized societies are "refracted." While such a distinction may indicate an im-

[12] Maine, *Ancient Law*, 99 (original italics).

[13] The foregoing comparison may appear to come strikingly close to the formulations of Maine (*ibid.*, 124-25) and Lewis H. Morgan (*Ancient Society* [New York 1877], 6-7)—formulations which have been criticized in recent years by anthropologists. See I. Schapera, *Government and Politics in Tribal Societies* (London 1956), 2-5. Despite the inadequacies of the conceptions of Maine and Morgan, especially with reference to their presumption of progress in human development, some distinction between primitive or traditional society, in which kinship and personal "status" play a predominant role, and modern territorial states, based on citizenship and contract, is today accepted by many social scientists. Indeed, it is paradoxical that while anthropologists have been attacking the Maine-Morgan dichotomy (by showing that all societies have a territorial element), sociologists and political scientists have been adopting the distinction from the works of Tönnies, Weber, Parsons, or Levy. E.g., see Fred W. Riggs, "Agraria and Industria—Toward a Typology of Comparative Administration," in William J. Siffin, ed., *Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration* (Bloomington 1959), 28-30, 111.

[14] E.g., according to Evans-Pritchard, "We do not therefore say that a man is acting politically or otherwise, but that between local groups there are relations of a structural order that can be called political" (*The Nuer*, 264-65).

[15] See Talcott Parsons, *The Social System* (Glencoe, Ill., 1951), 65-67.

[16] Fred W. Riggs, "International Relations as a Prismatic System," in Knorr and Verba, eds., *The International System*, 149. Cf. Modelski, "Agraria and Industria," in *ibid.*, for a stimulating adaptation of Riggs's concepts.

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portant tendency, it is a radical exaggeration to imply that in modern political systems, "for every function, a corresponding structure exists." The political unit of the modern state system has a "fused" character which parallels the "diffuse" role of kinship groups in primitive societies like the Nuer.[17] Moreover, just as an industrial civilization does not presuppose a perfectly "refracted" society, traditional societies are rarely totally "fused."[18]

Up to this point we have tried to show two things: first, that there is a striking similarity between some primitive political systems and the modern international system; and second, that one element of this similarity is the "functional diffuseness" of political units in both types of system. If this is so, one cannot employ the polar opposites of "primitive" and "modern" or "functionally diffuse" and "functionally specific" as the basis of a comparative analysis of primitive political systems. Because primitive political systems vary enormously, one must explicitly distinguish the particular *kind* of primitive society which is supposed to present the greatest similarity to world politics.

In order to compare primitive and international politics, therefore, one needs a classification which distinguishes primitive societies in terms of their political structure. Although the typologies of primitive political systems hitherto developed by anthropologists have been imperfect, it will be useful to accept provisionally the distinction between primitive peoples which have developed some form of governmental institutions and those which have generally been called "stateless societies."[19]

[17] To be sure, it is easier to specify what actions are "political" in the twentieth-century world than it was for Evans-Pritchard among the Nuer. Nonetheless, as Karl Deutsch has remarked, the nation-state is itself "functionally diffuse," performing an extraordinary range of economic, social, and political functions. See "Towards Western European Integration: An Interim Assessment," *Journal of International Affairs*, XVI (1962), 95-96. Cf. Gabriel A. Almond, "Introduction," in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton 1960), 11, 63.

[18] It is simply incorrect to assert that nonliterate peoples, however traditionally minded, were incapable of developing "functionally specific roles," "achievement norms of recruitment," or the "state" as a formal organization; each of these attributes, so readily described as "modern," can be found in societies which must be described as "primitive." For an example, see S. F. Nadel, *A Black Byzantium: The Kingdom of the Nupe in Nigeria* (London 1942). Cf. Riggs, "Agraria and Industria," 28. While some anthropologists would argue that primitive bands, such as those of the Australian aborigines and African bushmen, are an exception, others would suggest that there are some "functionally specific" roles even in these societies.

[19] See Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, *African Political Systems*, 5-23; John Middleton and David Tait, eds., *Tribes Without Rulers* (London 1958), 1-3; Lucy Mair, *Primitive Government* (Baltimore 1962), Part 1; Schapera, *Government and Politics*, 63-64, 208-14; and Robert Lowie, *Social Organization* (New York 1948), chap. 14. For a critique of the categories used by anthropologists, see Easton, "Political Anthropology," 210-26.

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The following comparison will focus on primitive societies that lack formal governments. Such systems may be described as having "diffuse leadership," since individuals or groups have influence without formally institutionalized coercive authority. There may be a "titular chief" in these societies, but such an individual, even together with other influential men, does not act as a ruler. Since the modern world, as a political system, shares this structural characteristic of "statelessness," a résumé of political life in primitive stateless societies will show the utility of comparing them to the international political system.

III. "Self-Help" and Violence in Primitive Stateless Societies

In stateless systems, disputes cannot be referred to an impartial government backed by a police force. The characteristic pattern of responding to criminal or civil wrongs is "self-help": the individual or group which feels injured considers himself or itself legitimately responsible for punishing a crime or penalizing a tort. Self-help in these circumstances involves two stages which appear to be directly comparable to the functions of adjudication and enforcement in modern legal systems. In either system, first it is necessary to determine that a wrong has occurred and that a particular individual or group will be punished in a particular way; second, the punishment or penalty for that wrong must be enforced or implemented.

In the simplest primitive societies, both stages are accomplished by the individual or family that has been wronged. For example, when a kinship group discovers that one of its members has been murdered, the guilty individual and his kinship group will be identified and a retaliatory killing (or other punishment) will be inflicted by the wronged group. As Barton indicated in his study of Philippine headhunters, such self-enforcement of legal penalties[20] raises a crucial problem among stateless primitive peoples. The kinship group which enforces the *lex talionis* by killing a murderer or one of his kin sees this act as not only necessary, but also legitimate. Although unrelated bystanders may accept this interpretation, since retaliatory killing is customary, the kinship group which is penalized may not consider the retaliation to be a legitimate punishment.[21] When this occurs, there

[20] It must be emphasized that the retaliation is *legal*, being sanctioned by customary law (or, in Weber's terms, "traditional legitimacy"). Cf. Mair, *Primitive Government*, 16-19; and A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, *Structure and Function in Primitive Society* (Glencoe, Ill., 1952), chap. 12.

[21] See Barton, *The Kalingas*, 231. Note the parallel tendency in world politics: "One

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is often a tendency for crime and punishment to "escalate" into a more or less permanent relation of "feud" between the kinship groups involved.[22]

In feuds, violence usually takes the form of sporadic surprise attacks by individuals or small groups. Hence a condition of feud should not be equated too completely with what we call "war";[23] rather, it is a condition of rivalry in which intermittent violence and aggression (e.g., seizure of property or person as well as retaliatory killing) appear legitimate to those who attack, and illegitimate to the victims. The similarity of this "state of feud" and a Hobbesian "state of nature" is obvious, with the important difference that kinship groups are often involved, instead of isolated individuals.

Although the notion of modern warfare cannot be accurately applied to all primitive intergroup fighting, primitive violence sometimes approximates a civilized war. The gradations of conflict arising out of self-help have been clarified by Tait and Middleton, who suggest that primitive feuds and wars be distinguished because only in the latter is there no obligation to attempt to settle the dispute.[24] They argue that within a restricted range (which varies from one primitive society to another) the more or less permanent condition of feud rivalry

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state's aggression is always another state's 'legitimate use of force to defend vital national interests'" (Inis L. Claude, Jr., "United Nations Use of Military Force," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, VII [June 1963], 119).

[22] Cf. Barton, *The Half-Way Sun*, chaps. 5 and 6. In some situations, however, a group may refrain from counterretaliation, either because the kinsman who was punished was offensive to his own kin or because the group lacks the power to react. As Carl Landé has pointed out to me, the principles of "an eye for an eye" and "might makes right" may, and often do, conflict in the operation of both primitive and international political systems.

[23] Numelin argues that organized, continuous warfare of the type known to civilized man is practically unknown among primitive peoples (*The Beginnings of Diplomacy*, chap. 2). Cf. Schapera, *Government and Politics*, 215, 219; and Melville J. Herskovits, *Cultural Anthropology* (New York 1955), 207-8.

[24] "Introduction," *Tribes Without Rulers*, 20-22. Cf. Radcliffe-Brown, *African Political Systems*, xx. A similar though not identical distinction is made by Barton, "Ifugao Law," 77-78. Kinds of violence in primitive society could also be distinguished in terms of the extent to which groups act as corporate units and the degree to which violence is continuous. In this sense, a true "war" would consist of more or less continuous hostilities between corporate groups, whereas "feuds," in the purest case, would be intermittent conflicts between individuals (albeit with the support of kinship groups). Although such an approach would take into consideration the fundamental issue raised by Rousseau's criticism of Hobbes's concept of a "state of war" (see *L'État de guerre*, in C. E. Vaughan, ed., *The Political Writings of Rousseau* [2 vols., Cambridge, Eng., 1915], I, 293-307), it raises theoretical questions which require a more exhaustive analysis than is here possible. For the present, therefore, it is useful to accept provisionally the distinction between feud and war as elaborated by anthropologists.

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is rendered unlikely, if not impossible, by the existence of close kinship ties and relationships of "administrative organization."

At this level there may be a duel or the requirement that ritual acts of atonement be performed, but prolonged group rivalry is unlikely since the individuals concerned are all members of a single "nuclear group" (which is, normally, a local community, a kinship group, or both). Within such a local or family unit, disputes culminating in violence are not self-perpetuating; as in modern states, a punishment or penalty "atones" for a crime and thereby completes the legal case.[25]

Outside of this range, punishment does not terminate the rivalry arising out of a dispute; although retaliatory violence tends to be self-perpetuating, Tait and Middleton suggest that there is a zone in which violence can be described as a feud because the opposed groups recognize an obligation to settle their dispute. In this range of social interaction there are normally procedures for arriving at a settlement. Hence, among the Nuer, the "leopard-skin chief" holds an office which serves the function of settling feuds on the basis of compensation.[26] The "go-between" among the Ifugao serves a similar function.[27]

This does not mean that such means of settling the feud are always successful, nor that the settlement is in fact permanent. On the contrary, Evans-Pritchard concludes: "Though the chief admonishes the relatives of the dead man at the ceremonies of settlement that the feud is ended and must not be renewed, Nuer know that 'a feud never ends'. . . . There is no frequent fighting or continuous unabated hostility, but the sore rankles and the feud, though formally concluded, may at any time break out again."[28] Hence the settlement of a feud amounts to a truce—one might say a treaty, given the impermanence of similar settlements in international politics—between rival groups. Such a settlement may occur because feuding segments need to cooperate on other matters, but it cannot unite them into a harmonious unit without further steps, such as a marriage between the feuding families.[29]

Tait and Middleton use the term "jural community" to describe the unit within which disputes take the form of feuds to be settled

[25] Tait and Middleton, *Tribes Without Rulers*, 19-20. See Barton, "Ifugao Law," 14-15, and the example, 120-21.

[26] Evans-Pritchard, *The Nuer*, 152-54.

[27] Barton, *The Half-Way Sun*, 109-10, and the example described on 70ff.

[28] *The Nuer*, 155. Cf. Barton, "Ifugao Law," 75: "Once started, a blood feud was well-nigh eternal (unless ended by a fusion of the families by means of marriage)."

[29] See the example in Barton, *The Half-Way Sun*, 115.

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by an established procedure.[30] Violence on this level tends to be limited in a way which presents very revealing similarities to procedures in international affairs: as with "limited war," there is a restriction on the means of violence used and the ends sought, and like some interstate treaties, each rival group is willing to end violence (if only temporarily) because of the need to cooperate with its rivals. Hence the settlement of a feud does not ordinarily preclude the recurrence of violence; as in international treaties, the parties are their own judges of the maintenance of the conditions of the peaceful settlement.[31]

The feuding condition is thus a relationship between rival groups in which violence is a latent but ever-present threat should disputes arise. War, as defined by Tait and Middleton, is a more extreme form of competition, since there is no obligation to settle conflict, however temporarily. Among many peoples with leaders instead of rulers and governments, a distinction is made between those groups with whom violence is limited to feuding and those with whom there is a continuous condition of war. A given group is not bound by common procedures of dispute settlement with foreigners or with individuals from different parts (or "jural communities") of the same nation. For example, whereas conflicting groups from the same Nuer tribe could only be in a state of feud, individuals or groups from different Nuer tribes are always in a potential state of war with each other. When spatially or culturally distant groups are involved, violence is likely to emerge at any time, even in the absence of a formal dispute.[32]

Among stateless primitive peoples, therefore, social distance (which is highly correlated with geographical distance) decreases the likelihood that violence, should it occur, will be limited.[33] This spatial distinction between those who are "far" and those who are "near" tends to produce a series of concentric zones around each group in many primitive

[30] "The jural community . . . is the widest grouping within which there are a moral obligation and a means ultimately to settle disputes peaceably" (*Tribes Without Rulers*, 9).

[31] Cf. the rarity of the emergence of what has been called a "security community" in international politics. Karl Deutsch, *et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton 1957), chap. 1.

[32] Evans-Pritchard, *The Nuer*, 121-22. Cf. Lewis H. Morgan, *League of the Iroquois* (Rochester 1851), 73.

[33] The conquest of physical space by modern technology has altered the character of "social distance" without destroying it. Today differences in the kind of political regime tend to have effects similar to those of geographical distance between primitive tribes; because of their political principles, Communist regimes are those farthest from the United States even when they are close to us in miles. Cf. the concepts of "structural distance" (Evans-Pritchard, *The Nuer*, 113ff.) and "social distance" (Emory S. Bogardus, *Sociology* [4th edn., New York 1954], 535-36).

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worlds.[34] Where such zones have been found, the specific boundaries of each region are often unclear. Thus there is considerable evidence that, for a member of many primitive societies without a government, the group or "political community" to which allegiance is owed varies, depending on the dispute in question.[35]

This characteristic is related to one of the fundamental differences between many primitive political systems and world politics—namely, the fusion of various levels of social intercourse which we are accustomed to distinguish. In modern life, one can speak of a distinction between the level of a society (normally organized as a nation-state), that of a local community, and that of a family. For the primitive, the family or kinship group may include all residents of a locality; even if it does not, the kinship group or locality will tend to have many of the functions of a modern society without having either the political structure or the unique claim to allegiance of the modern state. As a consequence, parallels drawn between primitive political systems and international politics, however useful they may be in other respects, must take into consideration differences in the scope and powers of units in the two kinds of systems.[36]

Despite these differences, however, there are some striking similarities between primitive stateless societies and international political systems with respect to the role of violence in intergroup conflict. In both, there is a range of social relationships which is relatively exempt from self-perpetuating violence; within the "nuclear groups" composing both systems, the procedures for settling disputes or atoning for crimes are terminal, at least in principle. In both types of systems, intermittent, violent conflict between nuclear groups can be temporarily settled without removing the potentiality of further attacks. Violence is justified in the eyes of the aggressive group because the legal system permits self-help as a means of enforcing one's rights. Since the punished group denies this justification, there is a tendency for a conflict

[34] See the similar diagrams in Barton, *The Half-Way Sun*, 114, and Evans-Pritchard, *The Nuer*, 114. Note that Barton distinguishes a "neutral zone" between the "home region" and the zone of feuding.

[35] See Mair, *Primitive Government*, 46-48, 104-6.

[36] The problem of units and levels of analysis has had surprisingly little attention in recent theorizing on international politics. For exceptions, see Karl Deutsch, *Political Community at the International Level* (Garden City, N.Y., 1954); Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*; and J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," in Knorr and Verba, eds., *The International System*, 77-92. Of particular importance is the relationship between a cultural community or "people" and organized "political communities." Cf. Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," *Journal of Politics*, XVIII (August 1956), 393-408.

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to erupt into an exchange of hostilities, a tendency which is restrained between those groups which consider themselves to be similar or "near" each other. These similarities indicate that the analogy between primitive political systems without governments and international politics is not merely fanciful; both appear to belong to a general class of political systems in which self-help or violence is an accepted and legitimate mode of procedure.

IV. Order in Primitive Stateless Societies

In discussing the characteristics of violence in primitive societies which lack rulers, there has been an emphasis on the competitive relationship of opposed groups. When seen in this light, primitive society may seem to be a barely controlled anarchy in which security of life and limb is scarcely to be expected. Since this impression is inaccurate, it is of the greatest importance to emphasize the variety of political functions performed in primitive stateless societies.

Even if one disputes Barton's estimate that the life of the Philippine headhunter was more secure than that of a citizen in modern societies, it is undoubtedly true that, as he says, "a people having no vestige of constituted authority and therefore living in literal anarchy, [can] dwell in comparative peace and security of life and property."[37] Whatever the logical merits of Hobbes's conception of a "state of nature," it does not seem to follow, at least among primitive peoples, that the anarchy of social life without a government produces a violent war of all against all. Quite the contrary, it would appear that violence in such primitive societies often serves the function of maintaining law and order according to customary procedures.

The pacific functions of self-help can be clearly seen if one considers the circumstances in which violence does *not* arise out of conflict in a stateless primitive system. In the simplest of such societies, the necessities of cooperation tend to preclude violence within the family and locality, while the limitations of technology tend to restrict social intercourse to these relatively narrow groups; hence, among the technologically least developed primitives, feuding relations are rare and wars virtually unknown. In this kind of system, self-help and retaliation function effectively as the only forcible means for punishing crimes because social opprobrium is, in itself, a strong punishment.[38]

[37] Barton, "Ifugao Law," 6. Barton calculated the annual death rate from headhunting at 2 per 1000 during a period of "abnormally high" activity (*The Half-Way Sun*, 200). In the United States, accidental deaths from all causes during 1963 were at the rate of 5.3 per 1000.

[38] E.g., A. R. [Radcliffe-] Brown, *The Andaman Islanders* (Cambridge, Eng., 1922), 48-52, 84-87.

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Among primitive peoples with a more complex stateless system, such as the Ifugao studied by Barton, there are many occasions for feuding or warfare, but actual violence does not arise out of every dispute. The limitation of violence between potentially feuding groups is related to the institutions which serve the function of settling feuds. The Ifugao "go-between" not only acts as a mediator in feuds which have caused deaths on either side, but also acts prior to the eruption of violence in an effort to prevent such killings. In negotiating disputes which have not yet led to killing, he emphasizes at every stage the dangers implicit in open feuding; by describing these dangers in detail, the "go-between" (with the backing of his own family and the local community at large) attempts to deter an attack by either of the opposed families.

Institutionalized pressures to prevent the outbreak of violence also occur within the rival groups themselves. Thus, while the closest relatives of an offended individual may insist on the need for killing as a punishment for such wrongs as adultery, sorcery, or refusal to pay debts, more wealthy relations (who, according to Ifugao custom, may be more vulnerable to counterretaliation than the killer should a feud occur) frequently counsel moderation.[39] Since retaliation is an action decided upon by the family as a unit, and since feuds are difficult to settle, "the accuser is usually not overanxious to kill the accused."[40]

Whether originating with a "go-between" or a member of a wronged group, advice that open feuding be avoided, or at least limited, is characteristic of a phenomenon which has recently received extensive attention in foreign affairs—namely, deterrence. Although it has sometimes been assumed that deterrence requires a rational calculation of the consequences of an attack, deterrence and self-help among primitive peoples do not presuppose a conscious strategic calculation of the type formalized by game theorists.[41] Thus the possibility of violent counterretaliation may, in itself and without further calculation, stabilize rivalries and limit conflicts when there is no governmental arbiter to enforce law and order.

[39] On the characteristics of self-help and retaliation among the Ifugao, see Barton, *The Half-Way Sun*, chaps. 3, 5, and 6; and "Ifugao Law," 75-87, 92-95, 99-109.

[40] *Ibid.*, 95. Compare the Cuban crisis of October 1962.

[41] Sophisticated students of strategy have never assumed, of course, that rivals can deter each other only if their calculations are formulated in terms of game theory. Cf. Thomas Schelling's analogy of deterring a child, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), 11. Nonetheless, popular analyses often assert that deterrence implies—and requires—rational calculation on both sides. E.g., Seymour Melman, *The Peace Race* (New York 1961), 22.

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In order to avoid an overemphasis on either the stability produced by deterrence or the violence resulting from self-help, it will be useful to view both as necessarily related consequences of a political system which lacks authoritative governmental institutions. In political regimes of this kind, self-help and deterrence have the function of regulating bargaining between opposed groups, but they also serve as a means of organizing social intercourse in a predictable fashion. This latter function is especially important, though it tends to be overlooked in analyses of deterrence from the standpoint of a theory of strategy.

Retaliation by an offended group, both as a means of deterring wrongs and as a method of punishment, can therefore be studied in terms of its social consequences. As Barton points out with reference to headhunting, these consequences are multiple, and are sometimes not consciously perceived by those concerned.[42] Consciously, retaliation is a means of maintaining the well-being of an offended group and of responding to a specific wrong. Unintentionally or unconsciously, self-help serves to preserve and unite a group which has been threatened by another, to fix responsibility for wrongs, and thus to maintain a legal order. For a specific individual who executes retaliation, the dangerous exploits required for self-help may consciously be a means of gaining glory and influence as well as a means of preserving his legal rights.[43] Since all of these functions have analogies in the self-help conducted by sovereign nation-states, it would be unwise to see in retaliation and deterrence merely a means of maximizing the advantage gained by one of two or more rivals.

The essential character of both self-help and deterrence in primitive society is thus political in the broadest sense: when there is no government, retaliation and the threat of violence serve to unite social groups and maintain legal or moral criteria of right and wrong. This use of might to make right seems repugnant to civilized men, for it has been largely (though not completely) superseded within modern society; nonetheless, such a procedure is consonant with a particular kind of social order and cannot be dismissed as having been surpassed with the formation of the first political society. Primitive legal procedures may largely be confined to the international political system

[42] For the distinction between latent and manifest functions which is here implied, see Marion J. Levy, Jr., *The Structure of Society* (Princeton 1952), 83-85. Cf. Barton, *The Half-Way Sun*, 196-97.

[43] *Ibid.* Barton also notes that headhunting served the latent function of providing "relief from the monotony of daily life."

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today, but on this level the uncivilized notions of self-help and retaliation continue to play a decisive role.[44]

Indeed, the example of primitive societies which have successfully developed governmental institutions shows how difficult it is to substitute hierarchical legal procedures for self-help. Even among peoples like the Alur, who are ruled by chiefs, a significant category of wrongs are punished, at least in the first instance, by retaliation on the part of the offended group.[45] Only if the consequences of retaliation and counterretaliation threaten the security of innocent bystanders do the chiefs intervene, making the conflict a matter of "public law" punishable by an authority acting in the name of the tribe as a whole. In this eventuality, punishment may be meted out impartially to both parties to a feud; the creation of specifically governmental institutions represents a departure from the principle of self-help, and requires a minimal awareness that there is an organized community at a higher level than that of the contending groups.[46]

V. International Politics as a Primitive, Stateless System

The foregoing analysis has attempted to show how self-help, retaliation, and deterrence can be viewed as a characteristically primitive approach to law and order. Through this focus on stateless primitive peoples, the reliance upon self-help and deterrence in international relations appears to be evidence that the world forms a political system that is in many respects similar to primitive systems. Although it is often argued that international law and politics are *sui generis*,[47] the utility of a comparison between international affairs and stateless primitive societies is shown by two characteristic similarities: first, the relation of law to violence as a means of organizing a coherent social system; and second, the relationship of custom to rivalry and bargaining as means of making and applying known rules.[48]

Although it is fashionable to describe international relations as a

[44] Cf. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, V.1130^{b}30-1134^{a}15.

[45] Aidan W. Southall, *Alur Society* (Cambridge, Eng., n.d.), 144. See also 122-36, 160-65.

[46] *Ibid.*, 144-46, 234, 237-39.

[47] E.g., Stanley Hoffmann, "International Systems and International Law," in Knorr and Verba, eds., *The International System*, 205.

[48] The second of these characteristics is concerned, speaking crudely, with the relationship between what Almond has called the "political functions" of rule-making, rule application, and interest articulation, while the first corresponds roughly to his functions of interest aggregation and rule adjudication. The last of these functions, in a stateless system, should really be spoken of as rule enforcement, for obvious reasons. Cf. "Introduction," in Almond and Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas*, 17; and see note 82 below.

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lawless anarchy,[49] and to admit that international law exists only on condition that it be called "weak" law,[50] these habitual opinions must be questioned. It is true that the international system permits and even sanctions a considerable amount of violence and bloodshed; but, as has been seen, there is a class of stateless political systems which have this characteristic because they depend upon self-help for the enforcement of law. In such systems law and violence are related in a way that is quite different from the internal political order under which civilized man is accustomed to live; if we speak of international "anarchy," it would be well to bear in mind that it is an "ordered anarchy."

To prove that international law is not necessarily "weak," one need only consider the functions of law in a political system. Hoffmann has suggested that any legal order has three functions: it should produce "security," "satisfaction," and "flexibility."[51] According to these criteria, a legal system dependent upon the self-enforcement of rights by autonomous groups (be they families or nation-states) is "strong" in all three respects.

Most obviously, "flexibility" is assured in a system which recognizes any change in power; to the extent that might makes right, changes in might produce changes in right. It may be somewhat less evident that international law produces a "satisfactory" solution for disputes, yet this is on the whole true because of the admitted impossibility of reversing the verdict of brute force.[52] And, finally, the stateless international system even produces a modicum of security, most especially through deterrence based upon a mutual recognition that rival nations will both be harmed (if not destroyed) by the use of their legitimate right to self-help. In this respect it is worth emphasizing that the nuclear age, with its awesome potentialities for destruction, has also seen a corresponding increase in the unwillingness of powerful nation-states to resort to overt war.[53]

[49] Cf. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, chaps. 6 and 7. While the present essay is in complete agreement with Waltz's major theme (i.e., that war is a necessary consequence of the state system, since "in anarchy there is no automatic harmony"), his emphasis on the problem of war tends to understate the elements of legality and order in world politics.

[50] E.g., Hoffmann, "International Systems and International Law," 206-7.

[51] *Ibid.*, 212.

[52] Although the "satisfaction" with defeat in war may be of short duration, this is not a necessary consequence of military defeat (as the pro-Western attitude of West Germany and Japan after World War II indicates). The limited durability of "satisfactory" settlements will be discussed below.

[53] Since World War II there have been numerous international incidents which, under prenuclear conditions, would probably have resulted in open warfare. Cf. Her-

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To reveal more clearly the orderly (if violent) aspects of a stateless international system, several elements of the relationship between force and law need to be spelled out in greater detail. As in primitive stateless societies, not only does violence erupt intermittently from a continuing condition of potential feud or war between autonomous groups; cooperation also occurs sporadically. While such cooperation is sometimes limited to actions which prepare for or prosecute warfare (as in most alliances), the members of the interstate system have also been capable of making mutually binding cooperative decisions in *ad hoc* multilateral conferences.[54] The Concert of Europe provides a more institutionalized example of such intermittent structures, which act as a kind of temporary "government" while preserving the sovereignty of the major states in the international system.[55]

This type of cooperative decision-making, subject to veto by a participating state, must be seen as a feasible—if obviously limited—method of procedure; it is present not only in *ad hoc* bilateral or multilateral meetings, but also in the continuously functioning international organizations (the League of Nations and the UN) which have been developed in this century.[56] It should also be noted that the emergence of so-called "functional" organizations represents a trend toward continuously functioning institutions capable of limited but very real cooperation in the international political system.[57]

The limitations as well as the importance of both violence and cooperation in world politics must therefore be equally emphasized in

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man Kahn, "The Arms Race and Some of Its Hazards," in Donald G. Brennan, ed., *Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security* (New York 1961), 93ff. On the security offered by the "impermeable" nation-state before the development of nuclear weapons, see John H. Herz, *International Politics in the Atomic Age* (New York 1959), Part 1.

[54] Most notably, of course, in peace conferences terminating major wars.

[55] On the Concert of Europe, see Richard N. Rosecrance, *Action and Reaction in World Politics* (Boston 1963), chap. 4, and the references there cited. Compare the specialized, intermittent political agencies in many stateless primitive societies: Robert H. Lowie, "Some Aspects of Political Organization Among American Aborigines," *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, LXXVII (1948), 17-18; and Radcliffe-Brown, *African Political Systems*, xix.

[56] Note the similarity between the Iroquois Confederacy, which could act as a unit only if a decision was unanimous, and the UN Security Council. See Morgan, *League of the Iroquois*, 111-14; and Inis L. Claude, Jr., *Swords into Plowshares* (2nd edn., New York 1959), chap. 8.

[57] Cf. the limited but continuous role of the *pangats* and "pact-holders" among the Kalinga, which Barton contrasts with the intermittent action of the Ifugao "go-betweens" and "trading partners" (*The Kalingas*, 144-46). On the question of the "continuity" or "contingency" of political structures, see Easton, "Political Anthropology," 235-38, 245-46.

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any total assessment of the international system. In so doing, the comparison with stateless primitive peoples serves the useful purpose of identifying the characteristic properties of a political system in which law is sanctioned by self-help. As among the primitives, retaliation is an acceptable means of righting a wrong, though it is true that civilized nations regard strict retaliation—"an eye for an eye"—as a more extreme recourse than do savage peoples.[58] As among stateless primitives, neutrality is possible, and non-involved groups often attempt to mediate conflict and induce rivals to cease fighting. As among stateless primitives, finally, the very possibility that conflict may escalate serves to deter violence on some occasions.[59] Hence the relation of law to force in the multistate system, like the "ordered anarchy" of primitive societies without governments, is derived from the lack of authoritative political institutions.

When we turn more directly to the decision-making process—the second characteristic mentioned above—it may be recalled that in many primitive political systems, especially those lacking governmental institutions, custom and bargaining are related in a crucial way, since they are the only methods for establishing enforceable rules. The same can be said of the international political system, for it too lacks an authoritative legislature or an all-powerful executive. International law can be said to be created in two major ways: a practice or rule either becomes a custom, having been followed for a considerable time, or it is adopted by mutual consent, as binding specific groups under particular circumstances. While the second of these legislative methods is relatively unambiguous to the extent that it produces formal treaties and agreements, the first produces customary law slowly and imperceptibly, so that in periods of rapid change one may wonder if any such law really exists. Over time, nonetheless, specific legal rules have been adopted and accepted as valid by the nation-states composing the modern international system.[60]

[58] Henry S. Maine, *International Law* (New York 1888), 174-75. Primitive peoples do not always exact strict retaliation, however; the institution of a "weregild" or payment in lieu of retaliation is paralleled in international politics by reparations and other penalties exacted in the negotiation of peace treaties. Also, compare Morton A. Kaplan, "The Strategy of Limited Retaliation," Policy Memorandum No. 19 (Princeton, Center of International Studies, 1959), and, more generally, recent strategic discussions of "graduated deterrence"—e.g., Henry A. Kissinger, *The Necessity for Choice* (New York 1961), 65-70.

[59] Cf. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, chap. 8.

[60] On the character of international law and its sources, see James L. Brierly, *The Law of Nations* (4th edn., London 1949), 1-91, 229-36; Percy E. Corbett, *Law and Society in the Relations of States* (New York 1951), 3-52; and Morton A. Kaplan and

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At any moment of time, international law seems to be chaotic and uncertain; "double standards" often appear to bind weak or law-abiding states, while permitting the ruthless or strong to satisfy their demands with impunity.[61] But when a longer-range view is taken and the world is considered as a stateless political system in which self-help is a legitimate means of legal procedure, disputes over the content of international law (like disputes over the legitimacy of each killing in a primitive feud) become a predictable consequence of the system's structure. As the world is now organized, international law almost requires conflict concerning the substantive provisions relating to a given dispute, and warfare is a legal means of bargaining prior to the conclusion of more or less temporary settlements.[62]

One peculiar characteristic of laws in a stateless political system is thus the legitimization of dispute concerning the application of legal rights to particular circumstances. While it is usual in this context to emphasize the relationship of force to law (by pointing out that "might makes right" in anarchy), the frequency and necessity of disputes over the substance of rights have another consequence: the primacy of political rivalry. Within a society with a government, men whose interests conflict must channel their demands through a specific insti-

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Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, *The Political Foundations of International Law* (New York 1961), chap. 9. Some observers of international relations, following John Austin's legal theory, have doubted that a system without a single sovereign authority could have "true" law. For a criticism of this application of Austin's view, see Maine, *International Law*, 47-51.

[61] William Foltz has pointed out to me that there is also a parallel "reverse double standard" in both primitive and international systems; weak and unimportant groups are often permitted actions which major groups would not commit (or which would be strongly criticized if committed). Many primitive systems allow inferior lineages or castes wider latitude in many forms of conduct (dishonesty, petty thievery, public defamation, etc.) than is permitted major lineages or castes. As long as the stability of the system or the vital interests of a major group are not threatened, such behavior may be a useful safety valve. The behavior of so-called "nonaligned" states in the UN General Assembly offers an obvious parallel.

[62] From the point of view of a systematic analysis, law need not be a "good." Indeed, law need not produce peaceful "order," though as civilized men we infer from our political experience that this *should* be so. Hence authorities on international law often feel compelled to go beyond mere restatements of accepted legal principles; the international law texts, long an important method of codifying customary international law, are frequently animated by a desire for reform. Cf. Maine, *International Law*, Lectures I, XII, *et passim*. Unlike the sphere of domestic politics, in which relativism sometimes seems tenable to scholars, international law and politics are difficult to treat in a wholly positivist fashion without thereby accepting as justifiable a condition of legal self-help and war which civilized men tend to reject as barbarous, if not unjust. Hence world politics is perhaps *the* area in which it is most evident that satisfactory political theory cannot divorce objectivity (and especially freedom from partisanship) from the quest for standards of justice.

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tutional structure, ultimately recognizing (in principle) the legitimacy of political attitudes which have been sanctioned by governmental decision.[63]

In international politics, this relatively terminal character of intra-state political decisions is often lacking; the policies of one's rivals need not be legitimized even by victory in warfare. In a sense, therefore, might does *not* make right in international politics (as, indeed, the French insisted after 1871 and the Germans after 1918). Like primitive feuds, international disputes are only temporarily settled; a settlement which precludes the possibility of further conflict is rare.[64] This means that political differences, and the interests upon which these differences are based, are often more visible in world politics than in intra-state politics. Conflicting demands for the satisfaction of the desires of one's own group—politics and rivalry—are therefore the prime factors in international relations.[65]

This primacy of political conflict in world affairs is especially important because of a further similarity between primitive and international politics. Just as some stateless primitive societies are differentiated into spatial "zones" of increasing opposition, so the world can be divided into areas which are politically "far" from each other.[66] Here again, a characteristic of world politics which often appears to be *sui generis* can be understood more broadly in the context of a comparison between primitive and international politics.

VI. Some Differences Between Primitive and International Political Systems

In arguing that stateless primitive political systems resemble the international political system in many ways, the search for analogies should not obscure the massive differences which must have been only too easily noticed by the reader. By specifying some of these differences, however, it will be possible to distinguish those aspects in

[63] But note that, even in domestic politics, the legitimacy of governmental decisions may be challenged by those who are willing to be "bellicose." Cf. Bertrand de Jouvenel, *The Pure Theory of Politics* (New Haven 1963), 180ff.

[64] For the prerequisites for these rare cases, see the study cited in note 31. Note the function of "marriage" (between representatives of rival kinship groups in primitive societies and between ruling families in the earlier period of the modern state system) as a means of formalizing such a settlement.

[65] Cf. the "principle of political primacy" emphasized by Robert E. Osgood, *Limited War* (Chicago 1957), 13-15.

[66] "Blocs" and regional systems are, of course, ready examples. On the relationship between the global system and regional systems in international politics, see George Liska, *Nations in Alliance* (Baltimore 1962), 19-20, 22-24, 259-62.

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which world politics is unique from those that are due to the absence of a formally constituted world government. In particular, there are two general differences between primitive and international politics which will make it easier to see the limits of the structural similarity between the two. It will be necessary to consider, first, the role of political culture, and second, the impact of change.

Although it is usually assumed that the beliefs, manners, and customs of nonliterate peoples are homogeneous, many primitive societies are composed of heterogeneous ethnic stocks; indeed, such heterogeneity is particularly important, for it appears to be related to the emergence of governmental institutions, at least among many African peoples.[67] Nonetheless, there is a marked tendency toward cultural homogeneity in primitive stateless societies, since most individuals accept without question the established way of life.[68] Although the application of traditional rules to specific cases may be and frequently is disputed, the relative stability of culture limits the kinds of change occurring in most primitive systems.[69]

In contrast, the international political system currently includes radically different political cultures. As Almond has shown, national political systems which face the task of integrating different political cultures are subject to strains that are absent in more homogeneous societies; *a fortiori*, this problem is even greater in a system which permits many antagonistic political cultures to organize themselves into autonomous nation-states.[70] In general, therefore, it could be argued that self-help and structural decentralization tend to produce a greater degree of instability in world politics than in most primitive stateless societies.[71]

An additional feature compounds this problem. The historical development of Western civilization, as it has increased man's control over nature and spread the effects of modern science throughout the world, has produced particularly sharp differences between political cultures, at the same time that it has brought these cultures into closer contact than was possible before the advent of modern technology. And,

[67] See Schapera, *Government and Politics*, 124-25; and Mair, *Primitive Government*, chap. 5.

[68] Cf. Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, *African Political Systems*, 9-10.

[69] Hence there may be disputes concerning the power and influence of opposed groups, but these conflicts are rarely ideological in character.

[70] See Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," 400-2. Cf. the importance of the nationality problem in the USSR.

[71] Note, however, that many primitive societies are not as stable and unchanging as is often believed. E.g., see Southall, *Alur Society*, 224-27, 236, *et passim*; and J. A. Barnes, *Politics in a Changing Society* (London 1954), chap. 2.

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simultaneously with this intensification of the contact between different cultures, it has become apparent that technologically advanced societies are capable of what seems to be virtually infinite material progress, so that the most powerful nations can continuously increase their technological superiority over "backward" or "underdeveloped" states.

The main consequence of the interaction of modern, scientific technology upon cultural differences has been extraordinarily rapid change in world politics, of which the great increase in the number of nation-states is but the most superficial index.[72] The stateless structure of a primitive political system may be tolerably stable, despite the reliance upon self-help in legal enforcement; a similar structure, in the changing context of international politics, may well lead to chaos. Even in a primitive world, the contact of a more "advanced" people with a society without governmental institutions has often produced a rapid domination of the latter by the former.[73] It is all the more to be expected, therefore, that the present structure of the international system is essentially transitional, and that quite considerable changes must be expected in the next century.

VII. Conclusion: Directions for Research

The reader may well wonder, at this point, whether the foregoing analysis has any theoretical significance: can the contrast between primitive stateless societies and the interstate system provide any substantive insights otherwise missed by students of world politics? The relative novelty of the comparison here proposed is not, in itself, sufficient justification of the endeavor. Almost eighty years ago, Henry Sumner Maine saw this parallel when he remarked: "Ancient jurisprudence, if perhaps a deceptive comparison may be employed, may be likened to international Law, filling nothing, as it were, except the interstices between the great groups which are the atoms of society."[74] While the parallels noted above may be nothing but a "deceptive comparison," Maine's formulation itself suggests the important element of similarity which promises to clarify our understanding of world politics.

[72] On the distinction between "stable" and "revolutionary" international systems, see Hoffmann, "International Systems and International Law," 208-11. Hoffmann suggests that three variables determine the stability or instability of an international system: (1) "the basic structure of the world," (2) "the technology of conflict," and (3) "the units' purposes" (*ibid.*, 207-8). In the present essay, emphasis is placed on the first of these variables—see below, section VII.

[73] Southall, *Alur Society*, 229-34.

[74] *Ancient Law*, 161.

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Although both primitive and international politics can take place in "the interstices between the great groups which are the atoms of society," the "groups" which are "atoms" are not always the same. While this has obviously been true in international affairs at different times and places, it is no less so in primitive societies. As a result, there are an immense variety of types of primitive political systems, just as there have been widely different international political systems.

The question, then, is whether there are different patterns of groups—or different political structures—which can be identified as typical alternatives among primitive peoples; if this is the case, then perhaps the types of primitive political systems have similarities to the possible types of international political systems.

To date, there have been two major approaches to the construction of typologies of international systems: on the one hand, models of the international system have been defined in terms of behavioral rules,[75] and on the other, types of international systems have been distinguished on the basis of historical evidence.[76] Without entering into methodological discussion, it can be wondered whether both of these approaches have shortcomings: the former tends to be *ad hoc*, and the latter to be restricted to the periods one studies.[77] Given the orientation of recent theoretical efforts in political science, the construction of a structural typology of political systems would seem to be a useful supplement to other approaches.[78]

Because such a typology appears to derive from "structural-functional" theory, developed especially by some British anthropologists,[79] it would be well to specify more precisely what is meant by "structure," and why it is emphasized rather than "function." As Marion J. Levy, Jr., has suggested, the term "structure," in its most general sense, "means a pattern, i.e., an observable uniformity, of action or opera-

[75] The most well-known example of this approach is, of course, Morton A. Kaplan's *System and Process in International Politics* (New York 1957), chap. 2.

[76] See Hoffmann, "International Systems and International Law," 215-33; and Rosecrance, *Action and Reaction in World Politics*, esp. Part II.

[77] Cf. *ibid.*, chap. 1, and Stanley Hoffmann, ed., *Contemporary Theory in International Relations* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1960), 40-50, 174-84.

[78] It seems, for example, that the distinction between stateless systems and fully developed states is insufficient because it ignores an intermediary type which Southall called "pyramidal" or "segmentary states." In such systems, of which feudalism is but one example, there are a multiplicity of levels of authority, the most comprehensive of which is "paramount" without being "sovereign." See Southall, *Alur Society*, 241-60; and Barnes, *Politics in a Changing Society*, 47-53. Further development of the conception of such pyramidal systems and its application to world politics will be attempted in subsequent publications.

[79] E.g., see Radcliffe-Brown, *Structure and Function in Primitive Society*, esp. Introduction and chap. 10.

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tion."[80] Levy adds: "Functions refer to what is done, and structure refers to how (including in the meaning of 'how' the concept 'by what') what is done is done. One refers to the results of actions (or empirical phenomena in general), and the other to the forms or patterns of action (or empirical phenomena in general). . . . The same empirical phenomenon may be an example of either a function or a structure, depending upon the point from which it is viewed. . . . An interest in the results of operation of a unit focuses attention on the concept of function. An interest in the patterns of operation focuses attention on structure. An interest in the results of operation of a unit and the implications of those results focuses attention on both function and structure since the implications that can be studied scientifically lie in their effects on observable uniformities."[81] As is evident, from the point of view of sociological theory it is impossible to develop a general theory which emphasizes solely either "structure" or "function." Nonetheless there are good reasons for suggesting that a structural typology precede refined "functional" analysis.

This advantage can best be shown by referring to Alger's analysis of the similarities between intranational and international politics. Although Alger suggests that Almond's list of political functions is useful for such a comparison,[82] when he turns to the parallel between primitive and international politics, he emphasizes three factors, derived from Easton's work, which are ultimately structural in character: namely, the differentiation of political roles and the contingency or continuity of their operation, the specialization of roles which control physical force, and the character of overlapping memberships.

The reason why Almond's political functions are not immediately useful in comparing primitive and international politics is not hard to see. As Alger remarked, "A headman of a primitive society may perform intermittently as interest articulator, aggregator, and rule-maker."[83] If Almond's functions are not performed by specialized individuals in many primitive societies, concentration on these functions may only

[80] Levy, *The Structure of Society*, 57.

[81] *Ibid.*, 60-62.

[82] Alger emphasizes the similarities between international politics and the internal politics of both developing nations and primitive societies ("Comparison of Intranational and International Politics," 410-19). He suggests that the "input functions" ("political socialization and recruitment, interest articulation, interest aggregation, and political communication") are more relevant than the "output functions" ("rule-making, rule application, and rule adjudication"). Cf. Almond and Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas*, 16-17; and note 48 above.

[83] Alger, "Comparison of Intranational and International Politics," 412. Cf. Almond and Coleman, eds., 19.

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emphasize the "diffuseness" of roles, without indicating the different patterns which emerge in different primitive systems. It is necessary to see in what kinds of situations different individuals act in different ways; functional categories derived from "modern" complex political systems may be simply inappropriate for the study of primitive societies.[84]

As Almond himself was at pains to point out, "The functional categories which one employs have to be adapted to the particular aspect of the political system with which one is concerned."[85] Since a comparison of primitive and international political systems must identify the "particular aspects" of each type of system which are analogous, the use of functional categories would seem to be unpromising at the outset. In contrast, the use of a structural typology of political systems, if it proves possible to define kinds of political structures which exist in *both* primitive and international politics, has a double advantage: this approach should permit one to see not only the similarities between systems, but also the sources of the differences between modern international politics and primitive political systems.[86]

Finally, it should be pointed out that research in this direction, while it appears to utilize recent theoretical approaches derived from

[84] An additional critique which might be made is that the Almond functions imply a political teleology: since traditional, "diffuse" systems tend to be replaced by modern, "functionally specific" ones, analysis may be oriented toward finding those activities which favor the trend toward "modernity." Cf. Almond and Coleman, eds., 16-17. However minor the danger of this implication in the analysis of developing nations, it would certainly be erroneous in international politics, since we have no reason to believe that present tendencies will produce a world government in which Almond's political functions have been specialized.

[85] *Ibid.*, 16.

[86] In addition, an emphasis on structure should permit one to handle more explicitly the troublesome problem of defining the "actors" in the international system. Cf. Arnold Wolfers, "The Actors in International Politics," *Discord and Collaboration* (Baltimore 1962), 3-24. Alger seems to adopt the so-called "individuals-as-actors" approach, which raises some severe methodological problems; for example, he suggests (in applying Easton's work) that "international systems would tend to be distributed toward the contingent end of the continuum" which ranges from "contingent" to "continuous." This is a questionable conclusion if one considers that not only international organizations, but specific roles within national governments (e.g., "foreign minister"), function continuously in the modern state system. Cf. Alger, "Comparison of Intranational and International Politics," esp. 416, with the discussion above, p. 610. As Wolfers concluded: "While it would be dangerous for theorists to divert their primary attention from the nation-state and multistate systems which continue to occupy most of the stage of contemporary world politics, theory remains inadequate if it is unable to include such phenomena as overlapping authorities, split loyalties, and divided sovereignty, which were pre-eminent characteristics of medieval actors" ("Actors in International Politics," 24). The structural approach proposed here seems best suited to satisfy the theoretical requirements suggested by Wolfers.

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anthropology, sociology, and behavioral political science, is not divorced from the problems posed by traditional political philosophy. By emphasizing the existence of a class of social systems in which no formally instituted governments are established, the relevance of the notion of a "state of nature" to international politics can be shown to be more than a mere by-product of "normative" theories developed by political philosophers.

At the same time, however, since the apparent "anarchy" of a "state of nature" is found in primitive societies, analysis of the various kinds of primitive political structures suggests that some of the implications of the "state of nature" doctrine in political philosophy are questionable. In particular, the phenomenon of stateless societies implies that even if one can speak of a "state of nature," such a condition cannot be used to prove that man is by nature an asocial being; as a result, the "state of nature" (whether in primitive or international politics) need not be considered the *natural* human condition, as opposed to the purely *conventional* political community or state. Hence the comparison of international and intranational politics—and, more specifically, the analysis of similarities between primitive and world politics—among other things leads us to a reassessment of the sufficiency of the theory of politics established by Hobbes and elaborated by Locke, Rousseau, and Kant.[87]

[87] For a sophisticated attempt to show the continuing relevance of the philosophy of Rousseau as the basis of a theory of international politics, see Stanley Hoffmann, "Rousseau on War and Peace," *American Political Science Review*, LVII (June 1963), 317-33. Cf. Kenneth J. Waltz, "Kant, Liberalism, and War," *ibid.*, LVI (June 1962), 331-40.

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Research Note

THE SECOND WORLD WAR AS A PROBLEM IN HISTORICAL RESEARCH

By HANS-ADOLF JACOBSEN

NINETEEN years have passed since the end of World War II and yet the rapid pace of current political events has shown again and again how closely the present state of affairs is connected with the grave and fateful decisions made between 1939 and 1945. The outcome of this world-wide struggle determines our time: the partition of Germany, Europe, and Korea; a new shift in the political balance of power; a world divided into great, partly antagonistic, power blocs; and the process of decolonization in Asia and Africa. And all this under the shadow of the atom bomb and the Communist threat. No wonder the question "How did the war come about?" remains so challenging.

Although innumerable questions of detail still remain unanswered, international research on contemporary history has clarified to a large extent the motives, causes, and course of events. Today one can write more objectively about the major contours and dimensions of World War II than was possible immediately after it ended. At the same time, the torrent of publications on World War II (general surveys, memoirs, diaries, monographs, documents, and essays) exceeds all bounds. For instance, a recently published special bibliography on the history of Southeastern Europe between 1939 and 1945 cites approximately 2,000 titles.[1] Under these circumstances, no single historian can possibly keep abreast of the new publications, and even less evaluate them. He will have to limit himself to the essentials; otherwise he will lose an overall view of the decisive lines of development.[2]

Whoever attempts a general summary of publications up to 1964 with research value for the history of the Second World War must admit that they have correlated certain events, clarified many issues, investigated various aspects of the war, and given due attention to the most important strategic plans and measures of all the belligerents. Yet, especially with regard to general surveys of the war, there are

[1] Andreas Hillgruber, *Südost-Europa im Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Frankfurt a.M. 1962).

[2] See the excellent selection in John L. Snell, *Illusion and Necessity: The Diplomacy of Global War, 1939-1945* (Boston 1963), 38-41, 88-90, 144-47, 205-7, 218-19.

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still considerable gaps (varying from country to country) and shortcomings. The following discussion can touch upon only a few of the fundamental problems, such as historical classification and periodization, the treatment of certain specific questions, and the general image of the war. These are problems which in future histories of World War II should be more thoroughly emphasized and investigated.

I. Historical Classification and Periodization

No one as yet has been able to define the historical position of the Second World War in world history. In other words, historical scholarship has not yet succeeded in critically analyzing its outbreak, course, and outcome as a phenomenon of late imperialism, of the age of revolutions, national independence movements, world wars, and totalitarian ideologies. This would call for a clear differentiation between the two World Wars—between the critical periods of 1914-1918 and 1939-1945 and their respective lines of thought as well as their objectives. It would also require an examination of the European and Asian conceptions of regional order and unity—or, indeed, world order—along with their concomitant political and economic problems.

An analysis of the studies made thus far in international research on the history of the Second World War reveals five different approaches to the problem: (1) the military, (2) the national, (3) the regional, (4) the global (at least, an attempt in that direction), and (5) the ideological.

Unquestionably, the *military approach* still prevails over all others—i.e., description and evaluation of the war principally or almost exclusively as a purely military struggle between nations, continents, and world powers—as a result of the enormous potential and mobility of the military services and their increasing interrelation. Accordingly, the aim of war is defined as the destruction of the enemy's forces by means of exhausting all one's own resources (including the psychological ones)—often without regard to political consequences. Such an approach provides essential knowledge of the basic form, character, constant changes, and range of the war in both quantitative and qualitative terms. It involves the description of armaments and military training, of the potential of the defense economy, of the manpower and war matériel of the belligerents in terms of scope, probable increase, and utmost limit of performance. Understandably, much space is devoted to the actual operations (preparation, execution, and conclusion), in order to do justice to the role and importance of the various forces put into action (infantry, artillery, tanks, paratroopers,

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air force, surface craft, and submarines); to communications and logistics in the various phases of the war and in the different theaters of operation. The organization, mechanism, strength, weaknesses, and frictions of a particular command apparatus (whether in a totalitarian, semi-totalitarian, or democratic society) as well as cooperation among allies (alliance strategy) are likewise critically investigated, along with their significance for the course of the military campaigns.[3]

After the most important questions of detail have been clarified, more fundamental questions are raised and answered: Which climactic events and crises on land, in the air, and at sea turned the tide of the war; and in what direction? (For example, Dunkirk, the bombardment of England, the attack on Russia, Pearl Harbor, the battles of Moscow, Midway, El Alamein, Stalingrad, Tunis, and Morocco, the naval battle in the Atlantic in May 1943, in Leyte Gulf in 1944, and so forth.) What importance can we ascribe to defensive or offensive strategy? What can be said about the inner lines of defense, about the advantages of fighting on one front only, the difficulties of holding several fronts simultaneously, and the unsoluble problem of a war on all fronts? (As is well known, Germany in 1943 tried—in the long run, without success—to defend so-called "Fortress Europe" on a land front extending 10,000 miles.) How successful historians are in gauging and describing the interdependence of the various weapons systems and the differences between naval and land, regional and world-wide, strategy obviously depends on their intellectual ability. Finally, in order to be able to summarize all the factors which either secured military victory or brought about defeat on the battlefield, the effects and influence of psychological warfare, of the defense economy and technology, of the mobilization of industry and manpower in total war, and the effect on the battles themselves of underground, guerrilla, and partisan warfare (including Commando operations) have to be studied.[4]

[3] Major-General J. F. C. Fuller, *The Second World War* (London 1949); T. Dodson Stamps and Vincent Esposito, eds., *A Military History of World War II* (2 vols., New York 1956); Kurt von Tippelskirch, *Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges* (Bonn 1956); Oberst Shilin, ed., *Die wichtigsten Operationen des Grossen Vaterländischen Krieges, 1941-1945* (East Berlin 1958); L. M. Chassin, *Histoire militaire de la seconde guerre mondiale* (Paris 1951); T. Hatton, *Dai Toa Senso Zenski* [The Complete History of the Greater East Asia War] (4 vols., Tokyo 1953). See also Lewis J. Edinger, "Military Leaders and Foreign Policy-making," *American Political Science Review*, LVII (June 1963), 392-405.

[4] See the series, *The United States Army in World War II*, ed. by Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army (Washington 1950—); United Kingdom Military Series, *History of the Second World War*, ed. by J. R. M. Butler (London 1950—); *Entscheidungsschlachten des Zweiten Weltkrieges*, ed. by Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and Jürgen Rohwer (Frankfurt a.M. 1960; English edn., 1964); Samuel

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Such an approach—of which only a few aspects have been indicated—may be necessary to gain certain insights into the modern conception of war (although this conception is already anachronistic). But the pitfalls of such a one-sided approach should not be overlooked. Its greatest weakness lies in its almost complete isolation of military events from politics. This inevitably narrows the perspective for an evaluation of the war, and the result is mistaken, untenable conclusions, like the "missed opportunity for victory."[5] The military struggle becomes so far removed from its inherent political impulses that the necessary link between politics and warfare is broken. The decisive question, the meaning of the war, cannot be answered in terms of this approach.

The *national approach*, on the other hand, explains the war and all its manifestations primarily in terms of the peculiar characteristics of one's own or another nation's historical past and present. On the basis of military data (one approach obviously correlates with the other), the unleashing, the course, and the outcome of the war are directly connected with the political and social fate of one's own people. Such an approach is advantageous and convincing because it brings clearly into focus the triangular relation among political objectives (to force one's political will on the enemy), total planning, and military imperatives; or, as Clausewitz once put it: it reveals the decisive and therefore very important interrelationship of political purpose, the given means (in all areas), and the military aim.[6] It enables us to understand to what extent the nature, the objectives, the motivations, and the instruments of the war are influenced by the governmental and social structure of the belligerent countries. This approach alone shows how domestic and foreign policy, the war effort of the entire nation at home and at the front, are interrelated with the aim of fulfilling the tasks defined by politics (for instance, in allocating manpower for war industry compatible with military strength). The relationship between the "motivating forces (*Bewegungskräfte*) of a society"[7] and its "governmental structure" and their impact on the war performance can thus be shown. It is obvious that only this approach can satisfactorily explain the ethical significance of these events.

Eliot Morison, *The Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War* (Boston 1963).

[5] E.g., Erich von Manstein, *Verlorene Siege* (Bonn 1955), and *Lost Victories* (New York 1958).

[6] Carl von Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege* (Bonn 1952), 89ff.

[7] Theodor Schieder, *Staat und Gesellschaft im Wandel unserer Zeit* (Munich 1958), 89-109.

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It is undoubtedly legitimate and has been used in innumerable summaries of national histories.[8] Yet it has a certain limitation (which most authors are aware of), since interest is limited to partial knowledge, if not entirely to local events. Consequently, the relative importance of those factors which cannot be explained from a national point of view remains largely beyond the reader's grasp, though they may have had a decisive influence on events. Moreover, it makes the necessary comparison of heterogeneous social systems, intellectual resources, and of the ideas and rights of other nations far more difficult. It also results in exaggerating the importance of the political fate of one's own nation, and ignores the fact that this is essentially embedded in the general fate of all nations.

The *regional approach* focuses on the political, social, and cultural fate of a region, determined and characterized particularly by its geography and history (Europe or East Asia, for example), and by the competing international systems (either bilateral or multilateral), which may be of a totalitarian, authoritarian, dictatorial, or democratic nature. Such a perspective is superior to the national one, since in transgressing the limits of the nation-state it makes visible the factors that are unifying or divisive, creative or destructive. The diverse and yet common aspects of civilizations can be discerned, as well as the selfish interests of the individual nation-states and power groups, or the determination of certain forces to conclude supranational agreements based on free decision. It is this regional principle which brings into sharp focus the essential, basic feature of total and revolutionary war, of the international civil war of the twentieth century. It shows that, in this day and age, war is less a matter of conquering provinces, strategic positions, and religious symbols, or even changing present power relations, than of destroying certain orders of value with a view to establishing a system of domination exalted to the absolute. The result is that more and more Quislings or resistance fighters, in "open or tacit opposition to their national setting and political order," have chosen to favor either freedom or totalitarianism.[9] Finally, this approach shows—taking Europe as an example—that regional forces are no longer able to impose decisions in international politics.

The course of the First World War had already demonstrated that the intervention of a non-European Great Power (or of peripheral

[8] See notes in Snell, *Illusion and Necessity*; G. A. Deborin, *Der Zweite Weltkrieg* (East Berlin 1960); Roberto Battaglia, *La seconda Guerra Mondiale* (Bologna 1961); Karl Dietrich Erdmann, *Die Zeit der Weltkriege* (Stuttgart 1960).

[9] General Wolf Graf von Baudissin, *Das moderne Kriegsbild* (Bonn 1962), hectographed.

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powers) was indispensable in shifting the balance in favor of a certain power constellation; in Asia, too, it was the United States which took the trick that decided the outcome of the war in 1945. Thus, the dividing line of World War II was probably the year 1941, when the European war was extended into a world-wide conflict.[10]

This approach overlaps with the fourth: the *global one*. Since such an approach includes non-European history in its total view, attaching to it equal importance and significance, it clearly makes extraordinary demands on the historian as well as the reader. The wealth of literature and material might induce the historian to deal with certain regions on the periphery of world politics rather than to write a world history in which all parts are treated in correct proportion. But the world-wide interrelationship of politics, economics, and warfare, the all-embracing network of communications—or, briefly, global interdependence—has become a fact. It has become increasingly significant since 1941 and has decisively determined the course of human history up to the present day. It is the world, after all—not just Germany and Korea—that has been divided.

The extent to which American wartime strategy became global in the truest sense of the word can be seen in the numerous political and military devices, operations, and economic deliveries (Lend-Lease) of the United States, and particularly in the distribution and provisioning of its military forces. By the end of 1943, the United States had sent 8,800 airplanes and 515 warships of all kinds to Europe and 7,800 airplanes and 713 warships to East Asia. One year later, the distribution of the US Army was as follows: of troops in action on non-American soil 50 per cent were fighting on the European continent, 17 per cent in the Mediterranean, 26 per cent in the Pacific, and the remaining 7 per cent in Africa, the Middle East, China, Burma, India, Alaska, and the Caribbean Sea. At the same time, Great Britain had spread her forces evenly—50 per cent overseas and 50 per cent in Europe.[11]

The fifth approach might be termed the *ideological one*. It is applied primarily in the realm of Soviet Communist power and forces all events into the mold of Marxism-Leninism. World history is interpreted exclusively in terms of class structure. The latest and at the same time

[10] Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. III: *The Grand Alliance* (London 1950), 337ff.; Herbert Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought* (Princeton 1957); *Geschichte des Grossen Vaterländischen Krieges der Sowjetunion*, Vol. II (East Berlin 1963), 212ff.; J. R. von Salis, *Weltgeschichte der Neuesten Zeit*, Vol. III: *Von Versailles bis Hiroschima* (Zurich 1960).

[11] Maurice Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944* (Washington 1959), 398, 543.

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the most instructive example is the two-volume *History of International Relations and Foreign Policy of the USSR* which was published in Moscow in 1963.[12]

THE PROBLEM OF PERIODIZATION

In connection with the foregoing, a particular weakness of most publications in the field must be mentioned: it concerns the *periodization* of the Second World War. As a result of the one-sided military approach, most authors have inevitably based their narrative on a purely military course of events. German historians are inclined to subdivide the war into (1) the phase of the triumphant blitz campaigns of Germany's army and its allies—i.e. Hitler's campaigns between 1939 and 1942; (2) the turning point of the war—i.e., the military reversal of 1942-1943 in the Pacific, North Africa, Russia, and the Atlantic; and (3) the phase of German-Japanese setbacks on all fronts until the military collapse in 1945.[13] British and American authors naturally prefer the opposite side of the coin. Churchill, for instance, makes four main subdivisions, based on the national point of view of Great Britain: (1) Milestones to Disaster, 1919-1940; (2) Alone, 1940-1941; (3) The Grand Alliance, December 1941-1942; and (4) Triumph and Tragedy, 1943-1945. A well-known German compendium by Ploetz uses the following subdivisions: (1) "the period of German successes" (1939-1941), and (2) "the period of German defeats" (1942-1945). It then devotes a third section to the war in the Pacific theater. The aforementioned three subdivisions are applied to the account of international events and to national histories between 1939 and 1945 as well as to the policies in the occupied areas.[14]

Most characteristic in this respect is the article on "World War II" in the 1960 edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*.[15] In 80 pages, outstanding military experts have treated the course of the Second World War in five main sections: (1) The Origins; (2) The War in Europe, Africa, and the Near East; (3) The Chinese-Japanese War (1937-1945); (4) The War in the Pacific; (5) The War at Sea. A brief

[12] See Cyril E. Black, ed., *Rewriting Russian History* (2nd edn., New York 1962); Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, "Der Zweite Weltkrieg im Spiegel der sowjet-kommunistischen Geschichtsschreibung (1945-1961)," in B. S. Telpuchowski, ed., *Die sowjetische Geschichte des Grossen Vaterländischen Krieges, 1941-1945* (Frankfurt a.M. 1961), 13E-94E; Matthew P. Gallagher, *The Soviet History of World War II* (New York 1963); John Erickson, "The Soviet Union at War (1941-1945): An Essay on Sources and Studies," *Soviet Studies*, XIV (January 1963), 249-74.

[13] Tippelskirch and others (see note 3 above); Louis L. Snyder, *The War: A Concise History, 1939-1945* (New York 1960).

[14] *Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges* (Würzburg 1960).

[15] Vol. XXIII, 790-95.

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sixth section contains some conclusions. The thirteen subdivisions dealing with war operations on all European fronts are arranged strictly according to chronology. Thus, the Polish Campaign, the Russo-Finnish War, the Balkan Campaign, the North African Campaign, the Italian Campaign (1943-1945), etc., succeed each other, up to the Allied Reconquest of Western Europe. Section 4 (The War in the Pacific) is subdivided into (A) The Period of Japanese Conquests; (B) The Allies Strike Back; (C) Across the Pacific; and (D) The Last Campaigns. Although problems of grand strategy and political concepts are briefly sketched by E. R. May (USA) in a separate entry, "World War II Conferences, Allied," the presentation in this volume as a whole is a telling example of an outdated, one-sided military approach that contributes little to an understanding of total war.

In the existing literature some attempts have been made to juxtapose military campaigns and wartime political and economic measures. In such cases, special chapters have been devoted to discussing in detail particular problems such as the persecution of the Jews, the resistance movements, the economy, armaments, war aims, the SS state, and so forth.

Understandably, Soviet historiography does not apply the same system of periodization. In keeping with Soviet ideology, the Kremlin historians differentiate between "just" and "unjust" phases of the war, depending on whether or not "socialist achievements" were at stake. In their terms, England and France in 1939 by no means waged a "just war," but a "war of imperialist conquest." The transition to a "just war" began only when the resistance of the masses to the German occupation grew. (There was a so-called transitional period from July 1940 to June 1941.) With the entry of the Soviet Union into the conflict in 1941, the war finally developed into a "truly just war of liberation." Even for the "capitalist participants of the anti-Hitler coalition," the war at this point assumed a "just" and "progressive" character, since what mattered most was the common effort to rescue the "first socialist state" in the world.

In his history of the Second World War (written from a German point of view), Hellmuth G. Dahms[16] attempted to give a comprehensive survey of the war, discussing, among other aspects, economy, technology, occupation policy, partisan warfare, and espionage. However, manifesting neither adequate knowledge of sources nor a clear conception as to how the war fits into the course of world history, his work—despite its useful intention—hardly goes beyond the enumera-

[16] Hellmuth Günther Dahms, *Der Zweite Weltkrieg* (Tübingen 1960).

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tion of mere facts. Hundreds of isolated facts do not provide a comprehensive picture; neither do they give us an answer to the questions which are most significant: How, for example, did this war, in which both sides fought with such tenacity for a united Europe, end in such a catastrophe? How did it lead to the tragic division of Europe? What produced the East-West conflict which compels us now to act as we do? Why did the imperialism of the European states finally result in the "dualism of the world powers" which involves interdependence on a world scale?

II. War as an Instrument of Policy

We should realize by now that a valid description and interpretation of this devastating process of world history are possible only when one assesses the war in its entirety: the fighting armies and partisans, the aircraft and warships engaged in combat, the various weapons, the evolving technology, the mobilization of entire economies as well as the passions engendered—in short, the all-embracing defense potential of the belligerents as a means of policy. One should regard war as an instrument for reaching particular aims in power politics; but at the same time, such an assessment must comprehend total war (with its multiplicity of elements) as a unified whole. Clausewitz once succinctly called war "the continuation of politics by other means." In his view, it should never be separated from politics, since to do so would destroy "all threads of relationship."[17]

If we adopt this definition of war, which until the breakthrough in new weapons following the Second World War could not be contested, it would be a mistake to analyze the historical evolution of the war from 1939 to 1945 merely in terms of victories and defeats on the battlefield; to follow unilaterally the ups and downs of the war; or even to take isolated aspects of the problem and use them as our criteria. (Compare, for example, the numerous more or less "germ-free" [*keimfrei*] military memoirs, strategic studies, and histories at various chronological points.) We should rather investigate the war aims of the Great Powers and of those supranational groups working in unison (e.g., the European resistance movements) to gain an insight into the interaction of policy and conduct of war, with their manifold dimensions and imponderables. Much will thus depend on the place we accord the military effort (taking all kinds of weapons into account), various projects in the fields of technology, economics, and armaments, as well as the psychological factors. This would also mean

[17] Clausewitz, 888ff.

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that the struggle between nations be viewed from regional and global perspectives. Only then will a real history of the Second World War emerge, and not just another work among an infinite number of studies treating the world-wide conflict from a narrow standpoint of national trends and special interests. In doing so, the historian should try not only to come close to the truth but to reach a fair judgment as well. He should not merely set down "how it really was" but also "do justice to men, show their involvement in guilt and fate, identify correctly what is bad and sinister, and not keep silent about the better."[18]

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: PART I

Yet how can such a history of the Second World War—which can be sketched here only in outline—be written? It could probably be divided into two main parts. Under the heading: "The Struggle for the Transformation of Europe and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, 1939-1943," Part I would concentrate on the political plans, aims, measures, and methods employed by those big powers—Japan, Italy, and Germany, the nations which arrived too late, or even the so-called "have-nots"—which in the 1930's began challenging Asia and Europe in a "breath-taking race for imperial conquest."[19] As it turned out, their actions remained uncoordinated, and to some degree were undertaken even without mutual contact. For this reason, it would be inappropriate to speak of a common, deliberate conspiracy by these three partners against the peace. Although their systems of government showed certain parallels in their structural elements, they retained some basic differences. Added to this, the expansionist policy they pursued was supported by a different group in each case: in Europe, it was the indefatigable, restless dictators who, against the will of their generals, drove their peoples to war; in Japan, the army generals succeeded in asserting themselves in the face of opposition from the navy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In recent times, a more frequent topic of discussion—namely, research on the question of war guilt in 1939, or 1941[20]—has led to this conclusion: it is certain that the Second World War did not originate solely from the ambition and craving for power of one single nation.

[18] Reinhard Wittram, *Das Interesse an der Geschichte* (Göttingen 1958), 26.

[19] Theodor Schieder, "Imperialismus in alter und neuer Sicht," *Das Parlament*, Supplement, May 25, 1960.

[20] A. J. P. Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War* (London 1961); David L. Hoggan, *Der erzwungene Krieg* (Tübingen 1961); Willy Glasebock, *War Deutschland am 2. Weltkrieg allein schuld?* (Niederpleis-Siegburg 1964). See the critical review by Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, "Hat Hitler den Krieg nicht gewollt?" *Das Parlament*, VIII, February 21, 1962.

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None of the Powers was completely free of responsibility for this new catastrophe. All the belligerents had in some way, directly or indirectly, promoted the policy of the Fascists and Nazis. It is sufficient to mention the "appeasement policy" of England and France which was intended to preserve peace at any price; the particularism of the Southeast European countries; the overconfidence of Polish statesmen, which was reflected in their exaggeration of their own strength; or the attitude of the Soviet Union in the summer of 1939. The United States likewise contributed to the outbreak of the war in the Pacific by stiffening its economic policy—which, however, does not free Japan from responsibility for December 7, 1941.

It is possible that the judgment on the theory and practice of National Socialism—a unique relapse into barbarism in contempt of the norms under which peoples are committed to live—may change somewhat in the ultimate perspective of history in view of the experiences of the "cold war," the ordeals of the developing countries, and the effects of modern weapons of mass destruction. Yet nothing will change the conclusion that Hitler and his regime, by their unrestrained policy of force, bear the greatest part of the responsibility for what happened in 1939 and its aftermath.

There is no doubt that Japan, Italy, and Germany, imbued with what may be called a sense of "historical mission," were intent on a regional redistribution of land and raw materials with the objective of forcibly pushing through their authoritarian or totalitarian systems in the conquered areas; their intention was to change the *status quo* to their own advantage. Their aims were, after all, governed by late imperialist power politics. In his study "Imperialismus in alter und neuer Sicht," Theodor Schieder indicates that the Japanese policy had above all one thing in common with Fascism and National Socialism: in all these cases, expansion was no longer—as in the age of classical imperialism—"due to surplus—surplus of capital, people, and goods," but "due to a kind of short-circuit reaction to political frustration, economic crisis, and impoverishment."[21] Of course, it could be added here that the National Socialist variety of late imperialism also contained elements of purposeful planning and long-range programming, as is typical of the predominating ideologies of the twentieth century—quite aside from the fact that from 1939 to 1943 its geographic scope was limited, in contrast to the imperialism of the German Empire, which had looked overseas.

The guiding line that should run through every chapter of Part I,

[21] Schieder, "Imperialismus."

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therefore, would be a description of how, with what means, and on what fronts these Great Powers sought to accomplish their far-reaching goals; what alliances they brought about, the amount of resistance they evoked, and the manner in which they ruled conquered peoples. However, the defense measures undertaken by the challenged Powers—singly or collectively—could be relegated to the background in Part I. Initially, Britain and the Soviet Union were fighting primarily for their national and social survival; they were fighting for their lives. The temporary and long-range political plans should be emphasized by appropriate headings. This also requires that the authors forgo the old, popular device of moving from campaign to campaign. Instead of taking the "Polish campaign" as a starting point, they should begin with the military defeat and new partition of Poland; instead of dealing with the military campaigns in Norway and in the West, the emphasis should be put on "Greater Germany's" attempt at hegemony in Europe. It should be made clear that destroying the Red Army (this being merely a means to an end) was not the primary purpose of Hitler's campaign in the East. His objective was rather to partition the Soviet Union, to exploit it economically, and to utilize its land for "Greater Germany's" settlement purposes (simultaneously destroying Bolshevism—admittedly, with the consequence that he was also destroying the *cordon sanitaire* set up in 1919 between Central Europe and Bolshevist Russia and was actually opening the way for Soviet communism in Europe). Similarly, Mussolini fought in North Africa and in Greece to reconstitute the "Roman Mediterranean Empire," and Japan to build a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere."[22]

If these viewpoints are consistently applied, the whole presentation (and likewise Part II) will automatically result in a periodization of World War II which can be logically explained as well as justified, and which takes into account the primacy of politics. Thus the first major part could conclude with a narrative treatment of the "Greater German Empire," the Fascist "Imperium," and the structure of the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere," to be supplemented by a critical analysis of German war policy from 1939 to 1943 (likewise for Italy and Japan) and of the German opposition to Hitler. As far as the sources permit, this should enable us to give a complete picture of the territorial

[22] See Lothar Gruchmann, *Nationalsozialistische Grossraumordnung* (Stuttgart 1962); Alexander Dallin, *German Rule in Russia, 1941-1945* (New York 1956); F. W. Deakin, *The Brutal Friendship: Mussolini, Hitler, and the Fall of Italian Fascism* (London 1962); F. C. Jones, *Japan's New Order in East Asia: Its Rise and Fall, 1937-1945* (London 1954).

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expansion, the nature, and methods of the various dominant social systems in Europe and East Asia. It also ought to help us explain why Hitler and his regime, as well as Italy and Japan, could never have won this war. Finally, it would be necessary to explain how the ugly image of National Socialism—not only in 1943-1944 but even prior to 1939—aroused the moral indignation of those in Germany and in the occupied areas who were not blinded by the external victories and the hollow slogans, but rather fought against the system and for an intellectual and moral rejuvenation of Germany and Europe.

ANALYSIS OF WAR POLICY (1939-1943/44)

In the eighth book of his work *On War*, Carl von Clausewitz warned that "one does not start a war," or at least, "if one were reasonable, one should not start one without clearly defining . . . first, its intent, and second, its objective. The direction war takes, its extent as well as the means and the energy applied, are determined by this basic premise whose influence reaches down to the most detailed action. In order 'to define the means required for war,' one must take into consideration their political purpose as seen from our own and from the enemy's point of view. Due attention must be paid to the resources and conditions of the enemy state as well as of our own. We must take into account the character and the capacity of its government, its people, and compare this with ours; we must duly consider the political alliances of other states and the effect which the war may have on them."[23]

It is interesting that the conclusions reached by nineteenth-century strategic theorists were ignored in the twentieth century, particularly by German military leaders. In fact, during the course of the Second World War, they paid no attention to them whatsoever. The utterly senseless goal of destroying political and social pluralism, in order to replace it by a totalitarian system or rule in the name of a particular historical myth, failed not only in face of the resistance of the peoples subjugated or threatened, but primarily because of the resistance inevitably engendered among the great naval and world Powers. Above all, Hitler and the German High Command, in addition to misjudging Britain, vastly underrated the military and economic resources of the Soviet Union and paid far too little heed to the American power potential. In addition, many military, economic, and technical factors finally sealed the fate of the aggressors in 1945. Without exaggeration one can conclude that for the aggressors the war was already lost

[23] Clausewitz, 859.

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politically before the first shot was fired, and this fact obliterates all speculations about so-called "missed opportunities."[24]

PART II

As the first major part of our proposed history dealt with the war policy of the Axis and of Japan in terms of Clausewitz's principle, the second must focus on the policies and strategy of the so-called "anti-Hitler coalition"—i.e., Great Britain, the USSR, and the USA (including the European resistance movements and the independence and liberation movements in Asia)—which in 1942-1943 seized the military initiative on all combat fronts and began to dictate the terms of action. Correspondingly, Germany's stubborn and desperate defensive battles (as well as Italy's, up to the fall of 1943) on the various fronts of "Fortress Europe" and Japan's retreats in the Pacific from 1943 to 1945 will have to recede into the background of the narrative. Yet their military victories over the old colonial powers (the Netherlands, France, and Britain) from 1939 to 1943 should be dealt with here in the light of their psychological repercussions on the nationalist movements in Asia and Africa from 1943 to 1945. Part II might bear the heading: "The Pacification of the Aggressors: Toward the Establishment and the Security of a New Order of World Peace (1943-1945)."

Such a heading would at the same time express the resolute and overriding aim of the Allies (which, apart from discussion of various proposals concerning strategic operations, aroused no serious controversies): namely, to effect a swift and complete military destruction of Germany, Italy, and Japan—with "Germany first"; and to keep the alliance as effective as possible, no matter how heterogeneous its forces were in each country and within the resistance groups. As has been emphasized earlier, it should always be borne in mind that the Second World War can be adequately evaluated only as a simultaneous and often interwoven struggle of land, naval, and air forces in terms of the global interdependence of the big combat areas: Europe-Africa-Asia and America.

Special attention would have to be given to the ultimate goal of the common Allied efforts: to execute a political transformation (to be laid down by treaty) of the defeated states—primarily Germany—so that never again could they afflict other nations with the "scourge of war." This also required them to establish a new collective security system which, proceeding from the principles of the Atlantic Charter, would

[24] See also Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, *1939-1945: Der Zweite Weltkrieg in Chronik und Dokumenten* (5th edn., Darmstadt 1961), 669-717.

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guarantee international peace and stability based on their faith in an undivided world, in "fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person . . ." (Charter of the United Nations).[25]

Admittedly, this was not the prime object for which all the warring nations in the Allied-Soviet coalition were fighting, and, if they were, they were doing so from different motives. There were divergences of opinion on certain matters between the two main allies, Britain and the United States of America. For instance, it was France's declared aim, as was the case with Poland, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece, and Czechoslovakia, to reestablish itself as a democratic republic. In India and Southern and Eastern Asia, the main aim was national independence from the old colonial powers. The main issue in China was an internal one: Kuomintang or the Communists? In North and West Africa, the Atlantic Charter provided a fresh incentive: in their petition of December 1943, for instance, the leading section of intellectuals in the Moroccan nationalist party, Istiqlal, referred to the Charter. In the same year, Azikiwe of Nigeria published his historic memorandum entitled "The Atlantic Charter and British West Africa," calling for the application of Point 3 of the Charter to West Africa. As was the case in Asia, the nationalist movements in Africa regarded the United Nations and its Charter as the best apologist and guarantor of their national independence.[26]

Although anticolonialism and the liberation of the colonial peoples from foreign rule were among the paramount goals of United States foreign policy, Great Britain stubbornly opposed any liquidation of her empire until, under the Labour Government which came into power at the end of the war, she was constrained to bow to the exigencies of reality. And the Soviet Union agreed to the creation of a new collective security system mainly because she regarded such a system as a shield against any new aggression; she was indubitably less inclined to see it as an instrument conducive to upholding national state sovereignty, the reestablished *status quo*, and world-wide peaceful collaboration,[27] for ever since 1944 she had been pursuing a policy of

[25] L. W. Holborn, ed., *War and Peace Aims of the United Nations: From Casablanca to Tokyo Bay* (Boston 1948); [Harley Notter], *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945* (Washington 1949).

[26] Thomas Hovet, Jr., *Africa in the United Nations* (London 1963); G. E. Hall, "South-east Asia" and "The Far East," in *New Cambridge Modern History*, XII (Cambridge, Eng., 1960), 219-35; Ruth B. Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter* (Washington 1958); L. M. Goodrich and E. J. Hambro, *The Charter of the United Nations* (Boston 1949); Ross N. Berkes and Mohinder S. Bedi, *The Diplomacy of India: Indian Foreign Policy in the United Nations* (Stanford 1958).

[27] Alexander Dallin, *The Soviet Union at the United Nations* (New York 1962).

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Communist revolutionary annexation under the cover of her bayonets.

Part II might culminate in an explanation as to how the response of the "strange alliance" to the National Socialist-Fascist-Japanese challenge indeed ended with a military victory, but at the same time produced a new political dilemma: the East-West conflict and all its consequences.[28] For during the discussion of ways and means of remolding Europe politically in order to ensure peace in the world and in the wake of unilateral measures in Eastern Europe, the alliance fell apart. The ideological chasm which until then had been concealed by the Soviet Union and disregarded or minimized by the Western nations was too deep. The *fait accompli* achieved by the Red Army in "liberated" areas carried more weight than all the decisions postponed up to 1945; the greatest error was laid bare—the assumption that, since all had had the same enemies, they were all fighting for the same cause. In Asia, however, there was no stopping the final process of decolonization after the underground armies—mainly Communist-led—had played their part in defeating Japan and had, together with the nationalist leaders, seized the reins of political power.

The various decisions and measures undertaken at that time should, of course, not be judged from the perspective of the "cold war," which frequently involves wishful thinking on the part of the United States as well as other countries. They should rather be viewed from the standpoint of that particular historical moment, which was influenced by the sum of all experiences up to then. George Kennan was right when he described the atmosphere of those days as one in which "the actors of the drama" were animated by "the anxieties, the moods, the hopes, the illusions, the dreams, the seizures of bitterness, the strains of devoted wartime labor, the fixations and psychoses of militancy."[29]

Only a treatment which takes into account these points of view as conditions for historical understanding will be able to do justice to the events and figures of that epoch. It will be able to analyze in a wider framework that historical development which transformed our world after 1945 into a cohesive politico-economic theater and assigned to it tasks of a magnitude encountered by no previous generation.

[28] Chester Wilmot, *The Struggle for Europe* (London 1952); John L. Snell, *Wartime Origins of the East-West Dilemma over Germany* (New Orleans 1959); Tang Tsou, *America's Failure in China, 1941-1950* (Chicago 1963); Herbert Feis, *Between War and Peace: The Potsdam Conference* (Princeton 1960); Wolfgang Wagner, *Die Teilung Europas* (Stuttgart 1959).

[29] George F. Kennan, *Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin* (Boston 1961), 349.

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ANALYSIS OF WAR POLICY (1942-1945)

In contrast to what was pointed out in the analysis of the political and military policy of the Axis Powers (including Japan), a parallel analysis for the Allies would show that from 1942 to 1945 all conditions for an Allied military victory either already existed or were being created. It can easily be demonstrated that the so-called anti-Hitler coalition did not automatically gain its advantageous position because here "the new fought against the old," as is asserted by Soviet historians (who seem to be convinced of historical determinism). First of all, the combined effect of numerous factors secured the military victory. The fact that this coalition soon had over 75 per cent of all human and material resources of the world at its disposal, and could operate from a far superior strategic position, was of decisive importance. The National Socialist policy of occupation in Europe and to a certain extent that of Japan in Asia played right into the Allies' hands, although in Asia it was mainly the national movements which profited. It would be idle, incidentally, to try to figure out who among the coalition partners had the greatest share in defeating the enemy. The Kremlin historians exaggerate the victory of their country, their system, and their forces because the Party instructs them to do so. One thing, however, is certain: the Great Alliance could defeat the aggressors only through its combined resources. None of the partners could have accomplished alone what they achieved together in 1945.

Nevertheless, the Western Allies—very much to the detriment of postwar developments—also violated one of Clausewitz's important principles: in the planning and the execution of their operations towards the end of the war in France and the Pacific, they failed to consider the political conditions that in all probability would predominate at the close of hostilities or in the ensuing cease-fire period. "If you conceived the war as only part of a complex of long-term political problems," contends George Kennan, "then you would have had to ask yourself to what extent it was desirable to weaken Japan permanently to the advantage of Russia; and the answer you would have come up with about the desirability of Russia's participation in the Pacific war might have been a somewhat different one."[30]

Seen as a whole, it was only the Soviet Union that followed a consistent and purposeful course of action; she entered the last phase of the war with a clear-cut political program—as we know today. From her defensive war, the "first socialist state" evolved an annexation

[30] *Ibid.*, 379.

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policy in the cause of world revolution. Her political conduct of war, based on the doctrines of Clausewitz and Lenin, helped world communism to attain decisive success: communism was able to advance the limits of its power realm into the heart of Germany, up to the Elbe. And by setting up Communist governments under the pretext of "liberation" and with the help of Russian bayonets, it succeeded in bringing nearly the whole of the Balkans under its control. The Soviet Union also achieved in China what Stalin had tried in vain to do in the 1920's: to make it a Communist country by involving it systematically and deliberately in civil war with the help of the resourcefulness and initiative of Mao Tse-tung.[31]

The illusions evident in the policy of President Roosevelt, however, which had far-reaching consequences, must be criticized chiefly because he failed to examine—in the light of Marxism-Leninism—whether the essential ideological terms employed by the three great coalition partners and the political aims they proclaimed, such as "peace," "freedom," "democracy," and "socialism," meant the same in the East as they did in the West. To the very last, Roosevelt believed he could negotiate with Stalin fairly, and he completely misjudged Soviet ambitions. In passing such a judgment, the historian, of course, must not forget that for the statesman "mere knowledge is seldom useful," and "plain common sense" is by no means always the "prime mover of men." He should keep in mind that in that "twilight zone" of politics, not the "certainty of knowledge" but more often the "uncertainty of the battle" holds sway. The decisions that had to be made in the years 1943-1945 had no analogies in history.[32] And yet we are constrained to ask whether, in view of the global strategic situation, the stubborn German resistance on all fronts, and the vibrant passions aroused by the conflict, any other outcome of the war would have been conceivable without simultaneously risking the "strange alliance" of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States and thereby the victory over Hitler. The Western statesmen were confronted with an almost insoluble dilemma: to defeat aggressive National Socialism and its satellites without favoring the hegemony of the Soviet Union in East and Central Europe. Whether an earlier landing of the Allies in 1942 or 1943 in France or the Balkans would have really worked to the advantage of the democracies belongs to the realm of speculation. For

[31] Hugh Seton-Watson, *Neither War nor Peace* (London 1960); Frank Trager, ed., *Marxism in Southeast Asia* (Stanford 1960); Philip E. Mosely, *The Kremlin and World Politics* (New York 1960).

[32] Michael Freund, "Politik," in *Handwörterbuch der Sozialwissenschaften* (Göttingen 1963), 356-62.

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many reasons which must be regarded as justified (not the least being security in transporting troops and supplies overseas), the Allies did not risk OVERLORD before June 6, 1944.[33]

III. The Image of War

Finally, a special chapter—perhaps the concluding one—should be devoted to studying the image of war. In all research conducted so far, the changing manifestations of the war image and how it influenced the political decisions (and vice-versa) before the outbreak of war and between 1939 and 1945 have been examined only in a fleeting manner. Why, for instance, in spite of the numerous international agreements and collective defense systems holding each other in balance, did the Great War—in 1914 as well as in 1939—break out? In part, it was certainly because the Powers, subscribing to the then prevailing notions on war, were convinced that by means of force—i.e., by means of war as the culmination of power politics, by the use of all available weapons and resources—they could banish, if not forever, then for a long period, the hostilities and issues dividing them. They believed that this was the quickest and safest way of realizing their political aims, and that the lives as well as the material costs involved would be tolerably commensurate with their objectives. This also determined their ideas of the conqueror and the conquered. The course of World War I, however, challenged this point of view. Total war was developing its own laws, which defied control. The Second World War intensified the ideologization and radicalization of war policy on both sides.

It is appropriate here to refer once again to a sentence of Clausewitz in the first book of his work *On War*: "War is an act of violence, and there are no limits to its application; thus one part of it dictates the laws for another, producing a reciprocal effect which by its very nature must lead to an extreme."[34] It would then have to be shown why battles alone could no longer secure the victory, how the defense economy, food supply, technology, transportation, and the morale of the population became decisive factors in the war. The Second World War sufficiently demonstrated the shift of emphasis to the defense economy—i.e., the strong reliance of war policy on an intact defense economy, on unhindered technological research and

[33] Arthur Bryant, *Triumph in the West, 1943-1946* (London 1958); Gordon A. Harrison, *Cross-Channel Attack* (Washington 1951); Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Kent Robert Greenfield, gen. ed., *Command Decisions* (New York 1959); Samuel Eliot Morison, *The Invasion of France and Germany, 1944-1945* (Boston 1957).

[34] Clausewitz, 92.

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development.[35] In the nineteenth century, economic war measures were designed to cover all supplies needed to equip and sustain the military units to be engaged in the initial operations in case of mobilization. Military experts at the turn of the century, however, demanded that in event of war the "entire national food allocation" be secured, "as an extended problem of army procurement." When war broke out in 1914, Germany was economically unprepared; only during the following years did she manage to build up an effective war economy. The year 1939 presented a similar situation; the available facilities and corresponding equipment barely sufficed to wage a few blitz campaigns. In spite of attaining its highest output in the production of weapons of all kinds in 1943-1944, the German Wehrmacht lost its operational mobility within a few months when the Allied Strategic Air Command succeeded in paralyzing from 80 to 90 per cent of all fuel supplies. In 1940, when Hitler postponed his "Sea Lion" undertaking—the scheduled landing on the British Isles—and veered towards Russia, England won time to build up and accelerate her urgently needed war economy. The enormous consumption of war materials of all kinds compelled the belligerents to make the utmost use of their economic capacities. Nor did they hesitate to exploit ruthlessly the nations they had subjugated. In the meantime, the war economy of the United States moved into high gear. In 1941, the ratio of armament production (in billions of dollars) between the Axis nations (including Japan) and their three major opponents (the USA, Great Britain, and the USSR) was still 1:2.4. By 1943, this had increased to 1:3.4. In mid-1944, Germany had 100 "units" of the militarily vital fuel reserves, while the enemy Powers were at the same time producing 2,920 units. The tremendous deliveries of materials that the United States made to all its allies under Lend-Lease should be recalled. The Soviet Union alone received over 13,000 military vehicles, 2,300 guns, 500,000 trucks, 15,000 airplanes—altogether more than 17.5 million English tons. Bearing this in mind, one gets a fair estimate of the significance of economic factors in the war.[36]

The American War of Independence and the Russo-Japanese War had been the precursors of a revolutionary military policy which in the twentieth century became an actual fact: the belligerents did not aim

[35] Burton H. Klein, *Germany's Economic Preparations for War* (Cambridge, Mass., 1959); M. M. Postan, *British War Production* (London 1952); Ploetz, *Die Kriegsmittel* (Würzburg 1960); Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., *The New World, 1939-1946*, Vol. I of a History of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (University Park, Penna., 1962); Vladimir Katkoff, *Soviet Economy, 1940-1965* (Baltimore 1961).

[36] Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., *Lend-Lease: Weapon for Victory* (New York 1944); Raymond H. Dawson, *The Decision to Aid Russia, 1941* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1959); J. Carl, *Das amerikanische Leih- und Pachtgesetz* (Frankfurt 1957).

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at destroying merely the enemy's military forces, but his economic defense potential, and his transportation system and media of communications as well. Employing all available means—blockades, modern mass-media, and an air offensive—they tried to crush the enemy's resistance or to starve him out. The home and war fronts were fused into one. The race in military technology culminated in the dropping of the first atomic bombs, which ushered in an age of completely different strategic weapons along with a capability for destruction of entire regions. The ideological battle and the revolutionary war policy not only drove passions on both sides beyond the bounds of control by use of terror and counterterror, but tore down the boundaries of national political ideas and created new value standards.[37]

There was also the so-called "population explosion." The tremendous rate of growth in world population gave both World Wars a dimension hitherto inconceivable. In the first "total war," 1914-1918, the nations of the world mobilized and sent 60 million soldiers into combat duty. The war, waged with modern weapons and technology, left over 9.2 million dead on the battlefields. More than 500,000 civilians were killed. Russia and Germany suffered the greatest losses, of 2 million dead each. From 1939 to 1945, there were 110 million soldiers on combat duty. Of this number, 27 million fell in battle, while civilian casualties for the world numbered 25 million dead (over 5 million of them victims of the National Socialist racial policy). Including the number of missing, the balance (compared to which the immense growth in world population is only a small consolation) shows a loss of 55 million people. Again Russia and Germany were hardest hit; Russia lost 13.6 and Germany 4.2 million soldiers; the United States counted 259,000 dead. India's fight for freedom cost more than 10,000 lives. While the air offensive in Germany destroyed about 1.63 million buildings—over 500 monuments of note among them—and made 7.5 million people homeless, the military campaigns in the Soviet Union devastated 1,710 cities and settlements, 70,000 towns and villages, and over 6 million buildings of all kinds.

The thoughts touched upon here are primarily designed to stimulate discussion. They have, it is hoped, indicated some of the profound problems which historical research on the period of the Second World War will have to cope with more intensively in the future. For if

[37] Jean Perré, *Les mutations de la guerre moderne* (Paris 1962); Bertrand Goldschmidt, *L'aventure atomique* (Paris 1962); Major-General J. F. C. Fuller, *The Conduct of War, 1789-1961* (London 1961); Raymond Aron, *Paix et guerre entre les nations* (Paris 1962).

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modern historiography is to fulfill one of its most important tasks, if it is to make the world of yesterday comprehensible for the generation of today by a study of the past, it should overcome certain partially outmoded categories of thought and interpretation, and try to ask its questions and to apply its methods in terms of the changed intellectual conditions of our times.

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Review Articles

METHOD AND SUBSTANCE IN THE ARMS DEBATE

By PHILIP GREEN

Robert A. Levine, *The Arms Debate*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1963, 347 pp. $6.50.

I

WITH surprising rapidity, nuclear arms policy has become an object not merely of political controversy but of critical scholarly discourse as well. The publication of Robert Levine's *The Arms Debate*, a meticulously researched study of the arguments which have been offered on behalf of the best-known competing arms-policy proposals, provides an appropriate opportunity for assessing both of these aspects of arms-policy discussion. Although not an exciting book, *The Arms Debate* is an important one: for Levine has so immersed himself in his subject that his efforts to clarify its discussion reveal more about the nature of the debate than any other recent contribution to it. And since he more or less identifies himself with one school of thought—that which I shall hereafter refer to as "deterrence theory"—he especially reveals much about the cast of mind and the reasoning processes of those who have developed what is certainly the most sophisticated and important of the policy arguments he discusses. I shall have more to say later about the relationship between Levine's view of the arms debate and the nature of deterrence theory; first, however, we should look at Levine's description of the arms debate in some detail, since it is interesting both as a guide to that subject and in its own right as well.

Although Levine has described five (really six) different schools of thought about arms policy, his basic analytical tool is his division of contributors to the debate into two dichotomous groupings: "systemists" and "marginalists." The latter are all those who favor "small incremental changes in existing processes and mechanisms"; the former are all those who propose "large variations affecting entire systems" (p. 46). More simply, the polity is divided into those of whatever political category who are willing to operate within the existing political framework and those—presumably of the far "Left" and "Right"—who think

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the framework itself must be changed before any worthwhile operations can be undertaken.[1]

Perhaps of equal interest as an analytic device is Levine's notion of what he calls "the *logical structure* of a policy position" (my emphasis). His discussion of "decision theory" (see p. 16, n. 2) is largely derivative, as he himself indicates. However, his systematic application of that branch of economic theory (Levine is by profession an economist) to the arms debate is novel. In Levine's vocabulary of decision-making, policy *recommendations*—which are what the arms debate is chiefly about, of course—proceed from the logical application of inductive (empirical) *analysis* to the policy-maker's structure of *values*; analysis in turn consists of the application of inductive logic to agreed-upon *facts*. Or: "Inductive policy analysis is . . . concerned with isolating from the infinity of events occurring before or simultaneously with an occasion of interest, those which were relevant to the particular occasion; and with estimating which of these events are likely to recur" (p. 24). Thus, if two persons start with the same values, they should *in principle* (a phrase on which Levine much relies) be able to arrive at similar analyses of a policy problem. Or, if their analyses are different, they should be able to decide which is more nearly "correct." Similarly, if two persons start with different values, we should in principle be able to hold constant the merely evaluative element in the different recommendations they make, thus leaving a residue of two trains of inductive analysis that can be subjected to comparison, in order to ascertain which is "better." Furthermore, one can often clarify the evaluative element in a decision-making situation by distinguishing between recommendations which look to the *maximization* of a *single* value, and those which look to *optimization* among competing or *conflicting* values—a task for which again there are in principle tools of rigorous analysis. Finally, even though one cannot in practice easily optimize among conflicting values such as "liberty" and "peace," one can still solve some of one's policy problems by the method of *dominance*—choosing a policy which promises to do no worse for *any* value system, and better for some, than any competing policy.[2]

[1] Levine, pp. 29-30, uses as an example the distinction between proposals for the unilateral abandonment of weapons-*testing* and proposals for the unilateral abandonment of weapons manufacture and deployment. The latter would require the scrapping of one's whole system of military arrangements; the former would not.

[2] The concept of "dominance" is somewhat more complicated than I have indicated, as Levine points out on p. 42. In general he seems to think that, within his decision-making schema, successful optimization is the theoretical goal least likely of real-world attainment; he suggests that one would be most likely in practice to eliminate inferior policies rather than looking for the one best policy, using this choice-making method.

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Thus Levine has a logical framework for analyzing policy positions, and a method of distinguishing them with regard to their most basic political characteristic. To put this another way, he is enabled to categorize policy positions according to both their logical *and* their political implications. His use of this method, when combined with some fine-toothed discrimination among the different types of "marginalism," is a fivefold classification of positions in the arms debate that is likely to become standard in academic discussion. These positions (reading from "Left" to "Right" in my order of choice rather than his) are summarized by Levine in the following manner.

Anti-war Systemists. Roughly speaking, Levine finds two *values* to be paramount in discussions of arms policy: the value of preventing nuclear war, and the value of opposing the spread of "international communism." The anti-war systemists are those persons, such as H. Stuart Hughes, Erich Fromm, Mulford Q. Sibley, Fred W. Neal, and W. H. Ferry, whose "values and analyses lead to a fear of thermonuclear war which enters the choice mechanism with infinite weight compared to the fear of forcible Communist advance" (p. 294).[3] This weighting is compounded of an *analytical* assessment of the threat of war (frightful); an analytical assessment of the threat of Communist expansion (not so frightful); and a method of discounting probabilities according to which a given threat of nuclear war is to be disvalued when compared with an equal threat of Communist expansion. The result of such a combination of values and analyses is usually the single arms-policy recommendation on which most anti-war systemists agree: unilateral nuclear disarmament;[4] in addition, unconditional disengagement in Western Europe is found by most anti-war systemists to be a (logically related) policy on which they can agree. These recom-

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As we shall see, however, the concept remains very significant for arms-policy discussion. A formal mathematical explanation of "dominance" may be found in any standard work on the theory of games—e.g., R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, *Games and Decisions* (New York 1957).

[3] Levine adds, "This fear of war is not a personal one—the advocates of nonviolence, for example, are anything but personally fearful—but it is a combination of values and analyses which dominates their beliefs." As we shall see, it is important to note that not all anti-war systemists are advocates of complete nonviolence; whether Levine has correctly understood the values of those who are not is a crucial point which is discussed below.

[4] Not all systemists are necessarily unilateralists in the common sense of the word; Neal, for instance, merely proposes unilateral abandonment of all American overseas bases except those in Central Europe. And a recommendation that the United States accept the most recent Soviet disarmament proposal without qualification would probably meet Levine's definition of "systemic," although at this point his concepts begin to seem fuzzy at the edges.

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mendations, it should be added, are further distinguished by the fact that they are "indefinite." In Levine's schema, an indefinite recommendation is one which is proposed without specification of any practical methods for achieving it: it is a characteristic of systemists, according to Levine, to make such recommendations.

Anti-war marginalists. The anti-war marginalists also stress the value of preventing war more than the value of opposing Communist expansion; Charles Osgood, Amitai Etzioni, Arthur Waskow, J. David Singer, and James Warburg are among those whose names Levine mentions in this connection. The chief difference between them and the anti-war systemists is that their arms-policy recommendations can be posed without demanding immediate and drastic changes in the present international system of controlling the use of violence through the threat of violence.[5] These recommendations consist chiefly of proposals for graduated unilateral "initiatives" to reduce tensions and lead to negotiated, *bilateral* (or multilateral) general and complete disarmament; negotiated disengagement (and ultimately *détente*) in Central Europe is also usually proposed.[6] The recommendations differ from those put forth by the anti-war systemists in that they consist more of concrete proposals and less of indefinite exhortation to "unconditional" goals; and in that they are avowedly based on a belief in the short-run utility *and necessity* of a system of "stable deterrence."[7]

Despite the difference in what is recommended, however, the *analyses* made by the anti-war marginalists are really quite similar to those made by the anti-war systemists. Thermonuclear war, it is believed by all those whom Levine calls "anti-war," is in the long run (at best) likely to come about through accident, "irrationality," miscalculation, or escalation; moreover, when nuclear war does come it will be uncontrollable, and thus too grossly destructive even to be considered seriously as an option. In addition to being in agreement with regard to the probable nature and causes of nuclear war, the anti-war schools are also in general agreement with regard to the likely motives for it.

[5] Thus writers such as Osgood, Etzioni, and Singer would "police" their disarmament schemes with a "minimum deterrence" force that would remain in existence on a national basis, until some kind of supranational authority had been created with effective power to enforce "peace."

[6] Cf. Charles E. Osgood, *An Alternative to War or Surrender* (Urbana 1962); Amitai Etzioni, *The Hard Way to Peace* (New York 1962); Arthur I. Waskow, *The Limits of Defense* (New York 1962); J. David Singer, *Deterrence, Arms Control, and Disarmament* (Columbus 1962).

[7] Actually, as Levine points out, the ultimate goal of most of the writers he discusses is the same *in the long run*: some form of world government. What, if anything, this goal is *conditional* on, in the mind of the advocate, separates the various schools of thought from each other.

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That is, the Soviet Union is seen, in line with the theorizing of George Kennan and Walter Lippmann, as an essentially conservative power, so that U.S.-USSR political interaction is a much less likely generator of nuclear war than is the hostility-breeding nuclear "arms race." However, Kennan and Lippmann are not nearly so sanguine about Soviet behavior as, say, Erich Fromm. The reason, then—in addition to different estimates of what constitutes political "realism"—why these similar analyses lead the two camps to different recommendations is that the anti-war marginalists do think that the Soviet Union poses a severe enough threat to "freedom" to make the deterrent function of nuclear weapons worth relying on *in the short run*.

Middle Marginalists. The middle marginalists, unlike both anti-war schools of thought, believe that the long-run goal of general and complete nuclear disarmament is either impractical, or dangerous, or both.[8] Thus they support—if indeed they are not partially responsible for—the broad outlines of what is today generally accepted as American national security policy: the United States should possess a balanced deterrence force such as will enable it to make credible deterrent threats, *and make them good if need be*, at every level of potential military conflict. Among their other prospective uses, that is, nuclear weapons may be used either to "win" or to stabilize a limited war, or even to control what is now being called a "no-cities" war, at high levels of nuclear violence. Especially in Western Europe—from which middle marginalists by and large oppose disengagement—it may be necessary to make a nuclear *first* strike in response to a conventional attack on a position which the West cannot successfully defend by conventional means. (Correlatively, as Herman Kahn has explained, civil defense thus becomes a necessary adjunct of deterrence strategy, enabling us to mitigate the effects of those nuclear wars that we may have to fight or to threaten to fight.) This "multistable" deterrence force, to use Kahn's term, should be subjected whenever possible to the restraints of "arms control" measures—but these are *not* intended to be steps toward general and complete disarmament.

The analyses upon which these recommendations are based are in sharp contrast to the analyses made by both the anti-war schools. The middle marginalists, though they accept that war "tends to become thermonuclear" (p. 212), believe that nuclear war *is* controllable by "rational" men; that escalation can be prevented or at least limited by

[8] Cf. Herman Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War* (Princeton 1960), 5; Thomas C. Schelling, "The Role of Deterrence in Total Disarmament," *Foreign Affairs*, XL (April 1962), 392-406.

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the adoption of a rational weapons doctrine; that accidents need not lead to war; and that relevant national actors are likely to be rational enough to obviate our fearing irrationality as deeply as the anti-war schools fear it. In sum, the middle marginalists believe that the arms race need not generate nuclear war and that deterrence is thus a rational long-run strategy.[9] Furthermore, it is a *necessary* one, in that the Kennan-Lippmann thesis is either incorrect or overstated: the USSR is still a cautiously aggressive power, and its caution is due rather to American firmness than to any inherent Soviet "conservatism."[10]

What is most interesting about the distinction between middle marginalists and the anti-war schools, however, is what Levine claims to be the basic *similarity of their values.* According to Levine, the middle marginalists share with both the anti-war marginalists and the nonpacifist anti-war systemists an emphasis on the prevention of all-out war as the basic goal of Western policy. It is true that there are some middle marginalists (Levine calls them "balanced-value middle marginalists") who arrive at their position by weighting equally the need to prevent war and the need to defend the West against communism, and who then find that the strategy of deterrence will accomplish this dual end best—is optimal, in other words. But the bulk of the middle marginalists are those whom Levine calls "analytical middle marginalists." Their argument he interprets entirely differently, and by his interpretation makes "dominance" one of the key concepts of his discussion. The analytical middle marginalists—to be precise, those whom I have heretofore been calling "deterrence theorists"—seek to prevent war, and the means they have chosen to do so are more efficacious, in their view, than those chosen by the anti-war theorists. In addition, they believe that the strategy of deterrence not only offers the best hope of preventing war and ameliorating its effects if it comes, but also promises—almost by definition—to be a stronger bulwark against the possible military aggressions of communism than *any*

[9] Levine asserts that the middle marginalists, unlike the anti-war schools, do not have a burning interest in the long run; that they see it as merely a series of short runs. This seems to me to be equivalent to saying that deterrence is a feasible *long*-run strategy, and I have therefore used such phraseology in describing deterrence theory. If one is interested only in indefinitely "buying time"—a view which Levine attributes to middle marginalists—one has really made a long-run decision as well as a short-run one.

[10] This view is adumbrated in U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe,* A Study by a Columbia-Harvard Research Group (Washington, GPO, 1960); Levine credits Marshall D. Shulman and Zbigniew Brzezinski with being the major sources of the ideas contained in this study. Compare George Kennan, *Russia, the Atom, and the West* (New York 1958), and Walter Lippmann, *The Coming Tests with Russia* (Boston 1961).

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disarmament strategy.[11] Thus that strategy, as elaborated by Herman Kahn, Thomas Schelling, Glenn Snyder, Albert Wohlstetter, and others, is alleged to be logically *dominant* over all other strategies which value highly the prevention of war; deterrence can accomplish everything that disarmament strategies wish to accomplish, and more, while serving the same ultimate ends.

Anti-Communist Marginalists. The remaining two schools of thought about arms policy consist of those persons who weight the value of prevention of Communist expansion more strongly than the value of prevention of war; to a certain extent, opposition to communism is also taken by them to imply "rolling back" the Iron Curtain. By anti-Communist marginalists Levine seems to mean nothing more than the group around Robert Strausz-Hupé—those writers associated with the idea of "protracted conflict" and "forward strategy."[12] In their analysis, war is seen as a spectrum of different types of hostilities, none being different *in kind* from any others; the distinction between thermonuclear and other weapons is therefore not perceived as important. The only question to be asked about nuclear weapons is, will their use be helpful in a given situation? The "analytical" answer given by the "forward strategists" is that in formal war situations (as opposed to some instances of revolutionary subversion) their use *is* likely to redound to the benefit of the West; in other words, deterrence—the making of threats—is not necessarily their primary function. This is so because, since war is merely "the continuation of politics by other means," weapons are *political* instruments. The arms race is an aspect of politics like, say, trade relations, and can be exploited to the West's benefit in the same fashion as trade relations can be, for the West is ultimately "stronger" than the Communist bloc if it can find the will to make full use of its resources. And the arms race *must* be so exploited, for the USSR is out to "bury" the West; nor is there any visible hope for change in its "implacably" aggressive attitude. As for the chief problem posed by the use of nuclear weapons, that of control, the anti-Communist marginalists agree with the middle marginalists in

[11] Cf. Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War*; Schelling, "The Role of Deterrence in Total Disarmament," and *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge 1960), especially Part IV; Glenn Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense* (Princeton 1961); Albert Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXVII (January 1959), 211-34; Henry A. Kissinger, *The Necessity for Choice* (New York 1960). The list of publications explicating the strategy of deterrence is of course almost endless; I have noted merely the most important contributions of those authors whom Levine emphasizes in his discussion.

[12] Robert Strausz-Hupé, William R. Kintner, James E. Dougherty, and Alvin J. Cottrell, *Protracted Conflict* (New York 1959); Robert Strausz-Hupé, William R. Kintner, and Stefan T. Possony, *A Forward Strategy for America* (New York 1961).

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seeing this as a soluble problem. War, being political, is by the same token likely to be conducted rationally, and the stronger side can thus rationally guide the use of nuclear weapons to achieve its ends. The policy recommendations which follow from this analysis are, simply, to plan for *all* possible uses of the weapons at our command, and to enter into no short-run arms control agreements (let alone disarmament agreements) that would hinder the West's attempt unilaterally to make nuclear weapons an instrument of its policy. (Specific proposals—satellite "liberation," NATO unity, independent national deterrents, support of militant anti-Communist forces everywhere—are more or less logical deductions from this general posture.) Thus, to repeat, it is a matter of values which differentiates the anti-Communist marginalists from the middle marginalists: whereas the latter propose to use nuclear weapons only out of necessity, the former propose to do so whenever such action will benefit the West in the unremitting struggle against communism.

Anti-Communist Systemists. The anti-Communist systemists, as designated by Levine, are on the whole those who have come to be known as the spokesmen of the extreme Right wing; among those he mentions are James Burnham, Major Alexander de Seversky and—incorrectly, I think—Senator Barry Goldwater. It is at times quite difficult to distinguish the two "anti-Communist" groups from each other. (It is equally difficult to tell exactly what makes the systemists systemists, except with regard to matters of domestic policy that are not really relevant in this context.) The chief distinction appears to be that for the marginalists uncontrolled American military predominance is not necessarily a permanent requisite, since the Communists may be induced to agree to a division of spheres of influence which the West would find satisfactory; the systemists, on the other hand, see absolutely no desirability in controls over our forces so long as communism exists. Levine also notes that the systemists tend to make indefinite recommendations—Stop Negotiating! Win! and the like—whereas the marginalists have a definite and detailed program to offer. However, Levine appears to exaggerate both these distinctions, although it is hard to be certain of this since his treatment of the systemists is so brief and so unsympathetic. On the basis of his own evidence, the values, analyses, and often the recommendations of the two groups appear to be similar: "protracted conflict" and "forward strategy" are phrases that could be used by either of them. The *real* difference, I think, is that there is an air of hysteria in the rhetoric—and occasionally the proposals—of the extreme anti-Communists that is lacking in the more sober work of

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Strausz-Hupé, so that what seems like an intellectual argument in his case becomes sheer rant in theirs.

Levine's preferences among these various schools of thought can be summarized easily, as he takes pains to make them clear. Those persons who emphasize anti-communism more than war prevention he finds hard to understand; furthermore, he thinks that the anti-Communist systemists, though perhaps representative of certain groups in the mass public, are an irrelevant force at the levels of action where political decisions are really taken. Specifically, they are of lesser consequence than the anti-*war* systemists. The latter's proposals have no hope of adoption, but they are at least listened to by influential persons, because they are intellectually coherent and because the national consensus is, overall, primarily anti-war. On the whole, however, the real argument—and the one in which Levine is an active participant—is between the anti-war and middle *marginalists*: between the advocates of negotiated disarmament and the advocates of deterrence plus arms control. The questions on which these groups disagree are the questions which really most deserve further investigation, not only because marginalists offer policy recommendations that are *ipso facto* more likely to be adopted than those offered by the systemists, but also because the recommendations they offer are on the whole the most sensible ones offered: "For an optimizing marginalist whose personal-political value judgments are that arms policy in the mid-twentieth century should be concerned primarily with avoiding thermonuclear war, and that the need to defend an area of freedom against the Communist military threat should be a major conditioning factor but not a primary objective, arms recommendations should be based on the answers given to certain fundamental analytical questions" (p. 316). These questions are, among others: can "rationality exert substantial control" over the use of nuclear weapons in situations involving accident, limited war, or low-level nuclear wars? Is it likely that the arms race will itself "cause war over the long run; or can a controlled arms race be a relatively stable one"? Is the optimistic (Kennan-Lippmann) or pessimistic (Brzezinski-Shulman) view of Soviet intentions more nearly correct?[13] These are

[13] Levine also identifies as "fundamental" certain questions that seem to me to be secondary to those noted above. Among these are the following: Is "militarism" a threat to democracy in the United States, in the context of the "cold war" and the nuclear arms race? Is the crucial battleground between the West and the Communists still Europe, or is it now the "underdeveloped" world? "Can the Soviets be induced to relax their grip on the East European satellites . . . [or not]?" Should Germany be neutralized or should West Germany be indissolubly tied to the West? Is virtue or force a more important ingredient of national power? On all these questions, the

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matters which can at least in theory be resolved by analysis (though Levine, despite an announced sympathy for certain of the anti-war marginalist positions, leaves one with the feeling that he thinks deterrence theorists have already satisfactorily resolved many of these questions). The main point, however, and one which deserves emphasis, is that according to Levine questions of *value* need be investigated and debated no further, since on them the chief contending groups are in agreement.

II

This then is Levine's guide to "the arms debate." As such, it should be extremely useful for all those who teach, write, or are otherwise engaged in the area of arms-policy discussion. Of course, as Levine himself notes, his classifications are too sharply differentiated to be completely satisfactory; and sometimes, as I have indicated above, they are even a little confusing. But on the whole, if one wishes to understand better the substance of and reasoning behind the proposals which we roughly call unilateral nuclear disarmament, unilateral initiatives toward negotiated disarmament, deterrence plus arms control, and the "forward strategy," one will be grateful for the research which Levine has done.

Unfortunately, however, *The Arms Debate* is more than merely a job of painstaking research. As I have said earlier, it is also itself a substantive contribution to the arms debate. Its substance inheres in Levine's determined application of the notion that a policy position has a "logical structure," and that different policy proposals can fruitfully be analyzed and compared on the basis of their several logics. At first glance such a notion may seem procedural rather than substantive, but deeper reflection shows that this is far from being the case. For, as we shall see, Levine's methodological commitment is inextricably bound up with the doctrines of the analytical middle marginalists—of deterrence theorists. His discussion of the arms debate is thus led, tendentiously, in a questionable direction, sometimes so subtly that the process is barely noticeable (though it is all the more unfortunate for precisely that reason). The result is that Levine damages an otherwise accurate description of the arms debate by distorting the true nature of some of its most important issues.

The aspect of Levine's work which is most responsible for this distortion is his use of the tools of rational economic analysis, the most

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positions of the two marginalist camps are what one would expect them to be, given their different recommendations concerning disarmament and disengagement.

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important of which I have referred to from time to time. In recent years these analytic tools have been found more and more attractive not only by economists but by social scientists generally. At least where vital issues of world politics are concerned, one begins to think that this may be a pity.

The apparent motivation behind the logic of the economist is the same as that behind the logic of the modern scientist and philosopher generally: to make measurable, or in some way objectively comparable, what was previously subjective and unmeasurable.[14] Levine's application to human behavior and social beliefs of a method which is ordinarily applied to the structure of matter and of language is not such as to give one confidence in the merit of this kind of social science. I shall here mention only the most important example of the ill effect which this peculiar mating of subject and method has.

(1) The logic of economic analysis leads Levine to commit a serious error concerning the value of "opposition to war"—a value which as a primary commitment is supposedly the subject of agreement among anti-war theorists and deterrence theorists alike. In economics a "value" is anything subjectively desired: the possession of apples and the attainment of peace both have some "value" to most persons, though in practice we make no attempt to compare such disparate kinds of "value." But trouble arises when we forget, as Levine forgets, that in this usage "value" is not at all synonymous with "morals" or "ethics," and that the euphemistic phrase "value judgment" does not necessarily connote the kind of acts of intellection to which we traditionally give the name "morality." Morality, so understood, consists not of mere statements of desire, but of *commandments* which one gives to oneself, or which God gives to one: "Thou shalts" or (usually) "Thou shalt nots."

Now the question arises, is opposition to war a moral commandment for both anti-war theorists and deterrence theorists? With regard to the latter at least, the answer is clearly "no." There is no deterrence theorist, to my knowledge, who anywhere makes any statement such as this: "We should not under any circumstances engage in acts of nuclear warfare." On the contrary, sophisticated deterrence theory, as Herman Kahn makes abundantly clear in *On Thermonuclear War*, is based on the notions that deterrence may fail; that one must be firmly resolved to use one's nuclear forces in certain contingencies if it does

[14] I do not consider here, though it would certainly be worth doing so in another context, the suggestion made by some critics that there is a strong ideological component in classical economic utilitarianism. See, e.g., Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York 1958), 123-57.

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fail; and that acts of nuclear war, even of the countercity variety, may themselves be a necessary aspect of "deterrence" in some circumstances. In other words, war prevention is *not* the ultimate end of the deployment of nuclear weapons, but rather the means to some other end: else we would not consider using them *ever* (except in engagements so "limited" that one could deny they were really nuclear wars).

What is the ultimate end of deterrence, then; and does that end suggest a moral commandment? The answer, I think, is that the ultimate purpose of deterrence is to prevent intolerable "provocations" or "aggressions" by the Communist nations against the West. This statement of purpose, furthermore, implicitly *does* take the form of a moral commandment: "We shall not under any circumstances allow the Communists to defeat us permanently, whatever such 'defeat' may consist of, if we can possibly help it."

Levine has thus got the "primary" and "secondary" values of deterrence theory exactly reversed. It is true that deterrence theorists assert that their proposed strategy will prevent war more certainly than any other, but this is a hopeful prediction rather than a statement of moral preference. We can see this more clearly by contrasting the following two statements: (1) "I do not wish under any circumstances to be a *victim* of nuclear warfare"; (2) "I refuse to *commit an act* of nuclear warfare under any circumstances." The first statement is an expression of prudence, or of a hedonic preference; it may involve a moral judgment in addition, but it also may not, and in the case of deterrence theorists it seems not to. The indiscriminate use of the word "value" to denote *any* of the differing kinds of subjective desire may be useful in economics, but it is misleading in the realm of moral choice: it obscures rather than clarifies the most important distinctions.

Nor are the economist's concepts of "maximization" and "optimization" any help in this context. I do not mean to assert merely that deterrence theorists are "balanced-value marginalists" deep down and should be seen as making an optimizing choice among two potentially conflicting values. (Of course, this may indeed be true of some of them, and of some anti-war marginalists as well.) The point is rather that though one may "balance" one's desires for—optimize among—the kinds of goods economists deal with, one cannot in the long run do so with regard to moral "goods." Ultimately there are no "balanced-value" marginalists in the realm of moral choice: at best there are simply persons who have not yet, fortunately perhaps, been forced to choose. Deterrence theorists do not on the whole claim to be among the latter, however; the main thrust of their argument is that in the end

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"defense of freedom" as a moral concern is more important than "defense of peace," even if to accomplish that defense we must unequivocally commit ourselves to make an all-out nuclear strike under some circumstances. Prospectively at least, deterrence theorists have chosen their central value, and it is not the one which Levine ascribes to them; nor do they want to be thought to be bluffing in their expression of this choice, since bluffing is self-defeating behavior in a deterrence system.[15]

(2) We have not yet considered whether the position of the anti-war theorists is in this regard any different: what kind of moral command(s), if any, have they given to themselves? Here again, Levine's treatment is seriously in error and the reason for his error—which is more one of omission than commission—appears to be his commitment to the rigorous logic of economics.

If one is going to insist, as does Levine, that beliefs about society can in principle be compared to the extent that they are "value-free"; and if one is interested, as he is, in making such comparisons: then one's impulse will obviously be somehow to hold constant the evaluative components of the different beliefs one wishes to compare. In the given instance, Levine has accomplished this, as we have seen, by discovering that nonpacifist anti-war theorists and deterrence theorists share essentially the same values. Since probably even the pacifists would agree on the irrelevance of their "not-killing" value to the discussion of "practical" affairs, the effect of Levine's discovery is to subject the analyses and recommendations of these theorists to the same tests of (in principle) objective inductive reasoning.

By doing this, I am afraid, he obscures the true nature of the arms debate. Of course, his discussion is a useful corrective to the assumption which so often and so properly infuriates spokesmen for deterrence theory: the assumption that they are somehow "immoral" compared with their "anti-war" colleagues.[16] But to say that different persons are equally "moral" is not to say that they have the same morality. Levine recognizes this fact by distinguishing from all the others that small group of pacifist anti-war theorists whose moral commandment is, absolutely, "Thou shalt not kill." But this distinction is quite insufficient.

[15] Of course, in a showdown they might not be able to make themselves adhere to that choice. This is why Kahn, Schelling, and Leo Szilard among others have suggested that the only absolutely convincing deterrent would be a publicly and unquestionably automated one.

[16] Some spokesmen of the "peace movement" have themselves noted the unfairness of this assumption. Compare the reviews of *On Thermonuclear War* by H. Stuart Hughes, in "The Strategy of Deterrence," *Commentary*, xxxi (March 1961), 185-92; and by James Newman, *Scientific American*, ccv (March 1961), 197.

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The moral choice with which decision-makers today are faced, if they consider themselves to be faced with any, is *not* the simple choice between absolute pacifism and a prudential approach to nuclear war which all non-pacifists will agree on: "we'll only do it if we have to." The fact is that Levine shares the same blindness to in-between, ambiguous moral stances vis-à-vis nuclear warfare that is characteristic of so much deterrence theory.[17] Thus, for example, while some anti-war marginalists might do what deterrence theorists indicate *they* would do if confronted with a real choice between all-out nuclear war and "surrender," others use a rhetoric which implies that their dedication to "minimum deterrence" is in the nature of a bluff: a bluff which they either hope or wishfully assume will never be called. Their morality, at least for the moment, is clearly not the same as the proclaimed morality of deterrence theorists; and this is also true of the morality of those anti-war writers who have simply avoided confronting this particular issue so far—a characterization which I imagine applies to many of them.

Furthermore, even if one considers the differences here to be only differences of nuance, they may still be such as to have a large effect on one's judgment of the different policy positions. A clear instance of this is suggested by the deterrence theorists' claim that decision-makers can be expected to balance "rationally" the varied requirements of a stable deterrence policy. When one says this, one is in fact making a judgment about the relationship between values and actions: one is implying that the values which motivate a deterrence policy do not have such an effect on the emotions or intellect of the person who holds them as to interfere with his ability to adopt the course of action required of him. But it is not at all clear that the implication is merited, in the absence of further investigation.

We have seen, for example, that deterrence theorists find it somewhat easier than anti-war marginalists to conceive of the "rightness" of acts of nuclear warfare. We should also take note here of the assumption, implicit in deterrence theory, that it is "rational" for a decision-maker to be dedicated to the "national interest"; indeed, Levine describes deterrence theorists as prone to conceive of that "interest" primarily in terms of national military advantage (p. 200). Now the real point being made by Osgood, Etzioni, Waskow, and other anti-war marginalists is precisely that decision-makers who have a morality such as the one

[17] Levine's attempt to be "fair" to anti-war systemists is so obviously sincere that this instance of insensitivity seems clearly to be a result of his method rather than of his emotions.

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so described—a "deterrence morality"—cannot at this historical juncture be trusted to behave "well" in the long run. For this reason, if for no other, the dispute between anti-war marginalists and deterrence theorists *is* essentially a dispute about values—about their role in human behavior. Certainly no anti-war marginalist would go so far as to repeat Erich Fromm's assertion that the leaders of the great powers, because of the fact that they have such a morality, are really not "sane."[18] But all anti-war marginalists clearly do feel that dedication to the primary and subsidiary values comprehended in the universalistic ideal of *disarmament*, as opposed to the nationalistic ideal of deterrence, is necessary if not sufficient as a qualification for world leadership in the nuclear era.

Furthermore, some writers—not all of them "systemists" by any means—have asserted the rightness of a moral posture which, while not at all "pacifist," *is* sharply different from the moral posture which Levine ascribes to deterrence theorists. I refer to the doctrine, as argued most persuasively by persons with a more or less formal religious commitment, which holds that not "war" or "killing" but "total war" is morally wrong; that we are subject to a commandment not to kill innocent persons in the mass in order to protect ourselves (or even to threaten to do so); and that to disobey such a commandment loosens the bonds of morality generally. As far as one can tell, this is actually the view held by most of those whom Levine calls "anti-war systemists"; their morality is neither the pacifism of a Mulford Q. Sibley nor the prudential "fear" of war of the deterrence theorist. It is thus a commentary on the worth of Levine's method that he does not see this truth about the writers he discusses; and worse, that he makes not a single reference to any of those who have specifically discussed this issue in ethical or theological terms. The latter are for the most part advocates of the traditional Christian alternative of "just war." Paul Ramsey, Dean John Bennett, and Thomas Murray are a few of the names that come to mind in this connection; Levine does not so much as acknowledge their existence, although this kind of thinking about the morality of warfare comports with the traditional ethical codes of Western and Christian civilization much more closely than does the absolute pacifism which it is so easy to dismiss as of negligible importance.[19]

[18] Erich Fromm, *May Man Prevail?* (New York 1961), 17ff.

[19] Cf. Paul Ramsey, *War and the Christian Conscience: How Shall Modern War Be Justly Conducted?* (Durham, N.C., 1961); the essays by Ramsey and Bennett in John C. Bennett, ed., *Nuclear Weapons and the Conflict of Conscience* (New York 1962); Thomas E. Murray, *Nuclear Policy for War and Peace* (New York 1960). See also

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In sum, then, Levine's account of the arms debate turns an essentially moral concern into a pseudo-analytic question. If his method had not prevented him from putting "values" in their proper perspective, he would have seen that the most important moral question in the arms debate has not only failed to receive a generally agreed-upon answer, but has hardly yet even been debated. More important for his purposes, he would have seen that the claim of deterrence theory to exhibit the logical property of "dominance" when compared with other anti-war positions cannot possibly be supported, because the recommendations of these different groups of arms-policy theorists are based on *different* "value systems." Most important of all, he might then have avoided making his most fundamental and tendentious error, which is to designate as "analysis" the deterrence theorists' view that "Weapons are primarily to deter war but we may have to strike (first or second)" (p. 212). Of course we do not *have* to do anything of the kind, except that we have made a complex *moral* judgment about the obligations of the United States to itself, its allies, and its enemies. A contrary moral judgment which says, for instance, that the United States could *never* be justified in striking first (or even second) with nuclear weapons is perfectly defensible, and all the "inductive analysis" in the world cannot make it less so. On Levine's own evidence, in other words, the heart of the arms debate is still concerned with "values," not "analyses": even in theory we cannot reach agreement on the basis of a discussion of "analytical questions" alone.

(3) Levine's rationalistic logic affects not only his treatment of values in the arms debate but also his treatment of politics.[20] I have

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William Clancy, ed., *The Moral Dilemma of Nuclear Weapons*, essays from *Worldview, A Journal of Religion and International Affairs* (New York 1961); J. C. Murray, "Theology and Modern War," in William J. Nagle, ed., *Morality and Modern Warfare* (Baltimore 1960); Richard A. Falk, *Law, Morality, and War in the Contemporary World* (New York 1963). Historical and analytical discussions of "just war" theory may be found in Robert M. Tucker, *The Just War: A Study in Contemporary American Doctrine* (Baltimore 1960). Perhaps the best contribution to this discussion is contained in Walter Stein, ed., *Nuclear Weapons: A Catholic Response* (New York 1961), a series of essays by English Catholics, several of whom are also well-known professional philosophers.

[20] Levine himself admits that political decision-making is very unlike decision-making in his "model"; he makes similar apologies for most of the analytical devices I have discussed here. However, he does not thereby feel prevented from making essentially political recommendations about what questions ought to be discussed by public men. This self-contradictory position is found so often in recent "scientific" social science that one wishes there were a satisfactory explanation for the frequency of its appearance. Perhaps the explanation lies in the desire of social scientists to be both rigorous scientists and influential publicists at the same time; for an elaboration of this point, see my article, "Social Scientists and Nuclear Deterrence," *Dissent*, XI (Winter 1964), 89-90.

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previously noted Levine's assertion that the anti-Communist systemists have little or no influence on policy-making for national security. In a sense this assertion is obviously correct (though it must be remembered that one of them is an active candidate for the Republican presidential nomination in 1964). But in a deeper sense the statement is quite incorrect, and it is incorrect because the notion of policy-making on which it is based is a false one.

Levine depicts a rational policy process in which policy-makers freely draw on the best available analyses of a situation, freely choose their values from a supply of relevant values, and freely arrive at that policy which can be shown to be the logical result of combining the preferred analyses and values. For better or worse, however, leaders in a democracy—and perhaps to some extent in any stable polity—are unable to act with anything resembling the freedom that is here attributed to them. As Charles Lindblom has pointed out, the choice of policies rather moves in incremental steps—which is exactly what one would have supposed Levine meant by "marginalism." Policy-makers tend to start with past choices—past analyses, values, and recommendations—and modify them in marginal ways.[21] This is partly due to inertia—in the complete absence of which political life would become chaotic—and partly due to the fact that past choices represent *commitments*, which must be at least partially honored as long as those to whom the commitments were made retain any political influence.

Now one of the least tangible but most far-reaching of the commitments that political leaders can make, is their commitment to be responsive to the attitudes of their constituents. If the attitudes are rigid, therefore, the commitments will also tend to be relatively rigid, and policy-makers will be "unfree" in the most important respect of all: their ability to choose direction for society. When speaking of policy-making, therefore, we should ask not only for what values policy-makers have indicated a preference, but also to what values they are publicly committed. With regard to the "cold war," for example, national leaders in the United States have steadily committed themselves, since approximately 1946 (and especially since the fall of China to communism), to a series of public attitudes that, to use Levine's terms, often look much more like "anti-Communist" than like "anti-war" attitudes.[22]

[21] Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of Muddling Through," *Public Administration Review*, XIX (Winter 1959), 79-88; "Policy Analysis," *American Economic Review*, XLVIII (June 1958), 298-313.

[22] For a mordant, pessimistic view of these attitudes and their effect on American

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No doubt the Kennedy Administration did much to dampen the heated public spirit which led to such phenomena as "McCarthyism." But it can certainly be argued that the national consensus on the "cold war" is still vulnerable to the extreme anti-Communists: that they play an important role, even if only a subterranean one, in setting the permissible limits of innovation and reform in national security policy-making.[23]

If this interpretation of American public opinion is at all correct, then the "marginalism" of deterrence theorists must be seen as fitting into a policy process in which dedication to an anti-communism more immediate and stronger than their own is an important element. When we further take into account that on occasion the rhetoric of deterrence necessarily emphasizes that reliance on force and distrust of communism to which the extreme Right is so attached, the exact contribution of deterrence theory to arms policy comes to seem somewhat more ambiguous than Levine makes it out to be, or than it is if taken at face value. It is entirely possible, that is, that in some circumstances deterrence theory may contribute as much to maintenance of the anti-Communist ethos as to the development of an anti-war ethos. This may or may not be a good thing, depending on one's point of view; but in either case, deterrence theory is clearly not "anti-war" in the same sense as are the overtly anti-war theories.

Once again the mistake is tendentious. Levine's fundamental questions are supposed to be those which divide anti-war marginalists and deterrence theorists, who are themselves seen as being essentially detached from and opposed to the anti-Communist camp. But if we view deterrence proposals as being dependent on, as well as contributing to, the political setting in which they are to be implemented—if we think that those proposals may be implemented in a spirit different from the spirit in which they are made—then we may be less impressed by the brilliantly rational logic of deterrence theory than we otherwise would be. And we should note here that an alleged tendency of deterrence theory to be liable to distortion, owing to its entanglement with "anti-Communist" attitudes of the kind that breed further hostility in

policy-making in the postwar years, see Gabriel A. Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York 1960), xii ff.

[23] Senator J. W. Fulbright, in a speech reported in the *New York Times*, March 27, 1964, made an analysis of American opinion and policy-making similar to this one; the generally hostile response to his speech by Republican spokesmen (see *New York Times* for March 28, 1964) is an interesting commentary on his thesis. One should also note in this context the efforts made by the Kennedy Administration, in the summer of 1963, to justify the nuclear test-ban treaty in terms which would appeal to strong "anti-Communists."

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the cold war, is precisely one of the major complaints which the anti-war schools make against that theory.[24] This is one of the basic issues in the arms debate, surely; Levine not only ignores it, but prevents us from seeing that it exists. Justice Frankfurter's favorite remark that on the questions we ask, depend the answers we get, is well illustrated by the ways in which Levine's method leads him and us astray.

(4) The problems I have so far discussed all have to do with the ways in which the economist's rationalistic logic interfere with the discussion of issues such as these. At this point we should question also the psychological theory that underlies Levine's method—as indeed it underlies economic thought generally. I refer, of course, to the idea of "rational" behavior, an idea which is central to perhaps the most fundamental of Levine's "fundamental analytical questions": can "rationality"—"the proper use of deterrence"—exert "substantial control" over the progress of the arms race?

The problem here is both a logical and an empirical one. Levine couples his insistence that questions of "analysis" can be separated from questions of "value," and that only the former are the ones we should be discussing at the moment, with the casual assumption that to ask about the prospects for "rational" behavior is to ask a question which can "in principle" be answered by means of inductive analysis alone. This assumption, however, is wrong from several points of view.

The basis for Levine's assumption is apparently his belief that any "empirical end" is potentially a goal of "rational" action.[25] This combination of instrumental rationality and moral relativism leads into a logical cul-de-sac. (I leave aside here the question, raised most strikingly by Dostoevsky's Ivan Karamazov, whether moral relativism does not itself represent a discrete morality of a particular type: the kind of morality which says that "anything goes," and ultimately that "might makes right.") Since there exists an infinity of possible ends for human actors to choose among, are not all those who are working intelligently toward their chosen ends equally "rational"? For example, not all decision-makers necessarily believe in the virtues of the strategy of

[24] In the past few years many articles articulating this criticism have appeared in the *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. See, e.g., Charles E. Osgood, "Suggestions for Winning the Real War with Communism," *ibid.*, III (December 1959), 295-325; Kenneth E. Boulding, "National Images and International Systems," *ibid.*, III (June 1959), 120-31; William Paul Livant, "On Deterrence," *ibid.*, V (September 1961), 340-342; J. David Singer, "Threat-Perception and the Armament-Tension Dilemma," *ibid.*, II (March 1958), 90-105.

[25] The term "empirical end" is taken from Marion J. Levy's definitive discussion of the notion of instrumental rationality, in *The Structure of Society* (Princeton 1952), 242-48.

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deterrence. If the Chinese Communist leaders decided (I do not think they have done so) that the world must be rid of white men, and that nuclear war was the best way to achieve this goal, then a detached scientific observer would have to call them "rational"—unless they failed, which we would not know until after the fact. Under the circumstances, then, it hardly clarifies matters to ask if "rationality" can control the arms race: one wants to know, *whose* rationality?

The only possible way of avoiding this logical pitfall is to argue, as Levine well might, that in the nuclear era a "rational man" is specifically one who is dedicated to deterrence values—the values of the middle marginalists, in short—and is capable of striking the optimal balance between them and other values that become relevant to policy-making. If that is what is meant, however, then a serious empirical problem is created, since a good many persons in all governments will then qualify as being irrational. One has only to study the literature of, for example, interdepartmental, interservice, and executive-legislative rivalry in the U.S. government to see how utopian is the expectation that all decision-makers in a national government will be working consistently toward the same ends.[26] Furthermore, to define "irrationality" as dedication to *non*-deterrence values must introduce a systematic political bias into the discussion, according to which such persons as Senator Goldwater and H. Stuart Hughes are by definition "irrational." The next step is to suggest, as does Levine (echoing a similar comment by Glenn Snyder), that the Kennedy-McNamara defense policy is (now, was) more "rational" than the one which preceded it, thus making political partisanship into a principle of "analysis."[27]

Furthermore, even if we could resolve this problem of whether dedication to certain *values* should be called "rational" or not, we would still be in great difficulty. When we ask if "rationality" can control the arms race, we clearly imply that, even if the answer is negative, we at least are clarifying the situation by asking the question.

[26] Cf. Samuel P. Huntington, "Strategy and the Political Process," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXVIII (January 1960), 285-99, and his *The Common Defense* (New York 1961); Roger Hilsman, "The Foreign-Policy Consensus: An Interim Research Report," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, III (December 1959), 361-82. For an earlier, firsthand account, see Cordell Hull's *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (2 vols., New York 1948). And for a general consideration of the practical utility of the concept of "rationality" for discussions of decision-making, see Sidney Verba, "Assumptions of Rationality and Non-Rationality in Models of the International System," in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba, eds., *The International System* (Princeton 1962), 93-117.

[27] Levine's comment is on p. 331 of *The Arms Debate*; for the statement by Snyder, see Glenn Snyder, "The Politics of National Defense: A Review of Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics*," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, VI (December 1962), 372.

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That is, we imply that there *is* such a thing as rational deterrence behavior, and that we know roughly what it is, and that therefore we need only investigate the empirical ("analytical") questions of whether there are rational men and what they are likely to be able to accomplish. But suppose there is no concept of rational behavior which is logically consistent with itself? Then to ask such questions would be premature, or obscurantist, or both.

Unfortunately, it is not at all clear that the concept of rationality as used by deterrence theorists *is* self-consistent. For example, deterrence rationality requires both continued technological progress in the arms race and, on occasion, arms stabilization; short-run decisions favoring the national interest, conceived in narrow military terms, and long-run decisions favoring the "interest" of international integration; the maintenance of feelings of hostility against a threatening enemy, and willingness to compromise with that enemy in order to avoid catastrophe. Are these requirements all compatible with one another? Clearly one can as easily argue in the negative as in the affirmative. To take but one instance, it can be argued that ideological and emotional rigidity in American attitudes led directly to the Cuban crisis of October 1962, and that while the crisis was "successfully" resolved, our success may have been the kind that Pyrrhus had at Asculum. On the other hand, it can equally well be argued that the Cuban crisis was an instance of the success of a flexible American strategy of deterrence. Again, the maintenance of arms-race superiority over the Soviet Union in order to make possible a "damage-limiting" first-strike capability can be said to be "rational" as long as the situation sustains itself; but it may also be said to be "irrational" in that the Soviets will be driven to make a new qualitative leap in the arms race such as to outmode the West's whole missile and bomber arsenal.[28] Which course of action is "rational," and which not? Or may it not be that two absolutely contradictory courses of action are equally "rational," depending on what perspective one adopts, or how one chooses to define the word? If that is the case, then "rationality" comes perilously close to being a cant word; it implies the possibility of giving a set of self-consistent instructions to decision-makers, when we are not at all sure that such a

[28] On the problem of technology and stabilization, see John C. Polanyi, "Armaments Policies for the Sixties," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, XVII (December 1961), 403. On nationalism in the nuclear era, see Falk, 54-55; as though addressing himself to those who talk about "rational" national decision-makers, Falk comments that the global impact of nuclear warfare "calls into profound question the traditional position of the state as 'sovereign' in matters touching its vital interests." On hostility and cooperation, see the articles cited in note 24 above.

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set exists. If we follow Levine's formulation of the problems that ought to be investigated, we are asking a merely secondary question, and covering up the fact that we have failed to ask a more difficult primary question, the answer to which might dispose of questions having to do with "rational control over the arms race." Or, more likely, we are simply wasting time, asking questions about an irrelevant concept when we ought to be asking how and whether the arms race can be controlled.

Does the "rational man" concept have any conceivable use in policy analysis? It seems doubtful. Hedley Bull, in a brilliant passage, has argued that as a matter of historical fact there is no such thing as rational action in international relations, that psychological knowledge does not support the concept of decision-maker rationality, and that "university professors of unusual intellectual subtlety" are merely projecting their own view of the world onto the international scene in their scholastic discussions of deterrence theory. "The notion of rational action," he remarks, "is useful only when it is defined in a particular way, for the purposes of a particular body of theory."[29] For purposes of the body of theory we are discussing here, that notion would seem to have no uses at all except to befog discussion.[30]

III

Thus *The Arms Debate*, though quite adequate as a source book, is unsatisfactory as an attempt to interpret and evaluate its subject. Furthermore, we have seen that all the difficulties in Levine's analysis have the same tendency. That tendency is to concede, before real debate has even been begun, the major claims of deterrence theorists: first, that they need not confront any important issues of morality, since everyone but the insignificant pacifists and the far Right is agreed on the relevant moral issues in the arms debate; second, that their analyses of the needs of deterrence strategy are in some sense "value-free" and politically neutral; third, that in the concept of "rationality" they have discovered an analytic tool which will be helpful in discussing the basic problems of deterrence.

Since Levine has made such immense efforts to produce a work of genuine scholarship, it would be most unreasonable to ascribe this result of his work to mere personal bias. Indeed, he is aware of his

[29] Hedley Bull, *The Control of the Arms Race* (New York 1961), 48-49.

[30] For two similar, more detailed theoretical criticisms of the notion of "rationality," see the essays by Alvin W. Gouldner and John R. Seeley in Maurice Stein and Arthur Vidich, eds., *Sociology on Trial* (Englewood Cliffs 1963).

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bias, states it frequently, and has clearly made every possible effort to compensate for it. He could not, however, do so, for his approach to the arms debate is characterized by the same vice that mars the work of deterrence theorists generally. I would call this vice *the depoliticalization of the political*: the attempt to fit essentially political questions into the straitjacket of "scientific analysis."

The operation of this methodology, sometimes direct and sometimes indirect, can be observed time and again in the writings of the most sophisticated deterrence theorists. Among the questionable results so obtained, the following are typical: (1) Herman Kahn's reliance on "systems analysis" to justify his civil defense proposals in *On Thermonuclear War*, and Klaus Knorr's prefatory remark that Kahn's book is not concerned with "the moral aspects of military problems." (2) Albert Wohlstetter's suggestion that there is a "scientific method" for studying the arms race, without knowledge of which a concerned person is really unqualified to discuss arms policy. (3) Morton Kaplan's and Glenn Snyder's use of "calculi" to discuss the incalculable problems of deterrence, and incidentally to justify their own strategic proposals. (4) Snyder's notion that "the national interest" connotes a perspective which rises above crass politics. (5) The abstracted, speculative manner in which the rather astonishing concept of "limited strategic war" has been conceived. (6) The way in which Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin substitute statements about the probable theoretical characteristics of arms control or disarmament systems for statements about political likelihoods. (7) The virtually total neglect, by virtually all deterrence theorists, of problems of public opinion and internal political developments that might affect the course of the arms race or a nation's reactions to it.[31]

The root error in all theorizing of this type, which is finally unpersuasive because it claims to demonstrate so much more than it possibly

[31] Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War*; Albert Wohlstetter, "Scientists, Seers, and Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, XLI (April 1963), 478; Morton A. Kaplan, "The Calculus of Nuclear Deterrence," *World Politics*, XI (October 1958), 20-43; Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense*; Snyder, "The Politics of National Defense," 370-72; Klaus Knorr and Thornton Read, eds., *Limited Strategic War* (New York 1962), especially the contributions by Knorr, Kaplan, and Kahn; Schelling, "The Role of Deterrence in Total Disarmament"; Schelling and Halperin, *Strategy and Arms Control* (New York 1961), 47-48. A more detailed exposition of the nature of the claims made by these and other deterrence theorists, and the reasons why these claims cannot be justified if one applies to them the usual canons of sound scholarship, is to be found in my article, "Social Scientists and Nuclear Deterrence." Two incisive articles which make similar criticisms of rationalistic deterrence theory are P. M. S. Blackett, "Critique of Some Contemporary Defence Thinking," *Encounter*, XVI (April 1961), 9-17; and Bernard C. Cohen, "Military Policy Analysis and the Art of the Possible: A Review of Glenn H. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security*," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, VI (June 1962), 154-59.

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can, lies in the attempt, as exemplified by Levine, somehow to separate out the "analytical" components of a policy problem from the political and moral ones. It is necessary to insist that this cannot be done: policy proposals rest on assertions about politics, and such assertions consist primarily of complex and indissoluble political *judgments.*[32] A judgment is an expression of belief based on one's entire training and experience, and is thus inevitably both "moral" and "analytical," "technical" and "political," "subjective" and "objective." Whether "in principle" political judgments can eventually be broken down into the kinds of categories Levine would have us deal with is an interesting but irrelevant question, in that the basic issues of the arms debate relate not to abstract matters of principle but to immediate practical needs.[33] All we can do at present is to recognize that there *is* an inseparable evaluative element in all political judgments, and not attempt to hide this frustrating fact under the camouflage of theoretical social science.[34]

This is not to say, however, that upon entering the realm of politics we become unable to analyze arguments at all. There *are* tests for

[32] One need only note the instructive fact, whose significance Levine apparently does not perceive, that somehow the values and the analyses of the writers he discusses always seem to wind up leading in the same direction. With the possible exception of H. Stuart Hughes, who might thereby qualify if medals were given for intellectual detachment, none of them has values which lead him to ignore his analyses, or analytical views which cast doubt on the relevance of his values. I do not mean to be cynical; the point is that these writers have not developed their "values" and "analyses" separately, and then looked at the result to see in what direction it logically leads them. Rather they have made complex political judgments; perhaps then they, like Levine, have tried to break their judgments down into evaluative and analytical elements, but they evidently have had no more success at this than Levine has had.

[33] Ernest Nagel, in *The Structure of Science* (New York 1961), presents a detailed and powerful case for the argument that *in principle* there *can* be a "science of society" such that Levine's categories—or some deductive model employing similar categories—would then be relevant to the discussion of social events and human behavior. But as one reviewer noted, Nagel "modifies this claim for social science with so many qualifications that it emerges as little more than a hope—and, finally, he limits himself to affirming that the evidence so far fails to prove the *logical* impossibility of theoretical knowledge of man that approaches our knowledge of the physical world." (Raziel Abelson, in *Commentary,* XXXII [October 1961], 366.)

[34] In an earlier article, "Facts and Morals in the Arms Debate" (*World Politics,* XIV [January 1962], 239-58), Levine set forth a viewpoint really opposed to the one expressed in *The Arms Debate*: he suggested that there was much agreement about *facts* but little about *values,* or the policy implications of facts, in arms-policy discussion. Levine's original viewpoint is thus, oddly, more useful than is the matured fruit of his thought. However, the earlier viewpoint still incorporated the notion that we can distinguish between the factual and the evaluative parts of a political judgment, and thus contained within itself the seeds of his later error. To see just how useless is this notion in dealing with non-trivial statements, one needs only try to separate "analysis" and "values" in the following important sentence from *On Thermonuclear War*: "Despite a widespread belief to the contrary, objective studies indicate that even though the amount of human tragedy would be greatly increased in the postwar world, the increase would not preclude normal and happy lives for the majority of survivors and their descendants" (p. 21).

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discriminating among statements about political affairs—tests which, since they accept the inevitability of personal involvement in one's judgments, are sharply different from the tests by which Levine wants arms-policy proposals to be judged.

To see this distinction more clearly, we may look at one of the central passages in which Levine justifies his approach to the arms debate: "What is also excluded . . . is the sociological *ad hominem* type of discussion which perhaps reaches its maximum vigor in relation to American military policy in [the work of C. Wright Mills]. This sort of argument, which in Mills' case states that those who favor strong military policies do so because of their elite positions, is also used by those in the opposite camp who aver that many of the radical opponents of current policy are radical precisely because they are 'outs,' and tend to become much more moderate if they get 'in.' It is also used by 'red-baiters' to discredit their opponents. Although arguments of this sort need not be completely baseless, they are irrelevant to this study. It is possible to analyze ideas on their own grounds—what is stated, and on what logic and values the statements are based—and this, rather than either psychoanalysis or social analysis, is the task I have undertaken. A policy viewpoint stands on the basis of what is said by its holder, not on the basis of what the holder is or has been" (pp. 10-11).

Levine here makes an excellent statement of a philosophical ideal; unfortunately—or perhaps fortunately—the statement has little relevance to politics in the real world. In practice, even if we can determine exactly what the "analytical" part of a policy argument is, we never have a chance to test the analysis until it is too late for our knowledge to do us any real good—at least in such a dynamic area as that of international conflict. Therefore, one of the first things we instinctively try to find out upon hearing a political argument (unless we are extremely naïve) is precisely who the person making the argument "is": what other positions he has associated himself with; what personal or professional interest, if any, he has in persuading us to adopt his view; who his employers are, if he is employed to make political statements; and so forth. We will want to know also what his rhetoric is like and what kind of character it seems to indicate; what kind of morality he seems to have; what is the nature of his intelligence; whether he is intellectually serious or a demagogue; whether he meets opposing viewpoints on their own grounds or attempts to avoid doing so; how he behaves when his beliefs are tested in a crisis, or whether they ever *have* been so tested; what his record as a prophet is, if he has ever made political predictions in the past; and in general whether his world-view is similar

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to our own. It follows that the nature of political debate is less a matter of offering testable propositions or verifying predictions, than it is a matter, as Anatol Rapoport has suggested, of judging intellectual behavior as a whole.[35] One states one's own case fairly and fully, and considers the opponent's case in the same way; questions of analysis are only secondary.

Unhappily, the kind of pseudo-scientific discussion which Levine proposes, and which deterrence theorists are prone to engage in,[36] can hinder the development of a genuine arms debate. Science, strictly conceived, is inherently authoritarian. We approach most closely to the goals of scientific endeavor as we formulate propositions that cannot be argued with by reasonable men: that have been satisfactorily "demonstrated" by the inductive analyses of knowledgeable experts. To suggest that there are or may be such propositions concerning political conflict is to propose the substitution of expert knowledge for debate in the choice-making process. Where problems are really technical, of course, there should be no objection to this: we do not ask that *every* problem, or even most problems, be resolved by democratic methods. But where problems demand the kind of judgment that is involved in the consideration of arms-policy proposals, then to appeal to expertise is to foreclose debate exactly at the point where it ought to begin.

More than anyone else, deterrence theorists set the tone of the arms debate. This is partially because they have been the most articulate, well-publicized, and authoritatively received contributors to it; and partially because they come closest to enunciating what has actually become U.S. government policy. That debate would benefit greatly, therefore, if deterrence theorists—including Robert Levine—would more openly confront the primarily political and moral questions of the nuclear era, rather than relying on a method of "scientific" analysis and a logic of "rational" action that really obscure discussion of basic issues.

[35] Anatol Rapoport, *Fights, Games, and Debates* (Ann Arbor 1960), Part III, "The Ethics of Debate."

[36] Of course, one must make distinctions. Authors such as Kissinger and Oskar Morgenstern, for example, are more or less straightforwardly *political* analysts, though the latter has an unfortunate predilection for making meaningless references to "game theory" in the midst of arguments that would otherwise stand by themselves; cf. *The Question of National Defense* (New York 1961), 62. However, by far the most useful discussion of deterrence strategy has been Bernard Brodie's *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Princeton 1959). In this book Brodie succeeds in raising almost every important political, moral, and technical issue relevant to the discussion of deterrence, without reference to the abstract categories of economic logic, and without that disingenuousness about his own values which characterizes the kind of deterrence theory I have been discussing here.

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THE NATURAL RESOURCE BASE
Where Do We Stand?

By HERBERT I. SCHILLER

Reports to the Committee on Natural Resources of the National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., National Research Council, 1962:
Natural Resources: A Summary Report, Pub. 1000, 40 pp.
Paul Weiss, *Renewable Resources*, Pub. 1000-A, 127 pp.
Abel Wolman, *Water Resources*, Pub. 1000-B, 35 pp.
Dean R. Frasché, *Mineral Resources*, Pub. 1000-C, 32 pp.
M. King Hubbert, *Energy Resources*, Pub. 1000-D, 141 pp.
Sumner T. Pike and Athelstan Spilhaus, *Marine Resources*, Pub. 1000-E, 8 pp.
Roger Revelle, *Environment*, Pub. 1000-F (not yet published).
Gilbert F. White, *Social and Economic Aspects of Natural Resources*, Pub. 1000-G, 53 pp.

Hans H. Landsberg, Leonard L. Fischman, and Joseph L. Fisher, *Resources in America's Future*, Baltimore, Md., Johns Hopkins Press, for Resources for the Future, Inc., 1963, 1,017 pp. $15.00.

CONCERN over natural resources not only persists in the contemporary world but may be intensifying. World war, cold war, the race in space, and the almost universal push toward economic development have individually and collectively, constructively and destructively, renewed public and private interest in natural resource requirements and availabilities. Planners in various countries, capitalist or socialist, require fairly comprehensive resource information before they can hope to succeed in preparing lines of economic policy. Answers have to be found for a wide range of questions. Is the domestic resource base sufficient to meet present and anticipated claims on it? If not, can technology be relied upon to produce substitutes or more economical processes? Failing or supplementing this, are foreign supplies realistic alternatives? And finally, how accurate are estimates of resource capabilities and needs?

Two recent studies, each in its own way, have attempted to provide some solid information on these matters for the American scene. In fact, one of these efforts was launched by the President of the United States. In his special message on Natural Resources to the Congress, on February 23, 1961, President Kennedy stated: "From the beginning of civilization every nation's basic wealth and progress has stemmed in large measure from its natural resources. This nation has been, and is now, especially fortunate in the blessings we have inherited. Our

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entire society rests upon—and is dependent upon—our water, our land, our forests, and our minerals. How we use these resources influences our health, security, economy, and well-being." Immediately following this message, on March 4, 1961, President Kennedy requested the President of the National Academy of Sciences to "initiate an evaluation of the present research on behalf of conservation and development of America's natural resources" (*Natural Resources*, Appendix 1). The Academy's Committee on Natural Resources, which undertook the evaluation, has produced to date seven monographs and a summary report, referred to hereafter as the NAS studies.

The second report, published for Resources for the Future, was long in preparation but appeared shortly after the NAS monographs. This volume, *Resources in America's Future* (RIAF), is a massive and comprehensive study of the patterns of requirements and availabilities of natural resources in the American economy for 1960-2000 A.D. The work was written by Hans H. Landsberg, Leonard L. Fischman, and Joseph L. Fisher. It is an entirely independent study but may be regarded as the first legitimate successor to *Resources for Freedom*, the five-volume study by the President's Materials Policy Commission (Paley Commission), which appeared in 1952.

The RIAF work is in three parts. Part I, "Requirements for Future Living," establishes what the authors believe to be the basic economic patterns of the society as reflected in population, labor force, personal income and expenditures, government activity, and private investment data. Using these statistical series, the study moves to estimates of requirements over a 40-year period in such categories as foodstuffs, clothing and textiles, construction, transportation, durable goods, containers and packaging, paper products, military goods, heat and power, and outdoor recreation. Part II, "The Demand for Key Materials," reduces the requirements in Part I to their most elemental level and offers estimates of the needs for these raw materials in the subdivisions of crops, lumber and wood pulp, water, minerals, fuels, metals, and chemicals. Part III, "Adequacy of the Resource Base," assays actual and potential natural-resource availability in the United States in land, water, energy, and non-fuel minerals.

The RIAF study has developed its estimates of resource requirements by carefully joining historical and current patterns of materials consumption to expected growth in population, labor force, productivity, income, and technology. Growth over this period, in each of these components, is taken for granted and the only open question is that of

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magnitude. To deal with this problem of uncertainty of the growth range, three levels—low, medium, and high—are projected for each element, with the medium range generally selected as the one that is most realistic.

In contrast, the NAS monographs concern themselves only occasionally with supply and demand projections for specific materials. Emphasized instead are the long-run scientific and research considerations that the authors believe will either facilitate or discourage future resource availabilities. Consequently, the two studies, the RIAF and the NAS, are not strictly comparable, one dealing for the most part with materials estimates, and the other with the outlook for materials research. But, as may be imagined, the two fields are essentially inseparable and both studies continually cross over into each other's dominant area of concern. It is for this reason that they may be profitably compared and analyzed.

The main conclusions of the RIAF study are generally optimistic: "Natural resources are of basic and continuing importance to national economic growth and individual well-being, and vastly greater quantities of them will be required in the future. Neither a long view of the past, nor current trends, nor our most careful estimates of future possibilities suggest any general running out of resources in this country during the remainder of this century (or, if a broad impression may serve in the absence of detailed analysis, for a long time thereafter). The possibilities of using lower grades of raw material, of substituting plentiful materials for scarce ones, of getting more out of given amounts, of importing some things from other countries, and of making multiple use of land and water resources seem to be sufficient guarantee against across-the-board shortages" (pp. 4-5). The study accepts the possibility that specific shortages may develop occasionally and pose serious difficulties. In the main, however, the authors feel that improved technology, increased foreign supplies, and improved private and governmental resource management policies probably can be relied upon to avoid any long-lasting, critical deficiencies.

Counterposed to this balanced but, on the whole, assuring appraisal of the United States' resource future is that of the NAS Committee on Natural Resources: "Today the United States finds itself in an ambivalent position. In an environment of comparative plenty it is able to enjoy a certain complacency concerning its own short-range situation; but it faces a wider arena and a larger term in which complacency would be tragically dangerous. It is currently accurate and immediately comforting to say that unless there is a sudden denial

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to world markets the United States need fear no serious curtailment of growth because of natural resources over the next few decades. Yet unless in that period the current research emphasis is changed, the consequences will be serious" (*Natural Resources*, 24).

These contrasting appraisals should not suggest that the authors of the RIAF study face a rosy dawn while the NAS analysts view a darkening sunset. Qualifying provisos abound in the RIAF volume, while fistfuls of "bright prospects" are scattered throughout the NAS reports. Still there is an element of essential disagreement in the two studies in regard to America's resource future. Whereas the RIAF report is confident of the society's resource capabilities in the years ahead and sees little need for structural change in institutions and practices (though "improvement" is posited), the NAS authors permit an atmosphere of urgency to permeate their studies. Inevitably issuing from this mood is their advocacy of far-reaching changes in attitude and action in every segment of the resource spectrum they survey.

As a sample of the differing tone and emphasis in the two studies, the RIAF writers state at one point: "We do not envision any single, monolithic Resource Policy, through the application of which all resource problems will be solved. . . . Policies, like actions, tend to come in bits and pieces, never thoroughly consistent in their direction" (pp. 52-53). Compare this approach with M. King Hubbert's view of what has to be done: "Which of these three possibilities [nuclear war, overpopulation and societal chaos, or peaceful transition to large-scale use of nuclear energy] may be the one actually realized depends largely upon the foresight that can be exercised with respect to the guidance of human affairs, and in large measure on whether the cultural lag can be sufficiently reduced between the inhibitory sacred-cow behavior patterns which we have inherited from our recent past and the action requirements which are necessitated by the socio-industrial complex with which we have to deal . . ." (pp. 135-36).

Foremost in separating one study's overview from the other's is the attitude to *national* planning and the role of government. The RIAF work declares that no important changes in the structure and behavior of the American economy over the next forty years are taken into account in its calculations: "No drastic changes in this country's essentially free-enterprise mixture of private and government economic activity or in its political and social framework" are anticipated (p. 11). Also, "We have made no specific allowance . . . for striking changes in the social and political rules of the game" (p. 69). As an earnest of this view, the authors foresee a slight decline in the share of

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governmental expenditures in the Gross National Product in a "completely peaceful world," although in their medium projection they have assumed a non-defense component (defense is assumed as a constant percentage throughout the interval) which causes a "gradual rise in the government share to 25 per cent from today's level of about 20" (p. 83).

The NAS studies, on the other hand, uniformly regard the present organization of private-public resource enterprise as unsatisfactory and they collectively urge an enormously extended role for government in the promotion of nationally planned resource development. Paul Weiss, writing about organic nature and renewable resources, stresses the "underlying principle of interrelatedness and interdependence" (p. 4), and the implicit need for decision-making at the highest and broadest level to achieve satisfactory balance in a complicated ecological system. Frank Notestein emphasizes that "private enterprise is highly productive but cannot take the long view . . . government can and must" (*ibid.*, 95). And elsewhere he writes, "Whole sectors must be managed by governments" (*ibid.*, 71). Dean Frasché, concurring in the general sentiment, alludes to the injurious effects of secrecy about technological and financial matters inherent in private competition as well as to the inability of private industry "to undertake scientific and engineering research on a scale commensurate with the geographic, geologic, or technologic dimensions of ore-finding and ore-treating problems" (p. 21).

The main conclusion of his study, Frasché notes, is that "The Federal Government . . . should enlarge nationwide research and development activities to assure the availability of mineral resources to support the economy and defense of the nation. . . . The Federal Government should recognize its prime scientific and technologic responsibility and assume leadership: it does not have to go it alone, but it must provide the national core around which industry, academic, and state and local programs can be built" (p. 26).

Gilbert White, in his report, recommends the establishment of a governmental research agency with a continuing responsibility for resource projections and estimates (p. 51). Similarly, an expanded role for the national government is recommended for marine resources research by Pike and Spilhaus, and in water resources control and research by Abel Wolman. Wolman notes: "Small economic or political units with a limited purview cannot be expected to act optimally with respect to major water-resources planning" (pp. 10-11). And, "The whole hydroscience field is now pathetically limited for the tasks involved" (*ibid.*, 33).

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The NAS view that the ecological systems that produce resources are often globally influenced accounts, it would seem, for another divergence between the NAS and the RIAF studies. This is the matter of foreign supplies and the general availability of extra-continental sources of raw materials. Here again the distinction between the two approaches is somewhat blurred by a middle ground of apparent agreement, which in this case arises from the general understanding in the RIAF work that the importation of raw materials can be beset by problems of political instability, rising world demand, and numerous other unforeseen factors. Nevertheless, in their estimates Fisher, Landsberg, and Fischman have generally accepted the likelihood of a continued future availability of raw materials from current suppliers, accompanied by only a relatively gradual increase in the consumption of raw materials by the presently underdeveloped societies. Eliminated from serious consideration thereby are the strongest economic and political pressures that might bring curtailment of these supplies. For oil, iron ore, and bauxite, to mention just a few currently significant raw-material imports of the United States which are expected to increase in years to come, the RIAF authors foresee few obstacles to increased importation.

Also minimized is the materials consumption in the developing countries. As for ". . . the greatest unknown variable—future consumption in the developing countries of Asia and Africa—it is well to keep one's perspective even over a period of forty years and not be carried away by the figures one can conjure up from prospective population growth and industrial expansion" (p. 402). This advice seems curious in a study which sets the United States' population in its medium projection at 331 million in the year 2000, compared with 180 million in 1960, and which accepts approvingly a quadrupling of the domestic GNP from 500 to over 2,000 billion dollars by the century's end.

In the NAS reports, concern about the changing dimensions of the demand for (and supply of) raw materials in the underdeveloped states ranks second only to that felt in regard to the urgent need for national planning and increased governmental activity in resource matters. Gilbert White declares: "The geographical stance is also changing rapidly. It is no longer realistic to think of a sound United States policy for managing land, water, energy and minerals without regard to the distribution and demand for resources around the world, and particularly in emerging countries" (p. iv). M. King Hubbert notes that "If the whole world were industrialized to the same level as is the United States, the annual drain on the world's mineral resources would be about five times what it is now" (p. 132).

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Admittedly, predicting the future consumption of raw materials in the developing countries is a hazardous business. Political instability adds another incalculable variable on the supply side. Certainly the RIAF authors cannot be criticized for refusing to do more than generalize optimistically about these developments. Yet it is difficult not to agree with White's conclusions: "The possibility of drastic dislocations in overseas resource supply as a result of political events and policies remains real. Thus, there may be a major future challenge in smoothing over the effects of changes in resource activities and areas, both within the United States and in other nations" (p. 27). This sense of challenge is missing in the Landsberg, Fischman, and Fisher work.

Do either of these studies answer the question of whether the United States economy, currently operating with limited and uneven controls on its resource base, can cope with the mounting claims on its land, water, energy, and mineral supply? What many would regard as a vital consideration in providing an answer is entirely overlooked in the RIAF volume and only implicitly treated in a few of the NAS monographs. This involves nothing less than the sacred American Standard of Living and the mechanism by which it functions—first, the consumer's titillation, succeeded, it is hoped, by the consumer's choice.

Years ago, and coincidentally at a Resources for the Future Forum, J. K. Galbraith suggested that the question of resource conservation—or management, if you will—was inseparable from the character and the level of personal consumption.[1] If each American wants to possess personally two tons of steel in a car, as well as another ton in the form of refrigerator, washer, dryer, freezer, and so forth, to say nothing of the barrels of oil or tons of coal or kilowatts of hydropower necessary to provide the energy for their operation, this becomes an evermore serious factor in national natural-resource availabilities and capabilities. Galbraith did not extend his observations to include alternate means of consumer satisfaction.

In a recent tour of the Soviet Union, a U.S. Department of the Interior mission reported on a feature of Russian society that is relevant here: "The Soviet Union does not, nor will it ever, use either energy or the components of it—coal, oil, gas, wood, falling water—within the same kind of pattern as we do, and we must remember this in assessing their ability to reach the energy goals they have set for them-

[1] J. K. Galbraith, "How Much Should a Country Consume?" in *Perspectives on Conservation: Essays on America's Natural Resources*, ed. by Henry Jarrett (Baltimore 1958), 89-99.

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selves. The differences reflect mainly the differences in social goals of the two systems."[2] Transportation and housing patterns were singled out for purposes of comparison of the two systems, and about the former it was noted: "Russian engineers told the American visitors that their country would never follow America's example of building a national transportation system based on individual automobile ownership. . . . They said such a system was too wasteful, with a much smaller investment of capital a nation could provide an entirely adequate system of mass transportation consisting of modern airplanes, railroads, buses and subways."[3]

The differences between the consumption patterns of consumers in the United States and the Soviet Union may well reflect differences in social goals. Also possible, and perhaps already occurring, is a relaxation in Soviet opposition to individual consumer enjoyments, despite their resource costs. All the same, the private goals of the average American consumer may be subjected to some careful scrutiny in the decades ahead, not because a new ideology has wormed its way into the national consciousness, but as the result of an inexorable pressure on the national resource base. Of this possibility there is no mention in the RIAF volume. There, on the contrary, satisfaction of private consumers' desires is presumably viewed as the *sine qua non* of national well-being. Consistent with the study's repeated declaration that no changes in prevailing societal patterns are to be expected and therefore have not been taken into account, except only insofar as to permit existing patterns to effloresce, is the appalling prospect of the automobile population in the year 2000 (p. 131), as shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1. AUTOMOBILE POPULATION
(in millions; adults per car in parentheses)

	1940	*1960*	*1980*	*2000*
Total stock of user-operated vehicles	36 (3.3)	59 (1.9)	L 114 (1.3)	199 (.94)
			M 120 (1.3)	243 (.85)
			H 144 (1.1)	372 (.65)

From the streams of under-utilized cars that burn oil and rubber and wear out metal on the nation's highways today, there are projected for the year 2000 (and not the highest projection at that, but the "realis-

[2] *Recent Electric Power Developments in the U.S.S.R.*, report of the U.S. Delegation Tour to Soviet Russia, August 28-September 9, 1962, under U.S.-U.S.S.R. Exchange Agreement (Washington, U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 1962), 59.
[3] *Ibid.*, 58.

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tic" medium range) 243 million cars, a quadrupling of the present stock, and a rate of 1 car per .85 adults in comparison with 1.9 adults in 1960. Not calculated are the additional parking facilities, highway construction and maintenance, air pollution, and the myriad other physical and social costs, hidden and overt, of hyper-stimulation of private automobile ownership.

With such a prospect, Gilbert White's warning that America must consider the world-wide demand for resources in formulating its own requirements is a sober call to reason. Relevant also is Kingsley Davis's reminder that if the affluent nations, with an already "staggering" demand for resources, persist in pushing up rapidly their populations and their per capita consumptions, "their privileged position in the world may become less tolerated."[4]

Resources in America's Future may be a realistic view of United States resource usage at the beginning of the twenty-first century, but one wonders whether that century actually will arrive if the trends outlined therein for the future development of this country are carried to realization.

[4] Kingsley Davis, "Population," *Scientific American*, ccix (September 1963), 68.

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AMERICAN BUSINESS, PUBLIC POLICY, CASE-STUDIES, AND POLITICAL THEORY

By THEODORE J. LOWI

Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis A. Dexter, *American Business and Public Policy: The Politics of Foreign Trade*, New York, Atherton Press, 1963, 499 pp. $8.95.

CASE-STUDIES of the policy-making process constitute one of the more important methods of political science analysis. Beginning with Schattschneider, Herring, and others in the 1930's, case-studies have been conducted on a great variety of decisions. They have varied in subject-matter and format, in scope and rigor, but they form a distinguishable body of literature which continues to grow year by year. The most recent addition, a book-length study by Raymond Bauer and his associates, stands with Robert A. Dahl's prize-winning *Who Governs?* (New Haven 1961) as the best yet to appear. With its publication a new level of sophistication has been reached. The standards of research its authors have set will indeed be difficult to uphold in the future. *American Business and Public Policy* is an analysis of political relationships within the context of a single, well-defined issue—foreign trade. It is an analysis of business attitudes, strategies, communications and, through these, business relationships in politics. The analysis makes use of the best behavioral research techniques without losing sight of the rich context of policies, traditions, and institutions. Thus, it does not, in Dahl's words, exchange relevance for rigor; rather it is standing proof that the two—relevance and rigor—are not mutually exclusive goals.

But what do all the case-studies, including *American Business and Public Policy*, add up to? As a result of these case materials, how much farther along the road of political theory are we? What questions have the authors of these studies raised, and what non-obvious hypotheses and generalizations about "who rules and why" would we have lacked without them?[1] Because of what it does, what it implies and what it does not do, *American Business and Public Policy* provides a proper occasion for asking these questions and for attempting once again to

[1] For similar questions and a critique, see Herbert Kaufman, "The Next Step in Case Studies," *Public Administration Review*, XVIII (Winter 1958), 52-59.

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formulate theories that will convert the discrete facts of the case-studies into elements that can be assessed, weighed, and cumulated. But, first, what theories have we now, and how does this significant new study relate to them?

I. Existing Notions: The Non-Theories of Power in America

It was inevitable that some general notions about power and public policy would develop out of the case-study literature. Together, these notions form what is variously called the group theory, the pressure-group, or the pluralist model of the democratic political system (a model recently also applied to non-democratic systems). No theory or approach has ever come closer to defining and unifying the field of political science than pluralism, perhaps because it fitted so nicely both the outlook of revered Federalist #10 and the observables of the New Deal. Group theory provided a rationale for the weakness of parties and the electoral process. It provided an appropriate defense for the particular programs pursued by the New Deal and successive Administrations. And, more importantly, it seemed to provide an instant explanation, in more or less generalizable terms, of the politics of each decision. Analysis requires simply an inventory of the group participants and their strategies, usually in chronological form—for, after all, politics is a process. Each group participant is a datum, and power is attributed in terms of inferred patterns of advantage and indulgence in the final decision. The extremists have treated government ("formal institutions") as a *tabula rasa*, with policy as the residue of the "interplay of forces" measurable as a "parallelogram." More sophisticated analysts avoided the government-as-blank-key approach by treating officials as simply other units in the group process, where Congressman and bureaucrat were brokers but with their own interests and resources.

In group theory, all resources are treated as equivalent and interchangeable. And all the varieties of interaction among groups and between groups and officials are also treated as equivalent, to such an extent that only one term is employed for all forms of political interaction: the *coalition*. Coalitions, so the argument goes, form around "shared attitudes" and are extended by expansion of the stakes of the controversy. Two types of strategies comprise the dynamics of the process: internal and external. The first refers to the problem of cohesion in the midst of overlapping memberships; cohesion is a determinant of full use of group resources. The second refers to expansion of the coalition and the strategy of its use. Large coalitions beat small coalitions. System equilibrium (of unquestionably high-priority value

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to pluralists) is maintained by the requirement of majority-size coalitions, which are extremely difficult to create but which must be created virtually from scratch for each issue. Thus, power is highly decentralized, fluid, and situational. There is no single elite, but a "multicentered" system in which the centers exist in a conflict-and-bargaining relation to each other.

As an argument that the group must be the major unit of analysis, pluralism excites little controversy. But controversy is unavoidable insofar as the pluralist model implies a theory of power or power distribution. Most importantly, the pluralist model has, until recently, failed to take into account the general economic *and* political structure within which the group process takes place.[2] On this basis, the leading type of critique of the pluralist model is a set of explicit propositions about power structure and elites. The typical answer to pluralism is a straightforward Marxian assumption that there is a one-for-one relation between socio-economic status and power over public decisions. Perhaps the more sophisticated version is a combination Marx-Weber approach which specifies the particular status bases most closely related to power—i.e., the major "orders" of society (*ständen*) in our day are the military, the industrial, and the political hierarchies.

This is no place to enter into an elaborate critique of either of these approaches or of the pluralist approach itself. Suffice it to say that while the pluralist model has failed to take the abiding, institutional factors sufficiently into account, the "social stratification" and "power elite" schools wrongly assume a simple relation between status and power. Both these latter schools mistake the resources of power for power itself, and escape analytic and empirical problems by the route of definition.[3] There is no denying, however, that the social-stratification or power-elite approaches can explain *certain* important outcomes in a more intuitively satisfactory manner than the pluralist model precisely because each emphasizes that, while coalition-forming may be universal, not all coalitions are equivalent. For certain types of issues (without accepting Mills's argument that these are all the "key" issues),

[2] David Truman's rather weak and diffuse "potential interest group" is a doff of the hat in this direction, but this concept is so non-directive and non-observable as to be disregarded even by its creator.

[3] The best critiques and analyses of all the various currents of thought are found in Nelson W. Polsby, *Community Power and Political Theory* (New Haven 1963); Daniel Bell, "The Power Elite—Revisited," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXIV (November 1958), 238-50; Robert A. Dahl, "Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," *American Political Science Review*, LII (June 1958), 463-69; and Raymond Wolfinger, "Reputation and Reality in the Study of Community Power," *American Sociological Review*, XXV (October 1960), 636-44.

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it seems clear that decisions are made by high public and private "officials" in virtually a public opinion and interest-group opinion vacuum. One does not have to go all the way with Mills and insist that behind all apparent conflict there is an elite whose members all agree on specific major policy goals as well as long-range aims. But the pluralist is equally unwise who refuses to recognize that "command post" positions in all orders of society are highly legitimate, and that the recruitment and grooming of these institutional leaders make possible a reduction in the number of basic conflicts among them, and equally possible (1) many stable and abiding agreements on policy, (2) accommodation to conflict by more formal, hierarchical means ("through channels") than coalition politics, and (3) settlement of conflict by more informal means (i.e., among gentlemen, without debates and votes) that maintain the leaders' legitimacy and stability.

There is still a third approach to power and policy-making, no less important than the others, which has not been self-consciously employed since its creation in 1935 because it was mistakenly taken as a case of pluralism. I refer to E. E. Schattschneider's conclusions in *Politics, Pressures and the Tariff* (New York 1935). Schattschneider observed a multiplicity of groups in a decentralized and bargaining arena, but the nature of relations among participants was not in the strictest sense pluralistic. The pluralist model stresses conflict and conflict resolution through bargaining among groups and coalitions organized around shared interests. The elitists stress conflict *reduction* among formal officeholders in a much more restricted, centralized, and stable arena. What Schattschneider saw was neither, but contained elements of both. His political arena was decentralized and multicentered, but relationships among participants were based upon "mutual non-interference" among uncommon interests. The "power structure" was stabilized toward the "command posts" (in this case, the House Ways and Means Committee), not because the officials were above pressure groups, but because the pattern of access led to supportive relations between pressure groups and officials. What may appear to one observer as evidence of a power elite appears to another as decentralized pluralism (to such an extent, indeed, that Schattschneider is often credited with an important share in the founding of pluralist political analysis). Schattschneider's masterful case-study actually reveals neither. At one point he concludes: "A policy that is so hospitable and catholic as the protective tariff disorganizes the opposition."[4] In many important

[4] *Politics, Pressures and the Tariff*, 88. The fact that Schattschneider holds his gen-

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cases completely unrelated to the tariff and much more recent than 1930, we can find plenty of evidence to support this third or fourth[5] approach to a "theory" of power and policy-making. But as a general theory Schattschneider's conclusions would be no more satisfactory than any one approach identified earlier.

The main trouble with all these approaches is that they do not generate related propositions that can be tested by research and experience. Moreover, the findings of studies based upon any one of them are not cumulative. Finally, in the absence of logical relations between the "theory" and the propositions, the "theory" becomes self-directing and self-supportive. This is why I have employed the term "theory" only with grave reservations and quotation marks.

The pluralist approach has generated case-study after case-study that "proves" the model with findings directed by the approach itself. Issues are chosen for research because conflict made them public; group influence is found because in public conflict groups participate whether they are influential or not. Group influence can be attributed because groups so often share in the *definition* of the issue and have taken positions that are more or less directly congruent with the outcomes. An indulged group was influential, and a deprived group was uninfluential; but that leaves no room for group *irrelevancy*.

The elitist approach is no less without a means of self-assessment. If power distributions are defined as "inherently hierarchical,"[6] then a case of coalition politics either represents non-exhaustive research or concerns an issue that is not fundamental and so only involves the "middle levels of power."[7] One need not look for theoretical weaknesses in Schattschneider's approach because his interpretation was mistakenly thrown in with the pluralists. This is most unfortunate, because if the differences between Schattschneider's discoveries (especially his insights

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eralizations to the particular policy in question should be noted here as a point central to my later arguments.

[5] There are four approaches here if the "social stratification" school is kept separate from the "power elite" school. While both make the same kinds of errors, each leads to different kinds of propositions. In some hands they are, of course, indistinguishable and, for good reason, Polsby in *Community Power and Political Theory* treats the two as one. Since the distinction, once made, is not important here, I will more or less follow Polsby's lead.

[6] Milton Gordon, quoted in Polsby, 103.

[7] Cf. C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York 1956), 245: ". . . the political analyst is generally on the middle levels of power himself. He knows the top only by gossip; the bottom, if at all, only by 'research.'" Thus, Mills continues, the professor and free-lance intellectual are "at home with the leaders of the middle level, and . . . focus upon the middle levels and their balances because they are closer to them."

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into a different *type* of coalition) and those of later case writers had been recognized, a more sophisticated kind of ordered pluralism might have resulted. This is coming close to the approach I will presently propose.

The controversies among the approaches to policy analysis, as well as the logical and empirical weaknesses I have identified, have engendered some of the best empirical work to be found in the literature. But since most of this work is based on the local community, only a collateral attack can be mounted from these findings against assumptions and propositions concerning national power. Only similarly careful and systematic studies of national political processes will lead to a balanced and well-founded attack and to a more productive approach to theory. The first step is certainly *American Business and Public Policy*. While the authors do not offer an adequate theoretical alternative to established approaches, their findings, either explicitly or by implication, are worthy of review in any effort to build such a theory.

American Business and Public Policy starts out as a study of "the flow of communications to and within groups involved in the foreign-policy decision-making process" (p. 5). But while this is carried through for every type of participant and phase in the process, the authors are in a position to deal as well with the substance of the communications, perceptions of them by the recipients and, therefore, with some of the vital aspects of influence. They have looked into the little black box of political relationships among all the influence-seekers which the pluralists say contains the reality of influence and the elitists say doesn't really exist anyhow. What they have found severely tests the assumptions of both schools of thought. Without significant adjustments, the pluralist framework (called by the authors the "pressure-group model") will be able to encompass a great many of their propositions and findings only with extreme difficulty. For example:

(1) There is no one-for-one nexus between the policies at stake and interest-group activation (chap. 9). Protectionists were more highly activated than anti-protectionists.

(2) The two "sides" of the controversy never met in a face-to-face conflict with a settlement by compromise. In large part, the basis of the protectionist coalition was a series of interests in individual tariff items, in a relation of "uncommon interest" rather than of "tangential interest." The basis of the anti-protectionist position was *general* opposition in line "with the ideology of the times" (pp. 150ff. and 209). The outcome depended not upon compromise between the two sides in Congress but upon whose *definition of the situation* prevailed. If tariff

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is an instrument of foreign policy and general regulation for international purposes, the anti-protectionists win; if the traditional definition of tariff as an aid to 100,000 individual firms prevails, then the protectionists win.[8]

(3) Cohesion was found to be *directly* (not inversely) related to overlapping membership (pp. 333 and 338). Most of the well-organized "associations" were so heterogeneous on the tariff question that they took no stand at all (pp. 334-38). Those groups that were at all cohesive maintained their cohesion "by use of multiple group memberships for purposes which might produce conflict within a single given group" (p. 332).[9]

(4) Despite the strong saliency of the trade issues to many groups, little in the way of direct attempts to influence policy-makers could be found. Most group activity "involved interaction with people on the same side." "Scholars have assumed that interest groups had clear interests, of which they were aware. A number of the campaigns we have described show clearly that a pressure group's function is frequently to define the interest of its partisans" (p. 398).[10]

(5) Massive activity, expenditure, and influence by monolithic interest groups appeared to constitute an image that opposing groups create of each other rather than the reality of pressure practices (Part IV, esp. chap. 28).

(6) Most Congressmen were found to have their own independent ideologies and interests and tended to read constituency support into

[8] Thus, with no major decline in the numbers of industries and groups with a self-interest in protection—indeed, with the defection of virtually the entire South from the free-trade cause—liberal trade lost consistently until 1962. But in 1962 it won because tariff had finally lost its traditional definition. Lest it be concluded that the Administration won merely because of its use of traditional log-rolling strategies in its textile concessions, note that on the crucial votes in both Houses most of the Democratic protectionist vote was Southern: in the House vote on the Mason motion for recommittal, 37 of the 44 protectionist Democrats were Southern, mainly from the textile and oil states of North and South Carolina, Texas, and Oklahoma. Kennedy's strategy probably got him only Georgia's votes. In the Senate, the crucial vote was on the "peril point," with the Southerners splitting 10 to 10. Despite Kennedy's concessions, the defectors included two from Georgia, South Carolina, Mississippi, and Virginia and one from North Carolina.

[9] I obtain from this and other propositions in the book a conclusion not reached by the authors but strongly supported by their findings: there are probably *several* kinds of coalitions (rather than "a politics of coalition" where all coalitions are equivalent in every way except size and value of resources). Each type of coalition is appropriate for certain types of issues and each has extreme significance for outcomes, perhaps as much as cohesion and access. More on this presently.

[10] Again suggesting that a distinct kind of coalition is involved here, the authors say: ". . . neither the interest of the New England textile manufacturers in supporting oil imports nor that of the Eastern railroads in opposing these imports were in any way self-evident. Offered the proper coalition, they both might well have been persuaded that their interest was in the opposite direction" (p. 398).

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their mail rather than to reflect the messages from the outside. Messages from constituents and groups are so numerous and conflicting that Congressmen have a maximum-choice situation. And, groups were found to hold fairly strictly to the rule of contacting only those Congressmen already known to agree with the group's aims. The predominant group role was found by the authors to be as "service bureaus."[11]

(7) Congress displayed no capacity for, nor did Congressmen display any desire for, retaining the power of tariff and trade decision-making (esp. pp. 35, 37-38, 197, and 455-56).

But for every single problem that the tariff decisions of a decade pose for the pluralist model, they pose several for the elitist or the stratification approaches:

(1) There was never, throughout the entire modern history of tariff and foreign trade, any evidence that the top military played a role of any sort. This is true despite the fact that the effectiveness of military aid and military installations abroad was deeply influenced by the economic health of the recipient countries. The Millsian complex of military-industrial intimacy would make military participation in foreign trade decisions all the more probable.

(2) Only a minority of businessmen large and small ever felt themselves aligned with either side of the issue (p. 125). (This finding hangs heavy upon the elitists who argue that the top business leaders care and control, and upon the pluralists who assume that most business leaders are interested and compete.)

(3) Of 128 classifiable responses by big business leaders in their sample, the authors report that 56 per cent favored freer trade, 3 per cent favored raising tariffs, and the remainder favored leaving tariffs "as is" (p. 111). A more conservative estimate of the distribution of attitudes was a 3-to-1 preference for freer trade (chap. 8). Yet the protectionists won year after year following World War II.

(4) Many of the leaders of the largest firms refused to generalize at all and remained actively inactive throughout the decade because their firms were too diversified to have a clear interest. General Electric and

[11] Access to and information about Congress and Congressmen was so poor that the liberal CNTP's list of Congressmen's positions was almost a third incorrect for both Houses in the case of those whose positions had been identified at all. Nearly 15 per cent of the members of Congress were listed as "undecided," and in most cases this meant no contact at all had been made. Many pluralist writers before Bauer, Pool, and Dexter have recognized the "service bureau" role, but rather than reexamine their premises, they usually catalogue this as a "form of influence."

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DuPont were identified as "typical of large firms" who left their individual division managers to lobby or not as they saw fit (p. 125).

(5) Most other industrialists in the top "command posts" probably favored freer trade. The leading liberal trade group, the Committee for a National Trade Policy, was composed of many of the leading lights of the "establishment": Harry Bullis of General Mills, Joseph Spang of Gillette, John McCloy of Chase National, John Coleman of Burroughs, and Charles Taft and George Ball for themselves and many others. Their leading opposition, the Nation-wide Committee of Agriculture, Industry and Labor on Export-Import Policy was composed of such "middle levels of power" interest-group leaders as representatives of the UMW, National Coal Association, Manufacturing Chemists' Association, and the Window Glass Cutters' League of America (chap. 3). The CNTP and its official parent, the Randall Commission (Inland Steel, etc.), had gone out of existence well before the 1962 Trade Act successes.

(6) The final outcome in the Trade Act of 1962 was the direct result of classic President-Congress interplay, involving many of the kinds of compromises that the most vulgar pluralist view of American politics would lead one to expect. Congressmen appeared to be more independent of constituents and groups than the pressure-group model would allow. But, on the other hand, the degree to which the Executive would be able to use trade as an instrument of international politics was determined in Congress; and it seemed that such a relationship would continue (pp. 73-79).

Elitists might accommodate to the extraordinarily careful analysis and unimpeachable findings of *American Business and Public Policy* by treating the trade issues of the whole postwar period as "middle-level." But this avoids all the interesting questions and begs a few as well. It was the large industrialists and the high members of the political directorate themselves who defined the issue as fundamental, particularly in the late 1950's after the Common Market was seen to be an immediate rather than a future reality. These were the men who kept trade on the agenda for over ten years. Yet there is nothing in the politics of trade decisions to support the notion that power follows directly from selected, established institutional positions in industry or military and public administration.

Bauer, Pool, and Dexter discovered that the pluralist model was of little use to them. It seems equally clear that the elitist model would have been of even less assistance. But this is because neither approach

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is a model. Each is, if anything, a self-validating standpoint; the pluralist approach suggests what to look for and the elitist model suggests perhaps what not to look for. Since neither is a theory, neither has much bearing on specific cases. At the end of an empirical study, neither approach affords a means for cumulating the data and findings in coherent and logical abstractions with other findings; they merely provide the basis for repeating the assumptions of the beginning. The following example is drawn from one of the very best case studies: "The realization of national policy in the United States depends upon the formation and maintenance of coalitions (often of a temporary nature) overcoming the separation of powers, overcoming the fragmentation of power within the legislative and executive branches of government, overcoming weak cohesion by joining elements of both parties and many interests, to accomplish a desired objective. There is no small group of men who, if they agree among themselves, can assure favorable decisions on all or most of the important national policies. Power in Congress is fragmented and dispersed. Bits and pieces of influence are scattered (unequally to be sure) among committee chairmen, party leaders, and many others. . . . National policy is approved or rejected by building a coalition majority through bargaining and the proposal of objectives appealing to a wide variety of interests. . . ."[12]

The comment "This is where we came in" would be appropriate not only for these general remarks in Wildavsky's study, but also for virtually all case-studies and their generalizations since Bentley. In many respects, one can say of both pluralists and elitists what was said of Debussy, but say it here more meaningfully: they opened up a couple of new streets that have turned out to be blind alleys.

II. Arenas of Power: An Interpretative Scheme for Cases

American Business and Public Policy, despite its richness as a case-study in the politics of foreign trade, suffers the one debilitating handicap of all case-studies, the problem of uniqueness. The case casts serious doubts on the perspectives employed in most case-studies because of the rare comprehensiveness and exhaustiveness of its analysis, which goes far beyond the storybook and paste-pot relations among participants usually contained in case-studies. But still, how are we to know the extent to which the patterns the authors discover apply to all cases? How are we to know at least toward what *class* of cases we can generalize? The authors have too little to say about this. The subtitle of the

[12] Aaron Wildavsky, *Dixon-Yates: A Study in Power Politics* (New Haven 1962), 311.

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book, "The Politics of Foreign Trade," implies that everything they say obtains only for this class of cases. However, at one point in the book they argue that the case belongs to a much larger class, a class which probably includes all domestic decisions except "some really new and unexpected issue" (p. 461): "So, on the whole, our case seems to us typical of any issue having economic implications for a number of industries and where, through a historical process, institutional alignments and expectations have been established" (pp. 460-61). On the other hand, one cannot be entirely sure how inclusive a category the authors had in mind, for at another point they say: ". . . the more an organization represents the business community as a whole, the more unlikely it is to become committed on such an issue as foreign-trade policy" (p. 339). The qualification ("on such an issue as") would hardly be necessary if they took foreign-trade policy as typical of all on-going policy processes.

Thus, the authors are unusually clear about their research aim, and self-conscious and skillful as to appropriate techniques of research and data manipulation; but they are far less than clear or self-conscious and skillful about defining their case in terms of some general scheme of classification. If their findings are to be judged for their applicability to all of national domestic policy-making, then we are about where we were before the book was published, except for some healthy negative insights as to prevailing "theories." If foreign trade is part of a smaller category of cases, then we would have to know what the class is, how it is distinguished from others, and what attributes are special to that class and what are general to all classes. Rather than dealing with these problems, the authors came out in favor of cashiering the present approaches altogether and of adopting a communications or "transactional" approach.[13] So, despite the fact that Bauer, Pool, and Dexter have managed an outstanding empirical study, the job of "making something of" the findings still remains, as it has remained for some time.

It seems to me that the reason for lack of interesting and non-obvious generalization from cases and other specific empirical studies is clearly that the broad-gauged theories of politics are not related, perhaps are not relatable, to observable cases. In general, American political science seems to be subject to a continuing fission of theory and research, in

[13] "*Inter alia*, the transactional analysis here employed makes the concept of 'power' and 'pressure' in the ordinary political-science sense of the terms somewhat more difficult to employ; Arthur F. Bentley himself pointed out to one of us in 1936 that he had long since abandoned these notions as not useful for systematic analysis" (p. 460). See also p. 456.

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which the empiricist is not sufficiently mindful of his role as system-builder and the system-builder is not sufficiently mindful (if at all) of the role that theory is supposed to play. What is needed is a basis for cumulating, comparing, and contrasting diverse findings. Such a framework or interpretative scheme would bring the diverse cases and findings into a more consistent relation to each other and would begin to suggest generalizations sufficiently close to the data to be relevant and sufficiently abstract to be subject to more broadly theoretical treatment.

An attempt at such a framework follows. For over two years prior to the publication of *American Business and Public Policy* I had been working on a general interpretative scheme.[14] The hypotheses drawn from the scheme have so far anticipated most of the patterns described in existing case literature, and few of those patterns not anticipated have been found to be inconsistent with a logical extension of the scheme. A review article as the first published use of the scheme for national politics seemed appropriate because Bauer, Pool, and Dexter's case-study is the most elaborate case yet published, and it appeared long after most of my hypotheses had been developed.[15]

The scheme is based upon the following argument: (1) The types of relationships to be found among people are determined by their expectations—by what they hope to achieve or get from relating to others. (2) In politics, expectations are determined by governmental outputs or policies. (3) Therefore, a political relationship is determined by the type of policy at stake, so that for every type of policy there is likely to be a distinctive type of political relationship. If power is defined as a share in the making of policy, or authoritative allocations, then the political relationship in question is a power relationship or, over time, a power structure. As Dahl would say, one must ask, "Power for *what*?" One must control for the *scope* of power and look for elites, power structures, and the like within each of the predefined scopes or "issue areas."[16] My analysis moves in this direction, but

[14] The first formulation, developed for urban politics, appears in my study, *At the Pleasure of the Mayor* (New York 1964), chaps. 6 and 7. The scheme for national politics which is presented in this article is an adaptation of the national "arenas of power" discussed in a book now in preparation.

[15] Their study is of further interest because they are dealing with a type of policy which made a transition from one of my "arenas" to another between 1930 and 1962. That the politics of tariff changed accordingly is the best test I have yet found for my scheme. The very differences they find between 1950's patterns and those reported so exceedingly well by Schattschneider—and which are branded by Bauer, Pool, and Dexter as inconsistent with Schattschneider or as due vaguely to the "changing times"—were both consistent with and anticipated by my scheme.

[16] Dahl, *Who Governs?*, and Polsby, *Community Power*, esp. chap. 6.

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farther. Issues as such are too ephemeral; it is on the basis of established expectations and a history of earlier government decisions *of the same type* that single issues are fought out. The study of single issues provides a good test of hypotheses about structure, but the hypotheses must be arrived at in some other, independent way.

Obviously, the major analytic problem is that of identifying types of outputs or policies. The approach I have taken is to define policies in terms of their impact or expected impact on the society. When policies are defined this way, there are only a limited number of types; when all is said and done, there are only a limited number of functions that governments can perform. This approach cashiers the "politics of agriculture" and the "politics of education" or, even more narrowly but typically, "the politics of the ARA bill" or "the politics of the 1956 Aid to Education bill," in which the composition and strategy of the participants are fairly well-known before the study is begun. But it maintains the pluralist's resistance to the assumption that there is only one power structure for every political system. My approach replaces the descriptive, subject-matter categories of the pluralists with functional categories. There is no need to argue that the classification scheme exhausts all the possibilities even among domestic policies; it is sufficient if most policies and the agencies that implement them can be categorized with little, if any, damage to the nuances.

There are three major categories of public policies in the scheme: distribution, regulation, and redistribution. These types are historically as well as functionally distinct, distribution being almost the exclusive type of national domestic policy from 1789 until virtually 1890. Agitation for regulatory and redistributive policies began at about the same time, but regulation had become an established fact before any headway at all was made in redistribution.[17]

These categories are not mere contrivances for purposes of simplification. They are meant to correspond to real phenomena—so much so that the major hypotheses of the scheme follow directly from the categories and their definitions. Thus, *these areas of policy or government activity constitute real arenas of power.* Each arena tends to develop its own characteristic political structure, political process, elites,

[17] Foreign policy, for which no appropriate "-tion" word has been found, is obviously a fourth category. It is not dealt with here for two reasons. First, it overly extends the analysis. Second, and of greater importance, it is in many ways not part of the same universe, because in foreign policy-making America is only a subsystem. Winston Churchill, among other foreigners, has consistently participated in our foreign policy decisions. Of course, those aspects of foreign and military policy that have direct domestic implications are included in my scheme.

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and group relations. What remains is to identify these arenas, to formulate hypotheses about the attributes of each, and to test the scheme by how many empirical relationships it can anticipate and explain.

AREAS OF POLICY DEFINED

(1) In the long run, all governmental policies may be considered redistributive, because in the long run some people pay in taxes more than they receive in services. Or, all may be thought regulatory because, in the long run, a governmental decision on the use of resources can only displace a private decision about the same resource or at least reduce private alternatives about the resource. But politics works in the short run, and in the short run certain kinds of government decisions can be made without regard to limited resources. Policies of this kind are called "distributive," a term first coined for nineteenth-century land policies, but easily extended to include most contemporary public land and resource policies; rivers and harbors ("pork barrel") programs; defense procurement and R & D; labor, business, and agricultural "clientele" services; and the traditional tariff. Distributive policies are characterized by the ease with which they can be disaggregated and dispensed unit by small unit, each unit more or less in isolation from other units and from any general rule. "Patronage" in the fullest meaning of the word can be taken as a synonym for "distributive." These are policies that are virtually not policies at all but are highly individualized decisions that only by accumulation can be called a policy. They are policies in which the indulged and the deprived, the loser and the recipient, need never come into direct confrontation. Indeed, in many instances of distributive policy, the deprived cannot as a class be identified, because the most influential among them can be accommodated by further disaggregation of the stakes.

(2) Regulatory policies are also specific and individual in their impact, but they are not capable of the almost infinite amount of disaggregation typical of distributive policies. Although the laws are stated in general terms ("Arrange the transportation system artistically." "Thou shalt not show favoritism in pricing."), the impact of regulatory decisions is clearly one of directly raising costs and/or reducing or expanding the alternatives of private individuals ("Get off the grass!" "Produce kosher if you advertise kosher!"). Regulatory policies are distinguishable from distributive in that in the short run the regulatory decision involves a direct choice as to who will be in-

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dulged and who deprived. Not all applicants for a single television channel or an overseas air route can be propitiated. Enforcement of an unfair labor practice on the part of management weakens management in its dealings with labor. So, while implementation is firm-by-firm and case-by-case, policies cannot be disaggregated to the level of the individual or the single firm (as in distribution), because individual decisions must be made by application of a general rule and therefore become interrelated within the broader standards of law. Decisions cumulate among all individuals affected by the law in roughly the same way. Since the most stable lines of perceived common impact are the basic sectors of the economy, regulatory decisions are cumulative largely along sectoral lines; regulatory policies are usually disaggregable only down to the sector level.[18]

(3) Redistributive policies are like regulatory policies in the sense that relations among broad categories of private individuals are involved and, hence, individual decisions must be interrelated. But on all other counts there are great differences in the nature of impact. The categories of impact are much broader, approaching social classes. They are, crudely speaking, haves and have-nots, bigness and smallness, bourgeoisie and proletariat. The aim involved is not use of property but property itself, not equal treatment but equal possession, not behavior but being. The fact that our income tax is in reality only mildly redistributive does not alter the fact of the aims and the stakes involved in income tax policies. The same goes for our various "welfare state" programs, which are redistributive only for those who entered retirement or unemployment rolls without having contributed at all. The nature of a redistributive issue is not determined by the outcome of a battle over how redistributive a policy is going to be. Expectations about what it *can* be, what it threatens to be, are determinative.

ARENAS OF POWER

Once one posits the general tendency of these areas of policy or governmental activity to develop characteristic political structures, a number of hypotheses become compelling. And when the various

[18] A "sector" refers to any set of common or substitutable commodities or services or any other form of established economic interaction. Sectors therefore vary in size because of natural economic forces and because of the different ways they are identified by economists or businessmen. They vary in size also because they are sometimes defined *a priori* by the observer's assessment of what constitutes a common product and at other times are defined *a posteriori* by the trade associations that represent the identification of a sector by economic actors themselves.

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hypotheses are accumulated, the general contours of each of the three arenas begin quickly to resemble, respectively, the three "general" theories of political process identified earlier. The arena that develops around distributive policies is best characterized in the terms of Schattschneider's findings. The regulatory arena corresponds to the pluralist school, and the school's general notions are found to be limited pretty much to this one arena. The redistributive arena most closely approximates, with some adaptation, an elitist view of the political process.

(1) The distributive arena can be identified in considerable detail from Schattschneider's case-study alone. What he and his pluralist successors did not see was that the traditional structure of tariff politics is also in largest part the structure of politics of all those diverse policies identified earlier as distributive. The arena is "pluralistic" only in the sense that a large number of small, intensely organized interests are operating. In fact, there is even greater multiplicity of participants here than the pressure-group model can account for, because essentially it is a politics of every man for himself. The single person and the single firm are the major activists. Bauer, Pool, and Dexter, for instance, are led to question seriously the "pressure-group model" because of the ineffectiveness of virtually all the groups that should have been most active and effective.

Although a generation removed, Schattschneider's conclusions about the politics of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff are almost one-for-one applicable to rivers and harbors and land development policies, tax exemptions, defense procurement, area redevelopment, and government "services." Since there is no real basis for discriminating between those who should and those who should not be protected [indulged], says Schattschneider, Congress seeks political support by "giving a limited protection [indulgence] to all interests strong enough to furnish formidable resistance." Decision-makers become "responsive to considerations of equality, consistency, impartiality, uniformity, precedent, and moderation, however formal and insubstantial these may be."[19] Furthermore, a "policy that is so hospitable and catholic . . . disorganizes the opposition."[20]

When a billion-dollar issue can be disaggregated into many millions of nickel-dime items and each item can be dealt with without regard to the others, multiplication of interests and of access is inevitable, and so is reduction of conflict. All of this has the greatest of bearing on the relations among participants and, therefore, the "power struc-

[19] *Politics, Pressures,* 85.
[20] *Ibid.,* 88.

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ture." Indeed, coalitions must be built to pass legislation and "make policy," but what of the nature and basis of the coalitions? In the distributive arena, political relationships approximate what Schattschneider called "mutual non-interference"—"a mutuality under which it is proper for each to seek duties [indulgences] for himself but improper and unfair to oppose duties [indulgences] sought by others."[21] In the area of rivers and harbors, references are made to "pork barrel" and "log-rolling," but these colloquialisms have not been taken sufficiently seriously. A log-rolling coalition is not one forged of conflict, compromise, and tangential interest but, on the contrary, one composed of members who have absolutely nothing in common; and this is possible because the "pork barrel" is a container for unrelated items. This is the typical form of relationship in the distributive arena.

The structure of these log-rolling relationships leads typically, though not always, to Congress; and the structure is relatively stable because all who have access of any sort usually support whoever are the leaders. And there tend to be "elites" of a peculiar sort in the Congressional committees whose jurisdictions include the subject-matter in question. Until recently, for instance, on tariff matters the House Ways and Means Committee was virtually the government. Much the same can be said for Public Works on rivers and harbors.[22] It is a broker leadership, but "policy" is best understood as cooptation rather than conflict and compromise.

Bauer, Pool, and Dexter are astonished to discover trade associations and other groups suffering from lack of funds and support. They see as paradoxical the fact that "protectionism" as a policy could win out time after time even when a majority of businessmen and Congressmen seemed on principle to favor freer trade. (There are instances of this running clear back to the 1890's.) They see as purposive Congress's "giving up" tariff-making because the "power to dole out favors is not worth the price of having to beat off and placate the insistent pleas of petitioners" (p. 37). Astonishment and the detection of paradox and a "Congressional group mind" are evidences of an insufficiently broad point of

[21] *Ibid.*, 135-36.

[22] The stable, intimate interlocking of Congressional committeemen and their support groups in the Rivers and Harbors Congress and the Corps of Engineers has been made famous by Arthur Maass; see *Muddy Waters: The Army Engineers and the Nation's Rivers* (Cambridge, Mass., 1951), and especially "Congress and Water Resources," *American Political Science Review*, XLIV (September 1950), 576-92, reprinted in my reader, *Legislative Politics USA* (Boston 1962). Cited widely as an example of interest-group strategy and access, this case has not until now, as far as I know, been given its proper significance. That significance comes clear within my scheme. The pattern approaches that of the tariff but not of regulatory situations.

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PERFECTIONIST

Assignment: Quality Control. He's a very special engineer at General Motors—a key man in a corporation which regards product dependability as a prime responsibility to its customers. He and a GM inspector are shown giving this transmission a final check. In addition to keeping an eagle eye on every phase of manufacturing, the quality control engineer is closely concerned with preliminary design and engineering. More than 13,000 individual parts go into a GM car, and every one must be as reliable as men and machines can make it. Raw materials, components, subassemblies—*all* get meticulous scrutiny. Tolerances to within *fifty millionths* of an inch are commonplace.

Among GM production employes, about *one of every twelve* devotes full time to quality control or inspection. Approximately 50,000 inspections are involved in the building of a single car. In addition, every machine operator has the responsibility for the quality of his work and performance of his machine. He can accept or reject any part he makes. His work is checked by the quality control engineer and the inspector, who analyze machine capabilities and predict machine inaccuracy *before* it occurs—not after.

They're mighty important people, these GM quality control engineers. They have an exacting job, and they take pride in doing it well. GM products bear witness to their effectiveness.

GENERAL MOTORS IS PEOPLE . . .

Making Better Things For You



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view. There are good and theoretically interesting reasons for each of these phenomena. Distributive issues individualize conflict and provide the basis for highly stable coalitions that are virtually irrelevant to the larger policy outcomes; thousands of obscure decisions are merely accumulated into a "policy" of protection or of natural-resources development or of defense subcontracting. And Congress did not "give up" the tariff; as the tariff became a matter of regulation (see below), committee elites lost their power to contain the participants because obscure decisions became interrelated, therefore less obscure, and more controversy became built in and unavoidable.[23]

(2) The regulatory arena could hardly be better identified than in the thousands of pages written for the whole polity by the pluralists. But, unfortunately, some translation is necessary to accommodate pluralism to its more limited universe. The regulatory arena appears to be composed of a multiplicity of groups organized around tangential relations or David Truman's "shared attitudes." Within this narrower context of regulatory decisions, one can even go so far as to accept the most extreme pluralist statement that policy tends to be a residue of the interplay of group conflict. This statement can be severely criticized only by use of examples drawn from non-regulatory decisions.

As I argued before, there is no way for regulatory policies to be disaggregated into very large numbers of unrelated items. Because individual regulatory decisions involve direct confrontations of indulged and deprived, the typical political coalition is born of conflict and compromise among tangential interests that usually involve a total sector of the economy. Thus, while the typical basis for coalition in distributive politics is uncommon interests (log-rolling), an entirely different basis is typical in regulatory politics. The pluralist went wrong only in assuming the regulatory type of coalition is *the* coalition.[24]

[23] Schattschneider, in his more recent book *The Semi-sovereign People* (New York 1960), offers some fascinating propositions about the "scope of conflict" which can easily be subsumed within the scheme offered here.

[24] I was surprised and pleased on rereading Truman's *The Governmental Process* (New York 1951), after completing the first draft of this article, to find that he identified two types of "mutual assistance," alliances and log-rolling (pp. 362-68). In my scheme, as will soon be clear, there are two types of "alliance," tangential interest and ideology. But what is of interest here is that Truman supports his distinction with examples perfectly congruent with my theory. His case of the alliance is the aggregation of interests around the 1946 Employment Act (redistribution, even if a peculiar "law"). The typical log-rolling situation he identifies with rivers and harbors appropriations (distribution). The difference between us is that my scheme considers these patterns of coalition as revealing fundamental political relations that are limited to certain types of issues, while Truman implies that they are two strategies in an inventory of strategies more or less appropriate to any issue.

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One of the most significant differences between the pluralists and Bauer, Pool, and Dexter—the treatment of the phenomenon and effects of overlapping membership—becomes consistent and supportive within this scheme. In fact, it helps to clarify the distinctions I am trying to draw here. Truman, for instance, stresses overlapping membership as a source of conflict, the function of overlapping membership as the reduction of cohesion in any given group. In contrast, Bauer, Pool, and Dexter found that in tariff politics this very overlapping of membership was a condition for cohesion: ". . . unanimity (or cohesion) is maintained by the use of multiple group memberships for purposes that might produce conflict within a single given group" (p. 332n). They observed that overlapping is a form of specialization allowing individual firms, or special constituent groups within larger associations, the freedom to pursue outside the association the goals that are contrary to other associated groups. Meanwhile the cohesion of the larger group is preserved for the goals that all the constituent groups share. The fact appears to be that both positions are correct. Owing to the unrelatedness of issues in distributive politics, the activities of single participants need not be related but rather can be specialized as the situation warrants it. But the relatedness of regulatory issues, at least up to the sector level of the trade association, leads to the containment of all these within the association and, therefore, to the dynamic situation ascribed erroneously by Truman to all intergroup relations in all issues. When all the stakes are contained in one organization, constituents have no alternative but to fight against each other to shape the policies of that organization or actually to abandon it.

What this suggests is that the typical power structure in regulatory politics is far less stable than that in the distributive arena. Since coalitions form around shared interests, the coalitions will shift as the interests change or as conflicts of interest emerge. With such group-based and shifting patterns of conflict built into every regulatory issue, it is in most cases impossible for a Congressional committee, an administrative agency, a peak association governing board, or a social elite to contain all the participants long enough to establish a stable power elite. Policy outcomes seem inevitably to be the residue remaining after all the reductions of demands by all participants have been made in order to extend support to majority size. But a majority-sized coalition of shared interests on one issue could not possibly be entirely appropriate for some other issue. In regulatory decision-making, relationships among group leadership elements and between them on any one or more points of governmental access are too unstable to

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form a single policy-making elite. As a consequence, decision-making tends to pass from administrative agencies and Congressional committees to Congress, the place where uncertainties in the policy process have always been settled. Congress as an institution is the last resort for breakdowns in bargaining over policy, just as in the case of parties the primary is a last resort for breakdowns in bargaining over nominations. No one leadership group can contain the conflict by an almost infinite subdivision and distribution of the stakes. In the regulatory political process, Congress and the "balance of power" seem to play the classic role attributed to them by the pluralists, attacked as a theory by C. Wright Mills, and at least seriously questioned by Bauer, Pool, and Dexter.

The most interesting thing about the work of Bauer, Pool, and Dexter, from the standpoint of my scheme, is that they studied a policy that was undergoing a transition from distribution to regulation. It is, I feel, for this reason that they find some support for the pressure-group model but not enough to convince them of its utility. But it is this very transition that makes their case-study so interesting. Beginning with reciprocity in the 1930's, the tariff began to lose its capacity for infinite disaggregation because it slowly underwent redefinition, moving away from its purely domestic significance towards that of an instrument of international politics. In brief, the tariff, especially following World War II and our assumption of peacetime international leadership, became a means of regulating the domestic economy for international purposes. The significant feature here is not the international but the regulatory part of the redefinition. As the process of redefinition took place, a number of significant shifts in power relations took place as well, because it was no longer possible to deal with each dutiable item in isolation. Everything in Bauer, Pool, and Dexter points toward the expansion of relationships to the level of the sector. The political problem of the South was the concentration of textile industry there. Coal, oil, and rails came closer and closer to coalition. The final shift came with the 1962 Trade Expansion Act, which enabled the President for the first time to deal with broad categories (to the sector) rather than individual commodities.

Certain elements of distributive politics remain, for two obvious reasons. First, there are always efforts on the part of political leaders to disaggregate policies because this is the best way to spread the patronage and to avoid conflict. (Political actors, like economic actors, probably view open competition as a necessary evil or a last resort to be avoided at almost any cost.) Second, until 1962, the basic tariff law and

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schedules were still contained in the Smoot-Hawley Act. This act was amended by Reciprocal Trade but only to the extent of allowing negotiated reductions rather than reductions based on comparative costs. Until 1962, tariff politics continued to be based on commodity-by-commodity transactions, and thus until then tariff coalitions could be based upon individual firms (or even branches of large and diversified firms) and log-rolling, unrelated interests. The escape clause and peril point were maintained in the 1950's so that transactions could be made on individual items even within reciprocity. And the coalitions of strange bedfellows continued: "Offered the proper coalition, they both [New England textiles and Eastern railroads] might well have been persuaded that their interest was in the opposite direction" (p. 398).

But despite the persistence of certain distributive features, the true nature of tariff in the 1960's emerges as regulatory policy with a developing regulatory arena. Already we can see some changes in Congress even more clearly than the few already observed in the group structure. Out of a committee (House Ways and Means) elite, we can see the emergence of Congress in a pluralist setting. Even as early as 1954-1955, the compromises eventually ratified by Congress were worked out, not in committee through direct cooptation of interests, but in the Randall Commission, a collection of the major interests in conflict (p. 47). Those issues that could not be thrashed out through the "group process" also could not be thrashed out in committee but had to pass on to Congress and the floor. After 1954 the battle centered on major categories of goods (even to the extent of a textile management-union entente) and the battle took place more or less openly on the floor (e.g., pp. 60, 62, and 67). The weakening of the Ways and Means Committee as the tariff elite is seen in the fact that in 1955 Chairman Cooper was unable to push a closed rule through. The Rules Committee, "in line with tradition," granted a closed rule but the House voted it down 207-178 (p. 63).[25] Bauer, Pool, and Dexter saw this as a victory for protectionism, but it is also evidence of the emerging regulatory arena—arising from the difficulty of containing conflict and policy within the governing committee. The last effort to keep the tariff as a traditional instrument of distributive politics—a motion by

[25] Sam Rayburn made one of his rare trips from rostrum to floor to support the closed rule and the integrity of Ways and Means: "Only once in the history of the House, in forty-two years in my memory, has a bill *of this kind and character* been considered except under a closed rule . . ." (p. 64, emphasis added). It was on the following morning that Rayburn expressed his now-famous warning to the frosh: "If you want to get along, go along" (p. 64).

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Reed to recommit, with instructions to write in a provision that Tariff Commission rulings under the escape clause be final except where the President finds the national security to be involved—was voted down 206-199 (pp. 64-65). After that, right up to 1962, it was clear that tariff decisions would not be made piecemeal. Tariff became a regulatory policy in 1962; all that remains of distributive politics now are quotas and subsidies for producers of specific commodities injured by general tariff reductions.

(3) If Bauer, Pool, and Dexter had chosen a line of cases from the redistributive arena for their intensive analysis, most assuredly they would have found themselves in an altogether different universe, proposing different generalizations, expressing different doubts. The same would have been true of Schattschneider and of the pluralist students of regulatory cases. Compared particularly with the regulatory area, very few case-studies of redistributive decisions have ever been published. This in itself is a significant datum—which Mills attributes to the middle-level character of the issues that have gotten attention. But, whatever the reasons, it reduces the opportunities for elaborating upon and testing the scheme. Most of the propositions to follow are illustrated by a single case, the "welfare state" battle of the 1930's. But this case is a complex of many decisions that became one of the most important acts of policy ever achieved in the United States. A brief review of the facts of the case will be helpful.[26] Other cases will be referred to in less detail from time to time.

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[26] The facts and events are taken from Paul H. Douglas, *Social Security in the United States* (New York 1936); Edwin E. Witte, *The Development of the Social Security Act* (Madison, Wis., 1962); Committee on Economic Security, *Report to the President* (Washington, GPO, 1935); and Frances Perkins, *The Roosevelt I Knew* (New York 1946).

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of the debate was contained within the CES and its committees until a mature bill emerged. Since not all of the major issues had been settled in the CES's bill, its members turned to Congress with far from a common front. But the role of Congress was still not what would have been expected. Except for a short fight over committee jurisdiction (won by the more conservative Finance and Ways and Means committees) the legislative process was extraordinarily quiet, despite the import of the issues. Hearings in both Houses brought forth very few witnesses, and these were primarily CES members supporting the bill, and Treasury Department officials, led by Morgenthau, opposing it with "constructive criticism."

The Congressional battle was quiet because the real struggle was taking place elsewhere, essentially between the Hopkins-Perkins bureaucracies and the Treasury. The changes made in the CES bill had all been proposed by Morgenthau (the most important one being the principle of contribution, which took away the redistributive sting). And the final victory for Treasury and mild redistribution came with the removal of administrative responsibility from both Labor and Hopkins's FERA. Throughout all of this some public expressions of opinion were to be heard from the peak associations, but their efforts were mainly expended in the quieter proceedings in the bureaucracies. The Congress's role seems largely to have been one of ratifying agreements that arose out of the bureaucracies and the class agents represented there. Revisions attributable to Congress concerned such matters as exceptions in coverage, which are part of the distributive game that Congress plays at every opportunity. The *principle* of the Act was set in an interplay involving (quietly) top executives and business and labor leaders.

With only slight changes in the left-right positions of the participants, the same pattern has been observed in income tax decisions.[27] Professor Surrey notes: "The question, 'Who speaks for tax equity and tax fairness?,' is answered today largely in terms of only the Treasury Department" (p. 1164). "Thus, in tax bouts . . . it is the Treasury versus percentage legislation, the Treasury versus capital gains, the Treasury versus this constituent, the Treasury versus that private group. . . . As a consequence, the congressman . . . [sees] a dispute . . . only as a contest between a private group and a government department" (pp. 1165-66). Congress, says Surrey, "occupies the role of mediator between the tax views of the executive and the demands of the pressure

[27] Stanley S. Surrey, "The Congress and the Tax Lobbyist: How Special Tax Provisions Get Enacted," *Harvard Law Review*, LXX (May 1957), 1145-82.

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groups" (p. 1154). And when the tax issues "are at a major political level, as are tax rates or personal exemptions, then pressure groups, labor organizations, the Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the others, become concerned" (p. 1166). The "average congressman does not basically believe in the present income tax in the upper brackets" (p. 1150), but rather than touch the principle he deals in "special hardship" and "penalizing" and waits for decisions on principle to come from abroad. Amidst the 1954-1955 tax controversies, for example, Ways and Means members decided to allow each member one bill to be favorably reported if the bill met with unanimous agreement (p. 1157).

Issues that involve[28] redistribution cut closer than any others along class lines and activate interests in what are roughly class terms. If there is ever any cohesion within the peak associations, it occurs on redistributive issues, and their rhetoric suggests that they occupy themselves most of the time with these.[29] In a ten-year period just before and after, but not including, the war years, the Manufacturers' Association of Connecticut, for example, expressed itself overwhelmingly more often on redistributive than on any other types of issues.[30] Table 1 summarizes the pattern, showing that expressions on generalized issues involving basic relations between bourgeoisie and proletariat outnumbered expressions on regulation of business practices by 870 to 418, despite the larger number of issues in the latter category.[31] This pattern goes contrary to the one observed by Bauer, Pool, and Dexter in tariff politics, where they discovered, much to their surprise, that self-interest did not activate both "sides" equally. Rather, they found, the con-

[28] "Involve" may appear to be a weasel word, but it is used advisedly. As I argued earlier when defining redistribution, it is not the actual outcomes but the expectations as to what the outcomes *can be* that shape the issues and determine their politics. One of the important strategies in any controversial issue is to attempt to define it in redistributive terms in order to broaden the base of opposition or support.

[29] In personal conversations, Andrew Biemiller of AFL-CIO has observed that this is true even of his group. He estimates that perhaps from 80 to 90 per cent of their formal policy expressions deal with welfare and general rights of collective bargaining and that only occasionally does the central board touch specific regulatory issues.

[30] Robert E. Lane, *The Regulation of Businessmen* (New Haven 1953), 38ff.

[31] Note also in the table the fairly drastic contrast in the proportion of references that expressed approval. Similarly drastic differences are revealed in Lane's figures on the reasons given for expressing disapproval. On those issues I call redistributive, the overwhelmingly most important reason is "coerciveness." In contrast, this reason was given for about 10 per cent of general trade regulation and anti-trust references, 3 per cent of the basing-point negative references, and not once when Miller-Tydings and Robinson-Patman were denounced. For regulatory issues, the reason for disapproval given most frequently was that the policy was confused and that it failed to achieve its purposes. And there were equally high percentages of residual or "other" responses, suggesting a widespread lack of agreement as to the very meaning of the policy.

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TABLE 1. PUBLISHED EXPRESSIONS OF MANUFACTURERS' ASSOCIATION OF CONNECTICUT ON SELECTED ISSUES

	Number of References in Ten-year Period (1934-40, 1946-48)		*Per Cent of Favorable References*
1. Unspecified regulation	378		7.7%
2. Labor relations, general	297		0.0
3. Wages and hours	195		0.5
Total expressions, redistribution		870	
4. Trade practices	119		13.8
5. Robinson-Patman	103		18.4
6. Anti-trust	72		26.4
7. Basing points	55		20.0
8. Fair-trade (Miller-Tydings)	69		45.5
Total expressions, regulation		418	

SOURCE: Lane, *Regulation of Businessmen*, 38ff. The figures are his; their arrangement is mine.

creteness and specificity of protectionist interests activated them much more often and intensely than did the general, ideological position of the liberal-traders (pp. 192-93). This was true in tariff, as they say, because there the "structure of the communications system favored the propagation of particular demands" (p. 191). But there is also a structure of communications favoring generalized and ideological demands; this structure consists of the peak associations (which were seen as ineffective in tariffs—pp. 334, 335-36, 337-38, and 340); and it is highly effective when the issues are generalizable. This is the case consistently for redistributive issues, almost never for distributive issues, and only seldom for regulatory issues.

As the pluralists would argue, there will be a vast array of organized interests for any item on the policy agenda. But the relations among the interests and between them and government vary, and the nature of and conditions for this variation are what our political analyses should be concerned with. Let us say, in brief, that on Monday night the big associations meet in agreement and considerable cohesion on "the problem of government," the income tax, the Welfare State. On Tuesday, facing regulatory issues, the big associations break up into their constituent trade and other specialized groups, each prepared to deal with special problems in its own special ways, usually along subject-matter lines. On Wednesday night still another fission takes place as the pork barrel and the other forms of subsidy and policy patronage come under consideration. The parent groups and "catalytic groups" still exist, but by Wednesday night they have little identity. As

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Bauer, Pool, and Dexter would say, they have preserved their unanimity through overlapping memberships. They gain identity to the extent that they can define the issues in redistributive terms. And when interests in issues are more salient in sectoral or geographic or individual terms, the common or generalized factor will be lost in abstractness and diffuseness. This is what happened to the liberal trade groups in the tariff battles of the 1950's, when "the protectionist position was more firmly grounded in direct business considerations and . . . the liberal-trade position fitted better with the ideology of the times . . ." (p. 150).

Where the peak associations, led by elements of Mr. Mills's power elite, have reality, their resources and access are bound to affect power relations. Owing to their stability and the impasse (or equilibrium) in relations among broad classes of the entire society, the political structure of the redistributive arena seems to be highly stabilized, virtually institutionalized. Its stability, unlike that of the distributive arena, derives from shared interests. But in contrast to the regulatory arena, these shared interests are sufficiently stable and clear and consistent to provide the foundation for ideologies. Table 2 summarizes the hypothesized differences in political relationships drawn above.

Many of the other distinctive characteristics of this arena are related to, perhaps follow from, the special role of the peak associations. The cohesion of peak associations means that the special differences among related but competing groups are likely to be settled long before the policies reach the governmental agenda. In many respects the upper-class directors perform the functions in the redistributive arena that are performed by Congressional committees in the distributive arena and by committees and Congress in the regulatory arena. But the differences are crucial. In distributive policies there are as many "sides" as there are tariff items, bridges and dams to be built, parcels of public land to be given away or leased, and so on. And there are probably as many elites as there are Congressional committees and subcommittees which have jurisdiction over distributive policies. In redistribution, there will never be more than two sides and the sides are clear, stable, and consistent. Negotiation is possible, but only for the purpose of strengthening or softening the impact of redistribution. And there is probably one elite for each side. The elites do not correspond directly to bourgeoisie and proletariat; they are better understood under Wallace Sayre's designation of "money-providing" and "service-demanding" groups. Nonetheless, the basis for coalition is broad, and it centers around those individuals most respected and best known for worth and wealth. If the top leaders did not know each other and develop

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TABLE 2. ARENAS AND POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS: A DIAGRAMMATIC SUMMARY

Arena	*Primary Political Unit*	*Relation Among Units*	*Power Structure*	*Stability of Structure*	*Primary Decisional Locus*	*Implementation*
Distribution	Individual, firm, corporation	Log-rolling, mutual noninterference, uncommon interests	Nonconflictual elite with support groups	Stable	Congressional committee and/or agency**	Agency centralized to primary functional unit ("bureau")
*Regulation**	Group	"The coalition," shared subject-matter interest, bargaining	Pluralistic, multi-centered, "theory of balance"	Unstable	Congress, in classic role	Agency decentralized from center by "delegation," mixed control
Redistribution	Association	The "peak association," class, ideology	Conflictual elite, i.e., elite and counterelite	Stable	Executive and peak associations	Agency centralized toward top (above "bureau"), elaborate standards

* Given the multiplicity of organized interests in the regulatory arena, there are obviously many cases of successful log-rolling coalitions that resemble the coalitions prevailing in distributive politics. In this respect, the difference between the regulatory and the distributive arenas is thus one of degree. The *predominant* form of coalition in regulatory politics is deemed to be that of common or tangential interest. Although the difference is only one of degree, it is significant because this prevailing type of coalition makes the regulatory arena so much more unstable, unpredictable, and non-elitist ("balance of power"). When we turn to the redistributive arena, however, we find differences of principle in every sense of the word.

** Distributive politics tends to stabilize around an institutional unit. In most cases, it is the Congressional committee (or subcommittee). But in others, particularly in the Department of Agriculture, the focus is the agency or the agency *and* the committee. In the cities, this is the arena where machine domination continues, if machines were in control in the first place.

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common perspectives as a result of common schooling, as Mills would argue, these commonalities could easily develop later in life because the kinds of stakes involved in redistributive issues are always the same. So institutionalized does the conflict become that governmental bureaucracies themselves begin to reflect them, as do national party leaders and Administrations. Finally, just as the nature of redistributive policies influences politics towards the centralization and stabilization of conflict, so does it further influence the removal of decision-making from Congress. A decentralized and bargaining Congress can cumulate but it cannot balance, and redistributive policies require complex balancing on a very large scale. What Riker has said of budget-making applies here: ". . . legislative governments cannot endure a budget. Its finances must be totted up by party leaders in the legislature itself. In a complex fiscal system, however, haphazard legislative judgments cannot bring revenue into even rough alignment with supply. So budgeting is introduced—which transfers financial control to the budget maker. . . ."[32] Congress can provide exceptions to principles and it can implement those principles with elaborate standards of implementation as a condition for the concessions that money-providers will make. But the makers of principles of redistribution seem to be the holders of the "command posts."

None of this suggests a power elite such as Mills would have had us believe existed, but it does suggest a type of stable and continual conflict that can only be understood in class terms. The foundation upon which the social-stratification and power-elite school rested, especially when dealing with national power, was so conceptually weak and empirically unsupported that its critics were led to err in the opposite direction by denying the direct relevance of social and institutional positions and the probability of stable decision-making elites. But the relevance of that approach becomes stronger as the scope of its application is reduced and as the standards for identifying the scope are clarified. But this is equally true of the pluralist school and of those approaches based on a "politics of this-or-that policy."

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[32] William H. Riker, *Democracy in the United States* (New York 1953), 216.

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